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As the European Union is on track to meet its 2020 energy targets on raising the share of 
renewable energy and increasing the efficiency in the energy consumption, considerable 
attention has been given to the integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) into the 
restructured distribution system. This thesis proposes market-oriented operations of micro 
virtual power prosumers (µVPPs) in the distribution system operator framework, in which 
the µVPPs evolve from home-oriented energy management systems to price-taking 
prosumers and to price-making prosumers. Considering the diversity of the DERs installed 
in the residential sector, a configurable µVPP is proposed first to deliver multiple energy 
services using a fuzzy logic-based generic algorithm. By responding to the retail price 
dynamics and applying load control, the µVPP achieves considerable electricity bill savings, 
active utilisation of energy storage system and fast return on investment. As the µVPPs enter 
the distribution system market, they are modelled as price-takers in a two-settlement market 
first and a chance-constrained formulation is proposed to derive the bidding strategies. The 
obtained strategy demonstrates its ability to bring the µVPP maximum profit based on 
different composition of DERs and to maintain adequate supply capacity to meet the 
demand considering the volatile renewable generation and load forecast. Given the 
non-cooperative nature of the actual market, the µVPPs are transformed into price-makers 
and their market behaviours are studied in the context of electricity market equilibrium 
models. The resulted equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) are 
 
 
presented and solved using a novel application of coevolutionary approach. Compared with 
the roles of home-oriented energy management systems and price-taking prosumers, the 
µVPPs as price-making prosumers have an improved utilisation rate of the installed DER 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
1.1.1 Clean and Affordable Electricity Delivered in Distributed Pathways 
The 2020 climate and energy package, enacted in legislation in 2009 by European 
Commission, aims at achieving three key targets: a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions, a 20% share of renewable energy sources (RES) in energy consumption and a 20% 
reduction in energy consumption [1]. As one of the leaders in promoting decarbonisation in 
the energy industry, the UK shoulders a heavier responsibility to deliver 30% renewable 
electricity, 12% renewable heat and 10% renewable transportation by 2020 [2]. Since then 
the EU has been on track to meet each of its key targets and especially it has made 
substantial progress in cutting emissions. The share of RES in gross energy consumption 
and the reduction of energy consumption, on the other hand, stood at 16% and only 11%, 
respectively, in 2014 [3]. As we approach 2020, the data and estimations reported by the EU 
Member States indicate that the trajectories to meet the RES target and consumption 
reduction target become steeper. In the UK, the progress summarised in 2015 showed the 
country is three-quarters of the way towards its 30% electricity sub-target. However, the 
biggest challenge remained in decarbonising the heat and transportation sector, with the 
share of renewables stood at only 5.64% and 4.23%, respectively [4]. While the EU should 




Massive deployment of costly renewable projects is not the solution to boost its share in the 
energy mix [3]. Also, it is not preferable to sacrifice the comfort of consumers just to lower 
the level of energy consumption. The successful completion of the 2020 package is not 
marked by achieving a fixed improvement percentage but by establishing a cost-effective 
pathway towards a clean, affordable and sustainable energy future. 
More pronounced decrease in energy consumption was found in conserving the fossil fuels 
rather than electricity. From 1990 to 2014, the largest reduction in energy consumption was 
recorded for transport via inland waterways, rails and aviation, which resulted from the 
advances of fuel-efficiency technologies [5]. Electricity consumption, on the other hand, 
rose in most of the EU Member States during the 10-year period from 2004 to 2014 [6]. 
Among the three dominant sectors of electricity consumption, residential consumers stand at 
the third place with a large share of 24.8% and it follows the consumption of industry 
(25.9%) closely [5]. Although the growing electrification of heating and cars in the 
residential sector has gradually substituted fuel-powered appliances, its savings of fossil 
resources could be largely offset by the consequent rising demand in electricity. As for the 
target of raising RES penetration level, the investment in residential sector is also less 
intensive. The data reported in 2015 has again showed that renewable electricity generation 
continues to be dominated by megawatt-scale generators that are owned by utilities and 
large investors [7]. In the UK, Scotland accounted for 34% of the country’s wind power 
output in 2015 and 96% of the capacity came from large onshore wind sites such as the 




just taken off, or is starting to exploit the territory of residential sector. Faced with rapid 
electrification of residential appliances and a schedule too tight for large-scale RES 
installation, it is a priority for EU to improve the efficiency of electricity consumption and 
to direct more investment into residential RES deployment. 
Residential RES is part of a wider resource category called distributed energy resources 
(DERs) shown in Fig. 1. DERs refer to small- to medium-scale (10 megawatts or less) 
energy resources that are connected to the low voltage distribution grids and located near the 
end-consumers. Four key categories of resources constitute DERs: 
 Dispatchable generators (DGs): power generators connected to distribution grids that 
can be dispatched at the request of grid operators or the owner of the generators. 
Typical DGs include cogeneration units, biomass plants and fuel cells. 
 




 Distributed RES: In contrast to dispatchable generation, distributed RES is a group of 
non-dispatchable generation technologies collected from fluctuating resources such as 
sunlight, wind, waves and geothermal heat. Typical distributed RES systems include 
small-scale photovoltaic systems and small-scale wind farms. 
 Energy storage systems (ESS): ESS are a collection of technologies used to store 
electrical energy and release at a later point of time. Typical ESS include batteries and 
flywheels. 
 Demand response (DR): DR programs are the changes in the electric consumption of 
end-users to provide upward regulation or downward regulation at the grid connection 
point, which can be viewed as a source of distributed energy. Compared with DGs and 
distributed RES, DR seeks to adjust the demand to create energy headroom instead of 
adjusting the supply. Typical DR programs involve active switching of controllable 
loads (or influenceable loads) and load shedding during peak demand period. 
To better exploit the potentials of DERs, the following updates should go hand in hand with 
the deployment of DER assets: an updated communication network capable of linking 
DERs with their decentralised control systems, which provides bi-directional pathways for 
weather-related generation/demand forecast, smart meter reading and real-time control 
signal; an updated paradigm of energy management systems (EMS) that is compatible to 
customisable portfolio of DER infrastructure, which improves energy efficiency and brings 
economic benefits through monitoring, control and optimisation; an updated market 




mitigates network challenges and offers better billing and invoicing services to 
end-consumers.  
The complete solution described above aims at integrating DERs rather than simply 
connecting them to the system. Faced with an increasing demand level, distribution network 
operators (DNOs) now have the alternative option of DER deployment instead of costly grid 
reinforcement. In addition to the increased headroom at the grid connection points, DERs 
also provide flexibility at both system level and local level. At system level, the DER 
flexibility can be utilised for balancing services, congestion management and meeting the 
system adequacy requirements. For instance, Germany has started a monthly auction from 
June 2013 to procure up to 3000MW of balancing reserves from flexible DR programs [10]. 
At local level, DER flexibility can be used by end-consumers to optimise their generation 
and consumption profiles thus improving the ability to meet their peak demand for 
electricity while reducing electricity bills. For instance, ESS are usually installed together 
with distributed RES to smooth out the intermittent output of the RES. Excess renewable 
generation during valley demand period could be stored and used later at peak demand 
times. Then the net load required by end-consumers becomes predictable and flat, reducing 
the electricity procurement during peak demand period which is often a period of high 
electricity prices. Based on the ESS market data collected from 2011 to 2017 in Germany, 
the number of battery-based ESS in 2020 is anticipated to triple its scale in 2016 as Fig. 2 
shows. The share of ESS on solar photovoltaic systems will rise dramatically from 33% to 









1.1.2 Opportunities and Challenges in DER Solutions 
The DER solutions, despite their inherent advantages of being near to the consumption, 
have also encountered challenges towards massive deployment. First and foremost, the lack 
of estimation tools makes it difficult for investors to decide the installed capacity of DERs. 
The impact of irrational decisions on capacity is less severe for RES such as solar PV 
systems and micro wind turbines, their weather-dependent properties help provide 
information for installation and they can always export the overproduction back to the utility 
grid at feed-in tariff (FIT). However, the charging and discharging behaviours of ESS 
depend entirely on the control paradigms and consequently ESS would suffer the most from 
irrational decisions on installed capacity. Oversized ESS lead to low utilisation of the rated 
capacity and inflict tremendous waste of the investment; undersized ESS are charged and 
discharged too often and therefore they would reach their specified cycle lifetime 
prematurely. The second barrier is the negative impact on electricity networks brought by 
high penetration level of distributed RES. The intermittent nature of residential renewable 
generation can potentially compromise system reliability by inflicting balancing challenges 
in distribution network [12]. Also, the consequent cost of voltage and frequency control in 
the presence of volatile RES may overshadow the savings from capacity release [13]. Faced 
with high upfront costs, there is an urgent need to develop cost-competitive, low-risk and 
stable-return business models for the deployment of DERs. For instance, the promotion of 
DR programs has encountered obstacles due to expensive initial costs and customers’ 




incentives for consumers to accept automation in home energy management, the 
unwillingness grows even stronger among low income and vulnerable consumers [14]. 
Additional challenges exist in reforming the current public interventions and effectively 
designing new ones for renewable energy subsidy schemes. Low level of FIT does not 
generate enough revenue for RES investors to reach break-even point. On the other hand, 
overcompensation in some subsidy schemes does not necessarily result in strong market 
growth because eventually the compensation costs are passed on to the end-consumers. As 
the RES technologies mature, the driving forces of the investment should shift gradually 
from guaranteed compensation levels determined by public authorities to the market prices 
[15]. The European Commission underlined the need to adjust public intervention to include 
DERs in the electricity market operation, stimulate self-sustainable business patterns, 
diminish the cost of support and ultimately end support. 
Despite the challenges stated above, DERs are still regarded as promising candidates to be 
of significant aid in the restructured electricity systems. Their negative impacts can be 
mitigated and their potentials can be better exploited in aggregated approaches such as 
microgrids (MGs) and virtual power plants (VPPs). The concept of MG is first proposed by 
the consortium for electric reliability technology solutions (CERTS) in 1999. MG is defined 
as an electricity distribution system containing loads and DERs that can be operated in a 
controlled, coordinated way either while connected to the main power network or while 
islanded [16]. The most distinguishing feature of MG is its ability to transfer smoothly from 




have enough capacity to support the local loads without importing any electricity from main 
grid. Unintentional islanding can occur when the main grid encounters faults or other 
unscheduled events. On the other hand, the islanding can also be intentionally executed due 
to network maintenance, power quality degradation in main grid or economic concerns. By 
reducing the dependence on the main grid, improved resiliency has been achieved which is 
recognised as the major perceived benefit of MGs. VPP is defined as a flexible 
representation of a portfolio of DERs. There are three unique characteristics that distinguish 
VPP from MG: firstly, the diversity of DERs aggregated by VPP lies not only in their 
different parameters but also in their different geographic locations. VPP creates a single 
operating profile from a composite of diverse DERs while incorporating the impact of the 
network constraints [17]. Secondly, VPP facilitates the trading of DER production in various 
energy markets and it offers a wider range of services to system operators. The ability to 
aggregate DERs in various locations makes it possible for VPP to enter either electricity 
wholesale market or retail market. Higher revenue can be generated from contracting DERs’ 
output and offering services such as balancing services and ancillary services. Finally, VPP 
solution relies heavily on the information and communications technology (ICT) to deal 
with huge volumes of DER information and market data. It is safe to conclude that VPP’s 
software infrastructure gives birth to its ability to allow any types of DERs from anywhere 
to trade energy in the open markets. VPP concept represents an internet of energy, tapping 





Many MG and VPP projects have been launched and successfully implemented in the 
European countries. In Portugal, a black start mechanism was designed specifically for 
microgrids to cope with blackouts. The project delivered a novel MG control and 
communication system that can achieve fast restart of low voltage networks with regulated 
voltage and frequency [18]. In Greece, the “More Microgrids” project proposed the 
standardisation of technical and commercial protocols for MG and investigated the 
integration of multi-microgrids [19]. The FENIX project – Flexible Electricity Networks to 
Integrate the expected energy evolution, has launched two large field deployments across 
UK and Spain to investigate the real-life implementation of VPP concept [20]. The project 
addressed the importance of a layered communication and control solution, as it should be 
able to deal with a comprehensive set of network use cases including normal and abnormal 
operations. Detailed analysis of the current UK and Spain markets was also conducted to 
demonstrate how the economics of wide-scale application of the VPP concepts into these 
markets would work out. At this point of DER integration, the authorities have come to 
realise the previous “fit and forget” approach has started to burden the electric power system 
with large enhancement costs and in turn impact the deployment rates of DERs adversely. 
The MG and VPP solutions counteract this problem by aggregating numerous and 
unmanaged DERs into a single and manageable profile that has similar characteristics to 
transmission connected generation. Then the aggregated DERs will gradually shoulder the 
same level of responsibilities of large conventional power plants and as a result, their 




urgent questions that need to be answered. 
Firstly, stronger incentives should be given to investors to procure DERs in the first place. 
On the one hand, innovations in the manufacture of DERs lead to the continuous decrease of 
upfront cost. The cost of residential PV systems is expected to decline 55% in 2020 
compared with historical price in 2010 and in 2030 the upfront cost will be only 30% of the 
cost in 2010 [22]. Also, the current high initial investment for ESS is predicted to drop 
20-30% annually and reaches a commercial/utility level at 2020 [23]. On the other hand, 
there is a lack of strong business cases to guarantee reasonable return on investment (ROI) 
and it is still unclear to investors what is the impact of different DER/RES on penetration 
levels. Secondly, the economic rationale should be explained when determining the role of 
aggregated DERs – intuitively MG solution is suitable for remote areas without reliable 
access to the main grid, but in urban areas it might bring more benefit to stretch the 
flexibility of DERs to act like VPPs. Compared with utility-scale DER owners, small 
residential investors are more vulnerable to the risks brought by ill-advised investment 
decisions. Hence, the research of DER solutions at this stage should dedicate its effort to 
develop technically sound control paradigms, restructure the current electricity systems, 





Back in 2001 when UK reformed its electricity market by introducing New Electricity 
Trading Arrangements (NETA), domestic consumers were encouraged to claim their savings 
by switching electricity supplier [24]. In 2016 there were already 4 million electricity 
consumers who switched their suppliers and received up to £200 savings on their electricity 
bills [25]. The valuable lesson from market reform also applies to the deployment of DER 
solutions, it is all about delivering what has been promised to consumers, stakeholders and 
system operators – reliable power supply, fast tracts to recoup the investment and 
restructured market frameworks to generate more value streams. 
The small-scale capacity of DERs and intermittency of RES make MGs/VPPs more 
vulnerable to shortage risks due to volatility in market prices, demand and generation 
compared with macrogrid. Therefore, it is critical to guarantee the reliability of power 
supply for MGs/VPPs, not from purchasing the balancing power from expensive spot 
market, but by dispatching their DER assets optimally and tapping into the flexibility of 
nearby MGs/VPPs. Risk hedging techniques should be incorporated into the energy 
management strategies to counter the risks brought by uncertainties. Secondly, the variety of 
DERs provides the opportunity to mix different categories of resources and measure how far 
these assets can be stretched to create value for both investors and customers. Beside 
significant reduction on electricity bills, extra revenue is expected from participating in the 




1.2 Research Focuses, Objectives and Contributions 
1.2.1 Research Focuses 
Considering the small-scale DER generation capacity and the residential level demand, this 
thesis proposes the concept of micro virtual power prosumer (µVPP) to include MGs and 
VPPs that are connected to the restructured distribution system. µVPP is defined as an 
extension to the MG concept and the DERs located within the µVPP have a capacity that 
can either cover part of the load or generate excess electricity to be consumed by other 
µVPPs. µVPP is considered as the fundamental building blocks of the MGs and VPPs and it 
has the following flexibilities: firstly, the DER capacity is not strictly required to satisfy the 
peak demand. µVPP can operate full-time in grid-connected mode and the ability to operate 
in islanded mode remains optional. The flexibility in µVPPs’ DER configuration provides 
the opportunity to investigate the impact brought by different levels of DER penetration and 
RES penetration. Secondly, µVPP has all the necessary ICT interfaces ready for entering the 
local energy-reserve markets, the flexibility to switch from a passive consumer to an active 
market participant helps establish the optimal business model for µVPP owners. By 
investigating the transformation of µVPPs’ role in the distribution system, the benefits to 
system operators and end-consumers are also identified. 
This thesis takes a structured approach to present different layers of the µVPP integration, 
depicting the evolution towards market-oriented µVPPs in the distribution system. The 




evolution of µVPPs, providing a hospitable market environment for the µVPPs to take root 
and blossom. The main research focal points are summarised as follows: 
Firstly, the control and optimisation paradigm of a configurable µVPP is studied in the 
context of providing managed energy services. The research is based on an exemplar µVPP 
designed, manufactured and deployed in Sweden by the joint endeavours of the University 
of Birmingham, E. ON UK and E. ON Sweden. The µVPP is equipped with solar PV 
systems, controllable loads (CLs), a scalable ESS and other critical household appliances, 
representing a typical residential community with a mix of DERs. The research focuses on 
designing a home energy management system (HEMS) to coordinate the interworking of 
various DER assets, establishing multiple energy services based on the different 
combinations of DERs and creating persuasive business cases that explain the economic 
rationale behind the selection of energy services. To facilitate the complex decision-making 
and satisfy the requirement for real-time control, this thesis firstly concentrates on 
developing a generic µVPP algorithm that accommodates all energy services and can be 
easily configured to achieve different optimisation goals. The metaheuristic control method 
– fuzzy logic control (FLC) is of interest to the first section because of its fast response, 
computational efficiency and compatibility for µVPP of any scale. 
Secondly, the thesis considers the possibility of the µVPP to enter the distribution level 
energy-reserve market and studies its behaviours as a market participant. With the high 
penetration level of intermittent RES and the small-scale generation capacity, the µVPP 




RES outputs. Therefore, the second focal point of the thesis is to derive the strategic 
proposition for a µVPP in terms of optimally dispatching its resources, mitigating the risks 
and maximising profits. A two-stage settlement market model and a stochastic, 
mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) formulation are used to capture the stochastic 
nature of the µVPP energy profile. The thesis then progresses to solve the following 
problems: how to achieve a good-quality approximation of uncertain generation, demand 
and prices without inflicting heavy computational burden; what is the method of choice to 
hedge against the risks under the two-stage stochastic modelling framework; what are the 
impacts brought by different penetration levels of DERs and RES and how will the rivals’ 
strategies affect the market behaviours. 
Thirdly, the role of µVPP is further evolved to an active price-making prosumer compared 
with the price-taker model used in the second part of the research. A novel active 
distribution system market is proposed where µVPPs compete with the traditional retailers 
in an oligopolistic environment. This section concentrates on building the market 
equilibrium model and incorporating the optimality of market clearing process into the 
optimisation of µVPPs’ individual profits. The third focal point is to accurately model the 
multi-leader-follower games in the proposed market structure, develop efficient algorithm to 
obtain good-quality equilibrium solution and address the impact of different market 
frameworks. When designing the algorithm to solve the equilibrium model, a 




1.2.2 Objectives  
Following the research focuses mentioned above, this thesis aims at achieving the following 
objectives: 
1. The first objective of the thesis is to present a pre-commercial µVPP with 
configurable and managed energy services. The proposed HEMS should be able to 
monitor and control various DERs on site and switch smoothly between different 
operation modes. These operation modes correspond to various optimisation goals 
such as maximising self-consumption, responding to price dynamics and applying 
load control, which are summarised and categorised as different energy services. The 
managed energy services are designed to bring reductions to the end-consumers’ 
electricity bills and generate revenue streams to µVPP owners. Considering the 
difference in µVPPs’ DER mix (i.e. µVPP can be characterised by the different types 
of DERs it owns) and the potential upscaling of DERs, the multiple energy services 
should be hosted in a generalised architecture and the switch between them should 
be achieved easily without any re-engineering in the code. 
2. The second objective of the thesis is to derive the bidding strategy of a price-taking 
µVPP when participating in a distribution level energy-reserve market. A 
chance-constrained two-stage stochastic formulation is proposed to maximise 
µVPP’s profit and guarantee the security of supply by controlling the loss of load 




µVPP’s bidding behaviours and profits brought by different penetration levels of 
DERs and RES, different uncertainty levels, the competition between rivals and the 
implementation of carbon tax policy. 
3. The third objective of the thesis is to present the equilibrium model of an active 
distribution system market where price-making µVPPs compete in a 
non-cooperative game, then a coevolutionary approach is proposed to derive the 
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the market operation. The maximisation of 
µVPPs’ individual profits is modelled as upper-level problems and the maximisation 
of the social welfare in the market clearing process is formulated as the lower-level 
problem. The proposed bilevel problem and the coevolutionary solution aim at 
considering the upper-level optimality and lower-level optimality simultaneously. 
The pure strategy NE obtained should demonstrate Pareto optimality, that is, no 
single µVPP can obtain a higher margin by deviating unilaterally from its pure 
strategy NE profile without decreasing the social welfare of the market. In addition, 
µVPPs’ performances under different market structures should be compared and the 
economic rationale behind the selection of an active distribution system market 
should be explained.        
To sum up, the first objective of the thesis is to design and implement a home-oriented 
µVPP that facilitates multiple energy services in a generic algorithmic architecture. 
End-consumers can receive significant savings on their electricity bills while the investors 




strategy for the µVPP to make profit when it enters the distribution system market as 
price-takers. The ability to meet the peak demand considering uncertainties in the operations 
can be guaranteed by controlling the loss of load. The third objective is to model an active 
distribution system market where multiple µVPPs compete as price-makers, and to solve the 
market equilibrium model using coevolutionary approach. The proposed market setup and 





The contributions of the thesis are threefold based on the research focuses and they are 
summarised as follows: 
Firstly, the thesis presents a configurable µVPP with managed energy services and the 
contributions are identified as: 
 The µVPP has gone through design, hardware/software construction, installation and 
finally it has been commissioned in an actual residential community, which would be a 
good reference for future industry developments on the subject.  
 The multiple energy services provided by the µVPP demonstrate various levels of 
energy and money savings from maximising the self-consumption, responding to price 
dynamics and applying load control, addressing the need to choose the right service to 
achieve higher asset utilisation and higher return on investment. 
 The detailed business model seizes the opportunity of declining ESS capital cost in 
recent years and proves the feasibility of massive market promotion of the proposed 
µVPP. 
Secondly, the thesis derives the bidding strategy of a µVPP from a chance-constrained 
two-stage stochastic formulation. The contributions are identified as: 
 µVPP is established as an active contributor of a distribution level energy-reserve pool. 
The value stream is described elaborately to justify the motivation of the µVPP. 




applied to reduce the number of RES generation and load scenarios. The obtained 
scenario subset is an accurate approximation of the initial data sample while reducing 
the computation time considerably. 
 Compared with the classical Monte Carlo recourse method, the proposed 
chance-constrained formulation produces a less conservative bidding strategy which 
leads to higher profit and controls the load loss under expected level. 
 The system formulation could be used to assess the impact brought by reducing forecast 
errors, relaxing loss of load tolerance and implementing carbon tax. The thesis argues 
that the additional profit brought by relaxing the LOLP is only significant for the 
µVPPs with large share of dispatchable generators, while more accurate load forecast is 
beneficial to all µVPPs with different DER capacity allocations. 
Thirdly, the thesis presents a novel active distribution system market framework that 
facilitates the trading among µVPPs in the energy and reserve markets. The market 
equilibrium problem is formulated as bilevel equilibrium problems with equilibrium 
constraints (EPEC) where the upper-level problem aims at maximising each µVPP’s profit 
and the lower-level problem aims at maximising the social welfare in the market clearing 
stage. A novel coevolutionary approach is proposed in the thesis to find the pure strategy NE 
of the market. The main contributions are identified as follows: 
 An active distribution system market framework is established to better utilise the 
emerging µVPPs. The potential of their DERs are optimally exploited to contribute to 




 The joint operation of the energy and reserve markets is formulated as bilevel EPEC 
combining the optimality conditions of all upper-level problems. Also, the dual role of 
µVPP as either “producer” or “consumer” and their heterogeneous DER assets are 
addressed. 
 To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the first attempt to utilise coevolutionary 
approach to derive pure strategy NE in an active distribution system market. Compared 
with conventional methods, the proposed coevolutionary approach demonstrates its 
effectiveness when handling nonlinear market model and renders pure strategy NE 
under strict convergence criteria. 
 The thesis argues that an active distribution system market structure is more beneficial 
to the µVPPs as the price-maker position leads to better utilisation of DERs and higher 
profit compared with that of pure MG. In addition, the price-maker role can guarantee 




1.3 Thesis Outlines 
The rest of the thesis is organised based on the research focuses and the content of each 
chapter is summarised as follows: 
Chapter 2: a literature review is carried out to identify and evaluate the available literature in 
the subject area of the research focuses. This chapter summarises prior research efforts and 
establishes the links between them and the proposed study. Also, the gaps in current 
knowledge are identified to address the contributions of the thesis. 
Chapter 3: A configurable µVPP with managed energy services is presented in this chapter. 
The system infrastructure of the µVPP is presented, followed by the illustration of multiple 
energy services and the business model of the µVPP. Then a generic µVPP algorithm 
embedded on the HEMS is presented with case studies demonstrating different levels of 
optimisation effects by switching between energy services. 
Chapter 4: A two-stage chance-constrained stochastic optimisation is presented in this 
chapter to derive the bidding strategy of the µVPP in the local energy-reserve pool. The 
market structure and the business model are illustrated first, then the two-stage 
chance-constrained formulation is presented. In the case studies, the interrelation between 
µVPP design and its projected profit is addressed. Chance-constrained method and the 
Monte Carlo recourse method are compared in terms of their risk-hedging abilities. Finally, 





Chapter 5: This chapter presents the bilevel EPEC formulation of an active distribution 
system market and proposes a coevolutionary approach to find the pure strategy NE of the 
equilibrium model effectively. Firstly, three market frameworks including the current 
distribution system market, a passive distribution system market and an active distribution 
system market and their differences are illustrated. Then the proposed active distribution 
market is modelled as a bilevel EPEC optimisation, followed by the presentation and 
application of a coevolutionary computation approach to find the pure strategy NE solution. 
In case studies, the effectiveness of the proposed coevolutionary approach in finding the 
equilibrium is demonstrated. Also, µVPP’s performance under three types of market 
frameworks is evaluated. 
Chapter 6: The research is concluded and the key findings are addressed in this chapter. The 
future research topics which could add to the body of knowledge are also included. 
The main research work is presented in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 which 
corresponds to the three research focuses respectively. Chapter 3 depicts the infrastructure 
of a µVPP elaborately, addressing its role and beneficiaries in the optimisation of local 
power flow. Chapter 4 incorporates the µVPP in a distribution level energy and reserve 
market, analyses their bidding behaviours as price-takers. Chapter 5 further evolves the 
µVPP as a price-maker and considers the competition of an active distribution system 




CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review that covers the three research focuses of this 
thesis. Firstly, the current development of home energy management systems (HEMS) is 
reviewed. Secondly, the existing studies about the bidding strategies of the MGs and VPPs 
are critically evaluated in terms of market participation, modelling of the market behaviour 
and the hedging methods against risks. Thirdly, an overview is provided for the construction 
of active distribution systems, the application of market equilibrium models and the solution 
techniques for the equilibrium problems. 
2.2 Overview of the Development of HEMS 
The main driving force of introducing the HEMS is that households, being the second 
largest sector in dominant energy use, is faced with a continuous energy price rise. HEMS 
monitor the energy consumption, manage the appliances automatically and help keep the 
domestic electricity cost in check. When using the human body metaphor to describe a 
µVPP, various DERs constitute the limbs, ICT infrastructures function as the nervous 
system and the HEMS is the brain to perform monitoring and control. 
2.2.1 Definitions, Architectures and Functions of HEMS 




hardware that monitor and control single energy end-use systems; to monitoring devices that 
track multiple DERs allocated in a building or a residential community; to platforms that 
only rely on software tools which tap into the consumer data, building characteristics and 
geographic location information to conduct sophisticated data analysis and yield schedules 
to guide the operation of appliances [26]. HEMS belong to a broader category of energy 
feedback programs, in which the energy information from the supply and/or the demand 
side is pooled together and cost-saving opportunities are identified after analysing the data. 
HEMS originate from the computer-aided tools used by operators of electric utility grids to 
monitor, control and optimise the performance of the generation, transmission and 
distribution systems. In 1988, J. L. Ryan was among the first to become aware of home 
automation, which uses interactive communications to monitor and control household 
appliances [27]. Interestingly, he accurately predicted the trends of the development process 
for HEMS: “it could begin as a set of lighting controllers, then proceeds to the heating 
sector and finally these islanded devices merge to form a larger system.” With the 
decentralisation of the once vertically integrated electricity systems and the emergency of 
DERs, energy suppliers, private investors and end-consumers are gradually gaining access 
to energy management systems and HEMS are developed to suit domestic sectors. The 
hardware and software HEMS units shipped in 2017 are expected to triple the level in 2010 
across Europe as shown in Fig. 3. Despite the dropping retail prices of HEMS, the market 
revenue is estimated to reach $ 2.01 billion in 2018 compared with the $ 1.14 billion in 2013. 




provided a wider platform for HEMS. Under the IoT framework, HEMS will have the 
potential to expand its definitions beyond energy management and tap into other functions 
such as access, surveillance, fire detection, and so on [28].  
 
Fig. 3 Total HEMS and BEMS market in Europe [29] 
Two crucial components constitute HEMS: a central processing unit (CPU) to host control 
algorithms and a wireless-based home area network (WHAN) to facilitate the two-way 
communication between various appliances and the CPU. By utilising a wireless-based 
network, the rewiring need could be reduced to minimum which makes HEMS 
cost-effective and nonintrusive to residential consumers. Also, a wireless-based network 
provides the flexibility to upscale the HEMS by adding new appliance nodes or to 




protocols such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and ZigBee have already been applied in developing the 
WHAN for HEMS. In [31], a Bluetooth-based HEMS solution was proposed to reduce 
consumers’ peak demand and bring energy savings. In [32], ZigBee-based WHAM was used 
to aggregate the energy data from numerous household appliances, compare them, and 
create useful statistical analysis to minimise the energy cost. Compared with Bluetooth, 
ZigBee shows a much bigger potential in becoming the industry standard of HEMS. ZigBee 
supports a wider operation range from 10 to 100 metres, and can be upgraded to up to 400 
metres if multiple households are managed together; ZigBee can accommodate as many as 
65000 devices in a single network, making it extremely scalable in building solutions and 
community solutions; ZigBee has been developed specifically to permit low power 
consumption instead of being constantly alert like Bluetooth devices, addressing the energy 
management issue in the ICT infrastructure itself; last but not least, the protocol uses a 128 
bit encryption and a user-definable application layer, which increases the security and 
flexibility of the network for HEMS [33]. 
The WHAN in the HEMS topology is made up of three layers and they are summarised as 
follows [34]: 
 Physical layer: the transceivers known as smart meters and smart controllers installed in 
the electrical outlets or directly integrated into the controllable appliances. 
 Middleware layer: the WHAN servers that collect, concentrate and forward data from 
DERs/appliances to the CPU. 




access to the consumption information and the authority to change system 
configurations. 
The overall objective of HEMS is to reduce consumers’ energy bills by optimising their 
consumption. The function of HEMS, however, evolves from monitoring the energy use of a 
single connection point, to coordinating multiple DERs in the same residential area, and 
finally to a more systematic decision-making concerning the electricity tariff schemes, 
weather forecasts and the impact on distribution networks. Many HEMS designs have been 
proposed in [32, 35-38]. An intelligent HEMS architecture proposed in [32] established the 
information pathways between household micro-generation and consumption. Estimated 
renewable generation data was collected and used to schedule appliances. In [35], ESS in 
the form of stationary batteries was incorporated into the DER mix and its 
charging/discharging activities were designed to serve those appliances with high priority 
and the simulation results showed further reduction in the energy consumption. The 
deployment of utility scale ESS in the residential households also raises concerns for high 
initial investment and wasted system resources such as oversized battery capacity. While 
serving the purpose of reducing the electricity bills for end-consumers, only a few of the 
proposed HEMS took the stability of the distribution system into consideration. In DNO’s 
point of view, power peak-to-average ratio (PAR) is regarded as an important metric to 
describe the load patterns. In [36], HEMS were designed to tap into the real-time pricing 
mechanism and alleviate the PAR. The proposed algorithm was designed not only to 




load in those valley price periods. In recent years, the landscape in which ESS is dedicated 
to a single household has changed and a shared ESS paradigm becomes the trend. In [37, 
38], an ESS was shared by multiple households as the means to compensate peak demands 
and provide backup power during outages. However, both designs lacked the evidence of an 
optimised local power flow where the surplus power from micro-generation can be 
immediately redistributed to supply those with demand. 
Only a few of the HEMS designs were demonstrated on hardware testbeds and the testbeds 
were developed only for the demonstration of basic concepts. In [39], a Wi-Fi based HEMS 
was designed to respond to dynamic pricing and the main focus was to establish 
comprehensive communication interfaces. In [40], a ZigBee-based HEMS was presented for 
DR applications with majority of the work being done in developing load controllers. 
Similarly, a showcase was presented in [41] to demonstrate the control of air conditioning 
by a Wi-Fi enabled thermostat. The ICT electronics were fully constructed in the works 
above but consumer loads were often simulated simply using high-wattage light bulbs or 
hair dryers, not to mention the absence of RES and DER in the testbed setup. With the 
merging incentive policies for smart household energy renovations and funding filtering 
down to support the establishment of pilot projects, there is a pressing need to move on from 
laboratory display towards industrial implementation, to include the full asset portfolio of a 
smart energy community and to explore the viability of business models that creates 




2.2.2 Application of MILP and FLC in HEMS 
As smart controllers are gradually replacing the outdated timer switches for domestic 
appliances such as electric heat pumps (eHeat Pumps) and boilers, the operation status of 
these appliances in the context of HEMS is treated as binary variable, representing ON or 
OFF status with their designated consumption power in each working interval. When 
designing control algorithm for HEMS, the optimisation problem with both binary and 
continuous variables was often addressed as a MILP by many previous works. In [42], a 
MILP-based demand response strategy was proposed to utilise electric vehicles (EVs) as 
bi-directional storage systems in smart homes. However, the investigation was conducted 
under the assumption that the EV user preferences and driving behaviours were known 
perfectly before each optimisation horizon. And the results showed that the robustness of the 
decision sets was highly influenced by the accuracy of user behaviours. To produce reliable 
real-time control signals, various risk-hedging methods were adopted by the MILP approach 
to mitigate the negative impact brought by uncertainties. In [43], the Monte Carlo 
simulations and scenario reduction techniques were applied under MILP framework in order 
to minimise the risks associated with uncertain real-time electricity prices. Considering the 
time-consuming characteristic of the Monte Carlo simulations and the rigid requirement of 
real-time signals, [43] made the compromise to reduce stochastic scenarios down to single 
digits so decisions can be delivered for every 5 minutes. In [44], a MILP-based EMS was 
introduced and a rolling horizon strategy was applied to mitigate negative impacts 




embedded in the EMS or it may take the form of external forecasting services. Either way 
the forecast cost is not negligible to the total investment, especially if the forecast horizon is 
required to be distant and the resolution should be high. Apart from the struggle in 
delivering good-quality real-time decisions and to obtain accurate but cheap forecast data, 
MILP becomes complex when the HEMS are scaled up and more appliances are involved. 
Due to the non-deterministic polynomial-time hardness (NP-hardness) of the MILP 
approach, the computational burden grows significant with an increasing number of binary 
variables [46]. In addition, the application of the MILP approach in HEMS means that the 
objective function must be executed every 3-5 minutes with all the relevant constraints 
considered. Any changes in the µVPP configurations, including the installation and removal 
of DERs, will lead to the re-engineering of the software and disadvantages in the view of a 
diversified customer group. 
Compared with the classical MILP optimisation approach, metaheuristic methods have a 
good reputation in dealing with automated systems with model uncertainty and complex 
decisions. The context-independent property of metaheuristic methods allows them to work 
and solve several course timetabling problems without using any explicit constraints. If 
there exists a change in the system inputs or parameters, the researcher does not need to 
invest time and effort to construct a new solution algorithm [47]. Among them, fuzzy logic 
control (FLC) method is of interest in this thesis for the development of HEMS. HEMS as a 
multi-agent system has various DERs and a constant need to expand and involve more 




response for HEMS to derive the control signals for each agent in parallel. FLC is defined as 
a set of linguistic control rules which capture the approximate, inexact nature of the real 
word decision-making process and convert the linguistic inference based on expert 
knowledge into an automatic control strategy [48]. Unlike classical control strategy, FLC 
resembles the inference process of human being in which fuzzy or ambiguous answers are 
often involved. FLC was firstly proposed by Professor L. A. Zadeh back in 1965 and in his 
work a fuzzy set was defined as a “class” with a continuum grades of membership [49]. In 
the notion of a classical set, the object lies within a given range with a sharp boundary 
which means the object can either belong to the set or not belong to the set (point-to-point 
inference). In a fuzzy set, however, an object corresponds to a broader degree of 
memberships and the boundary becomes smooth. The mapping of the members of the set is 
no longer black-and-white but becomes tolerant to ambiguity that a member can belong to a 
set to some partial degree (range-to-point or range-to-range inference). In [50], the 
difference between a classical set and a fuzzy set was clarified using a temperature example 
as follows: 
 




In a classical set, temperatures ranging from 0 °F to 120 °F are strictly categorised as “Low”, 
“Medium” and “High” in Fig. 4(a). In the fuzzy set shown in Fig. 4(b), one temperature 
reading can belong to multiple subsets at the same time. For example, temperature 50 °F can 
belong to “Low” and “High” simultaneously, but at a very low degree of 0.2. When 
considering it as a member of the “Medium” subset, the degree is almost 1. The advantage 
of a vague set is to avoid premature and arbitrary decisions, combine all sources of input 
and make well-informed judgement. Professor Zadeh pointed out that FLC has the potential 
to be applied to a wider scope, particularly in the fields of pattern recognition and 
information processing [49].  
The implementation of FLC consists of the following steps: 
Step 1) Fuzzification: the crisp data is converted into fuzzy data or membership functions 
(MFs). 
Step 2) Fuzzy inference: the membership functions of all inputs are combined to derive the 
fuzzy output based on the inference rules. 
Step 3) Defuzzification: the fuzzy output is converted back to its crisp format using a 
lookup table. 
The FLC has drawn the attention of HEMS development. In [51], a multi-agent, FLC-based 
EMS was proposed to address the suitability of FLC as the control scheme. The hybrid 
system was not controlled as a global system but rather as a cluster of independent entities 
that collaborate with each other. A multi-agent system architecture matched FLC’s quick 




FLC’s ability to let the system work without perturbation. In [52], a battery auxiliary power 
unit was designed based on FLC and the proposed system could be easily retrofitted for a 
wide range of DERs by identifying device-specific input variables and determining the 
corresponding human expertise rules. The adoption of FLC in MG development was further 
addressed in [53], where conclusions were drawn that FLC can not only encompass 
subjective decision-making process but also fit the plug-and-play concept to achieve low 
cost expansion for residential solutions. Three control approaches namely MILP, continuous 
relaxation (CR) and FLC were compared in terms of cost optimisation, computational 
efficiency and implementation [54]. The comparative study pointed out the MILP and CR 
approaches consume much more computational resources with insignificant contribution to 
the accuracy of optimisation results. To sum up, the FLC approach surpasses classical 
optimisation counterparts from a practical point of view: it does not need forecast 
information nor extra efforts in mitigating the risks brought by uncertainty; secondly, it does 
not consume large computational resource and hence can be accommodated on low cost 
CPUs. Furthermore, it provides compatibility for appliance clusters of any category and 
scale without dramatically increasing the processing time. Finally, the credit should be given 
to the quality of the decisions obtained by FLC. The FLC decision sets are, if not the most 
optimal for all times, at a very satisfactory level towards the optimisation goal and obtained 




2.3 Overview of the Bidding Strategies for MGs and VPPs 
The introduction of power brokerage and electricity auction markets was considered as a 
key step in the deregulation of electric utility industry when the reform started around 1986 
[55]. Different from the central dispatching scheme, generation companies in the auction 
markets need to compete against each other by marketing their product. The conventional 
rate-of-return regulation pricing would be replaced by market pricing in the competitive 
regime. With the emergence of MGs and VPPs, the concept of auction markets has been 
extended to distribution system level and it is crucial for MGs and VPPs to position 
themselves correctly in the markets considering their own strengths and weaknesses. 
2.3.1 Electricity Auction Markets 
The electricity auction markets consist of many producers and consumers and they are 
managed by a market operator (MO). Electricity producers submit a set of energy blocks 
and their corresponding prices to the market for profit maximisation. The constraints that 
generation companies comply to include the fuel costs, generation capacities, ramping limits 
and minimum up/down time, etc. The incorporation of the consumers in the auction process 
defines the market regime as “double-sided auction”, which has been demonstrated to be 
more efficient and competitive than producer-only auctions [56]. The consumers often 
appear in the wholesale electricity market as large load serving entities (LSEs), submitting a 
pair of demand blocks and their purchasing prices for cost minimisation [57]. The main 





 The bidding strategy should secure the energy supply required by the end-consumers, 
which is the first and foremost task of LSEs. 
 The bidding strategy should allocate the energy purchase in the day-ahead market as 
much as possible, given the lower average price than the real-time market. 
 The bidding strategy should include hedging methods against the risks brought by any 
volatility in the real-time operation. 
After receiving the energy bids/offers from both producers and consumers, the MO clears 
the market by releasing the market clearing price (MCP), the power production of every 
offering generation block and the consumption level of every demand bidding block [58]. 
The decisions are broadcasted for every hour of the market horizon and the target is to 
maximise the social welfare. There are two types of price settlement, namely the first-price 
rule and the second-price rule, which determine at what rate the winners should pay or 
receive for their bids [59]. The first-price rule is also known as “pay-as-bid” auction, where 
bidders pay and suppliers receive at the price equal to their individual bids. The 
second-price rule is known as “uniform-price” auction as oppose to the discriminatory 
nature of the “pay-as-bid” auction. Under the second-price rule, winners are paid or charged 
at the price of the first losing bid or equivalently the price of the last accepted bid. The 
mechanism of the second-price rule is depicted in Fig. 5. The supply offers are aggregated 
and sorted by price in ascending order to create the aggregated supply curve. If the demand 




MCP that prices the transactions. On the other hand, if the demand bidding is included in a 
double-sided auction, the demand bids are also aggregated but sorted by price in descending 
order to create the aggregated demand curve. The intersection of both curves is identified as 
the MCP.  
 
Fig. 5 Second-price rule mechanism [60] 
Analysis of the efficiency of the first-price rule and the second-price rule was performed in 
the England and Wales electricity pool market [61]. The results showed that small agents are 
at a clear disadvantage to the large agents in the first-price auctions, when it comes to the 
knowledge of the market trends. The results also showed that the imbalance could be 
mitigated under the second-price settlement because all agents, regardless of their sizes, 
receive the benefit of a collective decision. However, the disadvantages grow far more 
severe if MGs and VPPs are introduced to the electricity wholesale market. Lacking the 
same market power of those large agents, MGs/VPPs would have small influences on the 
market clearing results and sometimes be forced to submit zero energy supply offers to 




imperative for MGs and VPPs to compete with entities of their own sizes. The current 





2.3.2 Modelling of the Bidding Behaviours  
Previous works have designed a two-stage market consisting of a day-ahead (DA) market 
and a real-time balancing (RT) market for MGs and VPPs. In the DA market, MGs/VPPs 
coordinate their energy production and consumption based on the forecasted information. 
Then the RT market follows to clear up the unbalanced power left in the DA settlement or 
caused by unforeseen events, such as over and underproduction by RES [62]. In [63] and 
[64], the basic function of MGs and VPPs as energy market participants was described in 
the buying or selling of electricity. However, MGs and VPPs are more vulnerable to 
shortage risks due to the volatility in market prices, demand and generation output 
compared with Macrogrid. If they practice as sole electricity market players, the only 
hedging method against shortage risk is to purchase from grid at spot prices, which can be 
quite high at times of peak load [62, 65]. Thus, references [66-68] suggested that MGs and 
VPPs should contribute to the equilibrium of a joint energy and reserve market. The 
generation capacity of MGs/VPPs is required to not only relieve possible network 
congestions within themselves, but also transfer energy to the nearby feeders of the 
distribution network when necessary. Also, the small-scale MGs/VPPs participating in the 
electricity auction markets were modelled as price-takers in [62-64, 69], which corresponds 
to the arguments in section 2.3.1 that small agents lack the market power to influence the 
MCP. Their bids and offers consist of only quantity to be traded which respond to volatile 




The bidding behaviour of MGs/VPPs could be modelled as a deterministic linear 
programming problem with linear fuel cost for dispatchable generator in [53, 70, 71]. An 
approach to account for the uncertainties by using the deterministic model was described in 
[72], where the DA plans were made based on a more accurate quasi real-time status of 
generation and load profiles. To better address the considerable impact of the uncertainties 
on the economic rationale and technical viability of MGs/VPPs, stochastic models were 
applied in [73-78]. In [74], a stochastic energy scheduling solution was proposed and an 
iterative method was adopted to minimise the expected loss from the intermittent RES. 
However, the iterative search method could lead to a premature convergence to local 
optimums. In [75], the fluctuations in the generation and demand were often assumed to 
follow a normal distribution and adequate number of scenarios were generated to form the 
uncertain profile. In [76], the optimal offering strategy of a large-scale VPP was proposed 
and the uncertainty of its rivals’ strategies was considered besides the intermittent 
generation and consumption. Faced with a multi-period scheduling scheme and potentially 
thousands of scenarios, reference [77] addressed the necessity to apply scenario reduction 
techniques and improve the computational efficiency. While references [74-77] identified 
the amount of the electricity to be purchased from and sold to utility grid and commitment 
of DERs that serve their optimisation purposes, they lacked concerns for the reserve 
flexibilities. The reserve requirement was settled as a fixed percentage of the load in [73], of 
which the percentage itself was difficult to determine. A modified approach was proposed in 




resource in the works above was not contributing to the other participants of the reserve 




2.3.3 Risk-hedging Methods to Cope with Uncertainties 
The integration of RES into the European electricity market has not been the smoothest ride 
by far. In Spain, for instance, RES and cogeneration facilities were not obligated to sell their 
production in the market but receive a remuneration based on administrative premiums. The 
difficult-to-predict nature of the RES made the system operator obligated for a greater 
spinning and supplemental energy reserves, to balance the errors between the estimated RES 
output and the actual production [79]. The impact of volatile electricity prices in the RT 
market was addressed in [80], combining with the variation in the quantity, the volatility 
could lead to considerable financial burdens on the bidders. The risks associated with the 
production scheduling are the unexpected deviations from DA schedules caused by RT 
uncertainties. The risks include but are not limited to renewable generation curtailment, 
involuntary disconnection of load, failure to deliver the offering capacity and loss of 
revenue (known as value at risk). These risks are often assessed based on the probability of 
their occurrence. Under the circumstances, futures contract was introduced as a financial 
tool to mitigate the risks for µVPPs. The futures contract is defined as a legally binding 
agreement made between two parties to buy or sell a commodity or financial instrument, at 
an agreed price, on a specified date in the future delivery date [81]. However, the difficulties 
in determining the terms and conditions of the financial contracts were also recognised and 
risk management should be incorporated in the production scheduling. 




scheduling problems. A Monte Carlo recourse method was introduced in [82] to work with 
the deterministic optimisation to increase the reliability of the solution. Monte Carlo 
sampling is one of a broad class of computational methods that rely on repeated random 
sampling to define a domain of uncertain inputs that have a probabilistic interpretation. In 
the proposed paradigm above, the decision variables involved in the deterministic 
optimisation stage were determined firstly before the realisation of randomness in the 
problem. Then sampling techniques such as the Monte Carlo sampling were applied to 
“recourse” the deterministic decisions and make them less vulnerable to uncertainty risks. 
References [63, 83, 84] utilised robust optimisation to construct a solution that is 
deterministically immune to any realisation of the uncertainty in the given set. Conditional 
value at risk (CVaR) was introduced as a risk management scheme in [76, 77, 85] to control 
the trade-off between the expected economic profit and the variability caused by uncertain 
components. Like the robust optimisation and the CVaR, chance-constrained optimisation 
was introduced as a reliable solution to stochastic optimisation problems. In the 
chance-constrained optimisation, some constraints can be relaxed with a predefined small 
level of probability, or must be satisfied with a high level of probability. The concept of 
chance-constrained programming was proposed firstly by Charnes and Cooper in 1959 [86]. 
Under the stochastic programming framework, it was pointed out that the decisions obtained 
may not satisfy the constraints rigorously, but the probability of them satisfying the 
constraints can be controlled at a confident level. By applying the chance-constrained 














where X is an n dimensional vector to be determined, A and b are random coefficients and
α is the confidence level that the first constraint should satisfy. The confidence level here 
means that the probability of the value of AX being lower than or equal to b should be at 
least α . 
The early application of the chance-constrained method was found in the unit commitment 
problems which consider uncertain demand and random outages of power system 
components [87, 88]. In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in utilising 
chance-constrained optimisation due to the rising penetration level of RES. A 
chance-constrained optimal power flow (OPF) algorithm was proposed in [89] to distribute 
both RES generation and regulation in a manner that saves operational costs and yields 
better technical performance. In [90], the possibility of changing transmission network 
topology was explored to keep raising wind penetration without jeopardising grid security 
and reliability. In the transmission switching program, chance constraints were applied to 
ensure that the wind energy utilisation exceeds a satisfactory level for most of the times. In 
[91], a chance-constrained solution was proposed for unit commitment problems with wind 
integration. Three potential negative impacts brought by intermittent wind generation were 
modelled as chance constraints, namely the loss of load probability, the loss of wind 
probability and transmission line overloading probability, aiming at improving the reliability 




the author’s knowledge, applications of the chance-constrained optimisation in deriving the 
µVPPs’ bidding strategy has not been discussed yet. The uniqueness of the application is 
twofold: firstly, µVPPs are connected to the distribution system and have limited generation 
capacities. Conservative strategies based on worst-case-scenario could lead to insufficient 
offering capacity and therefore low income from participating in the market. Secondly, 
µVPPs are responsible for satisfying the peak demand of their end-consumers and the 
probability of involuntary loss of load should be guaranteed to be very low. In some cases, a 
producer µVPP could be reconfigured and becomes consumer µVPP to meet the internal 
demand. 
Compared with the proposed chance-constrained method, robust optimisation can be too 
conservative with its worst-case-oriented decisions [92]. Although the CVaR method is a 
similar probabilistic risk measure, it only controls the variability indirectly in financial terms. 
On the other hand, the proposed chance-constrained method interacts directly with the 
uncertainties in the actual physical system such as loss of load probability (LOLP). LOLP is 
the likelihood of involuntary load disconnection occurring due to the disruption in power 
supply. Based on the risk-preparedness regulation issued by the European Parliament, 95% 




2.4 Overview of Distribution System Market with Equilibrium 
Model 
It has been more than ten years since the electricity retail markets were liberalised, evident 
barriers to entry remain for small suppliers still. It is hard for small suppliers to secure 
contracts of small quantity to match their load profile, for the long duration they are seeking 
and at a price that is competitive with the large vertically integrated suppliers [93]. Another 
prominent barrier is the expectation of low or even negative margins for small-scale 
retail-only business. In contrast, such as in the UK retail market, the six large suppliers 
continue to dominate the electricity retail segments with a combined market shares of 85% 
[25]. However, their consumers have not experienced significant price reductions while the 
consumption level continues to rise from 2012 to 2016, resulting in high electricity bills.  
In recent years, there is a growing trend to introduce MGs and VPPs as new entries into the 
electricity retail market and overcome the barriers mentioned above. MGs and VPPs’ access 
to supply is guaranteed by local distributed generation, they do not share the same level of 
reliance on wholesale market as their vertically integrated supplier counterparts. This should 
reduce losses in the transmission of wholesale electricity and potentially justify a reduction 
in the network charges that end-consumers pay [94]. Accordingly, the participation of MGs 





2.4.1 Active Distribution System and its Market Framework 
In the traditional and centralised electric power system, there are three almost independent 
subsystems including the generation system, the transmission system and the distribution 
system. The distribution system is defined as the system to distribute the electricity from 
generation facilities to individual end-consumers within a specific geographical area [95]. 
The manager of the distribution network, DNOs, own and operate the distribution network 
consisting of towers and cables that bring the electricity from the transmission network to 
homes, businesses and industries [96]. The emerging DERs could not isolate themselves 
from the traditional distribution system, and if they are integrated properly the following 
benefits could be brought to the distribution system [97]: 
 Electricity quality improvement: dynamic voltage support. 
 System reliability improvement: urgent power supply functions, local service 
restoration such as intentional islanding. 
 System efficiency improvement: self-consumption in local areas, loss reduction from 
the transmission and distribution. 
However, the traditional distribution system is faced with many limitations which may lead 
to significant deviations from what have been expected of DERs. “Fit-and-forget” is 
concerned as the most typical approach to install DERs, in which the dispatching and the 
monitoring of DERs are excluded from the daily operation of the distribution system. In 




distribution system. UK power networks is a DNO company that manages the distribution 
networks covering London, the South East and the East of England. In its “Flexible DG 
connection” scheme, the connection of the DERs is based on a “last-in-first-out” principle 
where each DER is assigned a position within the local priority stack [98]. When DERs 
apply for a connection in the area, they are given a position at the bottom of the priority 
stack and they will be curtailed first during a constraint event. The discriminatory agreement 
was determined considering the bigger picture of network stability, but it could demotivate 
the DER investors even with a seemingly profitable compensation scheme. 
Considering the small-scale generation capacity and the residential level demand, the 
concept of µVPP is proposed here to include MGs and VPPs that are connected to the 
restructured distribution system. µVPP is defined as an extension to the MG concept since 
the DERs located within the µVPP has a capacity that can either cover part of the load or 
generate excess electricity to be consumed by other µVPPs. To optimally exploit µVPPs’ 
potentials, the concept of active distribution system (ADS) has been brought forward. The 
International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) defined ADS as an unified system 
with some active control approaches for a combination of DERs including DGs, ESS and 
DR programs [99]. In the restructured ADS, the traditional DNOs are transformed to DSOs 
with added responsibilities [100]. 
A few works studied the trends and challenges in the implementation of ADS [101-103]. In 
[101], the technical and economic rationale of the ADS framework was further addressed as 




 Better TSO/DSO coordination: ADS has a better grasp of the generation and 
consumption information in the area, which in turn helps transmission system operators 
(TSOs) to make better judgements in terms of system balancing and security services. 
 Localised energy solution: DERs can provide local balancing and voltage control 
without affecting the upstream transmission system negatively and even help its 
operation. 
 Network investment reduction: ADS has a much wider range of network access options, 
which effectively reduces the reinforcement investment. 
Case studies were applied on a real UK distribution network and the results showed that the 
proposed ADS could accommodate high levels of RES penetration, reduce the deviations of 
dispatching schedules and become self-sufficient in terms of reserves. Reference [102] 
pointed out that the DERs in ADS could provide a wide range of ancillary services including 
reactive power consumption, asymmetry reduction and harmonic mitigation. Competent as 
the DERs are in the provision of energy services, the DER owners or the µVPPs may not 
utilise them if the incentives are shadowed by the operation costs. In addition, reference 
[103] addressed the urgent need to design a new market mechanism for the emerging ADS, 
which can involve the µVPPs in the electricity trading and generate value streams for them. 
The design of the new market framework for ADS should comply with two basic rules that 
were used to guide the decentralisation of European electricity market. The first rule is the 




single DSO operates the distribution network and owns the DERs at the same time, it may 
have an incentive to obstruct other DERs’ access to infrastructure. The second rule is to 
ensure non-discriminatory access to the network for all third parties of producers and 
consumers [105]. An active distribution system market (ADSM) should be constructed that 
mimics the wholesale auction market under the clearing pricing rule. µVPPs and traditional 
retailers as market participants tender supply and demand bid curves in the format of 
quantity and price bids. The DSOs then construct aggregated hourly supply and demand 
curves to determine market clearing prices as well as the corresponding supply and demand 
schedules [59]. The benefits of implementing such an auction market in ADS are shared by 
all market participants: for µVPP owners, the electricity generated from their DER assets 
now has the same market value as the electricity purchased from wholesale market [106]. 
µVPP owners are expected to receive a higher return on investment than the current low 
feed-in tariff [107]. For DSOs, the growing entries of µVPPs reduce the system operators’ 
exposure to the risk associated with the unpredictability of spot market prices and volatility 
in consumption patterns [108]. Ultimately for end-consumers, they pay at cheaper electricity 




2.4.2 Application of the Equilibrium Models in the Electricity Market 
The equilibrium of the market is defined as a state of the economic system where there are 
simultaneous equations for supply and demand. K. J. Arrow and G. Debreu were among the 
first to investigate and prove that the equilibrium state in competitive markets does have a 
solution [109]. The equilibrium models for economic systems were therefore developed to 
study the behaviour of supply, demand and prices in the markets, seeking for the 
equilibrium solutions from the interaction of supply and demand. To evaluate the quality of 
the equilibrium solutions, the concepts of Pareto optimality and Nash Equilibrium (NE) are 
introduced to characterise the effectiveness of the equilibrium. 
Pareto optimality has been widely applied to assess the efficiency of a market equilibrium 
[109]. Pareto optimality is a state of allocation of resources from which no redistribution can 
improve the position of one individual without marking at least one other individual worsen 
off. The mathematical representation of Pareto optimality was shown in [110]. The problem 
consists of N players that do not cooperate and each of the players i has a strategy set iX . 
The payoff function ( ),i i iF x x− of player i is associated not only with the strategy of the 
player itself but also with the strategies ix− formed by the rest of the players. With each 
player trying to minimise its payoff functions over the strategy set X , the equilibrium
x X∈ can be defined as a Pareto equilibrium if 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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where the inequality above must hold for a least one player. The concept of Nash 
Equilibrium (NE) is closely tied to the Pareto optimality but they are not equivalent. NE 
exists when the strategy is the player’s best response to the strategies of the opponents. 
Under the circumstance, no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the NE 
solution. The mathematical formulation of NE was presented in [111]. In the same 
noncooperative game that consists of N players, the strategy ix of each player belongs to a 
feasible set ( )i iX x− corresponding to the strategies of its rivals. The equilibrium is defined 
as NE if it satisfies the following condition: 
( ) ( ) ( ), , ,i i i i i i i i iF x x F x x x X x i− − −≤ ∈ ∀  
Considering the mathematical presentation of Pareto optimality and NE, conclusion can be 
drawn that NE is Pareto optimal if no other outcome could help some players without 
harming others at the same time. It is not guaranteed that a NE solution is Pareto optimal, 
such as the NE in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but NE provides strategically feasible solutions 
that could be applied in the industrial to guide the dispatching of resources.  
Finding the equilibrium of the active distribution system market described in section 2.4.1 is 
crucial. DSOs as the market managers use the equilibrium model to monitor and assess the 
market while the participants use the model to make strategic decisions on their bids and 
offers. The studies of electricity market are often performed using oligopolistic equilibrium 
models where there are limited number of participants. Popular models include the Bertrand 




equilibrium. Despite their different assumptions and applications, these equilibrium models 
all aim at solving the market equilibrium as an optimisation problem. The result of the 
optimisation includes a set of prices, generating power outputs, transmission line flows and 
load demand levels [112]. Among the equilibrium models, a noncooperative game-theoretic 
model such as Stackelberg equilibrium has demonstrated the following advantages [113]: 
 The equilibrium formulation in a game-theoretic point of view preserves the 
behavioural and strategic complexity of the participants. For instance, the bids and 
offers involved in the electricity market could have multiple parts and they can be well 
incorporated in game-theoretical models. 
 The game-theoretic equilibrium models are flexible in terms of institutional 
sophistication. In other words, different market types, market settlement rules and 
participant configurations can be easily accommodated, which facilitates the 
implementation of any new policies and the comparative study between different 
market topologies. 
Using a bilevel optimisation formulation, each market participant in the game faces an 
optimisation problem that can be modelled as a mathematical program with equilibrium 
constraints (MPEC). When considering multiple participants in the market, the competition 
is therefore recast as equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) [114]. 
EPEC arise when analysing multi-leader-follower games where multiple firms compete 




between generation companies and system operators in the transmission system as a 
hierarchical relationship between two autonomous, and possibly conflictual, decision 
makers [115]. This description is also fitting for the distribution system market: DSOs 
expect minimised cost for clearing the market, however, an optimal market clearing results 
should bring profits to µVPPs – otherwise the µVPP owners are deterred from entering the 
market and the µVPPs become isolated MGs. Once the DSOs have cleared the market, 
µVPPs react to the clearing price and quantities and refine their bidding/offering strategies 
such that their profits are maximised. The maximisation of the individual profit is called the 
upper-level problem and the minimisation of the DSOs’ cost is called the lower-level 
problem. The hierarchical relationship results from the fact that the optimisation problem 
related to the individual µVPP’s behaviour is part of the DSO’s constraints and it is the 




2.4.3 Solution Technologies for EPECs 
In [76, 116, 117], the bilevel EPECs were reformulated as a single-level optimisation 
problem by using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and dual theory. Reference [116] 
presented a decision-making model for distribution companies with DERs in a competitive 
wholesale market, in which the distribution companies submitted quantity bids/offers 
sourced from their DERs. Reference [76] applied a more practical market setting by 
including the price variables in the offers. In [117], the bilevel model was implemented in 
ADSM and the economic benefits of DER aggregators were addressed, however, those 
aggregators were still prohibited from participating in the price-making process hence the 
market power of their DER generation was not analysed. 
There are two inherent disadvantages when applying the KKT conditions and dual theory in 
realistic electricity market: 
 This method is based on the optimistic assumption of a convex lower-level problem. 
 The reformation towards a single-level problem brings many Lagrange multipliers 
which make the procedure difficult for practical markets with detailed constraints [118]. 
Under the optimistic assumption, the “follower” (i.e. DER aggregators such as µVPPs) 
altruistically submits an optimal bid/offer that also benefits the “leader” (system operators 
such as DSOs) [119]. However, the leader is not able nor allowed to influence the followers’ 




bids/offers based on their own economic benefits. 
Alternative methods were proposed to solve bilevel EPECs. In [120], a primal-dual 
approach was proposed to solve the bilevel market equilibrium model under the same 
optimistic assumption of a convex formulation. Binary expansion approach was 
implemented in [121, 122] to transform nonconvex problem into MILP with acceptable loss 
of accuracy. An iterative approximation algorithm was used in [123] as another alternative 
method but the results were not guaranteed to be NE. 
Coevolutionary computation is a relatively new form of agent-based simulation approach 
developed from classical evolutionary algorithms, which adopts the notion of ecosystem 
where multiple species coevolve towards mutual benefit [124]. Consequently, it is very 
suitable for bilevel optimisation problem which has a hierarchical structure between two 
decision-making groups. Coevolutionary computation solves the two levels sequentially, 
improves solutions on each level separately, while periodically exchanging information to 
get a good overall solution [125]. Coevolutionary computation is an extension to the 
standard genetic algorithms (GAs) in the overall category of evolutionary algorithm. 
Standard GAs and their applications were firstly proposed by J. Holland in the 1960s as the 
means to import the natural adaptation mechanism into computer systems. They were also 
seen as innovative methods to tackle large and complex optimisation problems. 
Optimisation is in fact the searching among an enormous number of possibilities for 
“solutions” while the process of evolution, in biology terms, is also the searching for highly 




which survived the natural selection of the evolution demonstrate their ability to adapt to the 
given environment, just like the solution (global optimum or local optimum) of an 
optimisation problem delivers good objective function value while complying with the 
constraints. However, in a complex system where multiple players participate, the fitness of 
an individual can’t be determined unilaterally by the individual’s own actions. Instead, the 
fitness value should be considered as the consequence of the interactions between this 
individual and the others. Therefore, the idea of coevolution was incorporated into the GA 
framework by adding various feedback mechanism between the individuals and driving the 
evolution towards a mutually beneficial result [127]. 
The application of coevolutionary computation was first seen in a predator-prey problem 
described by W. D. Hills [128]. This pioneer work addressed the fundamental difference that 
distinguishes the coevolutionary approach from the standard GAs, that is, the introduction 
of a partial, continuous fitness evaluation embedded in a fine-grained, step-by-step 
algorithm. Coevolutionary computation was successfully applied in modelling the wholesale 
electricity market with Cournot and SFE formulation. Reference [129] addressed 
coevolutionary computation as a parallel and global search algorithm, even if the results 
obtained are local optima. However, references [130, 131] pointed out that the 
coevolutionary Cournot/SFE approach may not be effective if market players have 
heterogeneous cost functions, which was exactly the case in ADSM where µVPPs have a 
mix of different DERs. Revisiting the benefits of game-theoretic equilibrium models in 




multi-leader-follower equilibrium games. How to utilise the novel coevolutionary 
computation approach to solve the proposed EPEC is the research focus of this thesis and 




CHAPTER 3 A CONFIGURABLE µVPP WITH 
MANAGED ENERGY SERVICES  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes an exemplar micro virtual power prosumer (µVPP) which is the 
fundamental building block of the market-oriented µVPPs. The µVPP presented in this 
thesis has gone through planning, design, hardware/software construction and finally it has 
been installed in a residential community in Sweden. Since July 2014 the system has been 
successfully operated and become the flagship project which received significant attention 
and support from the local government [132]. As an industry-oriented work, the hardware 
depiction includes all detailed components and the schematic reflects actual hardware which 
would be a good reference for future industry developments on the subject. The 
development of software considers real engineering conundrums where some crucial 
forecast data is hard or impossible to obtain and certain algorithmic process takes an 
empirical approach to solve. Most importantly, the year-long test data and the electricity 
tariff were obtained not from unreliable sources but from the same site via smart meters, 
which makes the data analysis authentic and trustworthy. Secondly, a detailed business 
model is proposed and tested for its economic rationale. Taking advantage of the simulation 
test bed and actual data, this chapter has presented a very comprehensive case study that 




3.2 µVPP System Architecture 
The µVPP has been deployed in a residential community and it controls eight residential 
apartments. Each apartment has its own solar PV micro-generation and four apartments 
share an ESS to optimise their power flow. Smart meters and micro-controllers were already 
embedded into the PV systems and controllable appliances to provide real-time monitoring 
and control. Two key components constitute the HEMS of the µVPP: an embedded personal 
computer (EPC) was used as the central processing unit (CPU) to host the energy 
management software; ZigBee protocol was adopted to form the wireless-based home area 
network (WHAN) and facilitate bi-directional information streams. The WHAN governs the 
data logging and algorithmic control over the DERs inside the µVPP and it also provides 
interfaces to a cloud platform which enables remote monitoring and control from another 
location. As a safety preliminary of the electrical installation, a miniature circuit breaker 
(MCB) was pre-installed to isolate each apartment from the main grid during abnormal 
conditions and an isolator was also pre-installed to protect the ESS. The system architecture 
of the µVPP is presented in Fig. 6. 
The home appliances within the µVPP are categorised into critical appliances (e.g. lights, 
TVs and refrigerators, etc.) and controllable loads (CLs) such as EVs and eHeat Pumps. The 
appliance demand data is collected by pre-installed smart meters and transmitted to the 
HEMS via the wireless network. The EVs in the µVPP are typical plug-in hybrid vehicle 




power with a full charge typically taking 1.5 to 2 hours, which makes EVs energy intensive 
appliances in terms of consumption. Each charging outlet is equipped with a smart 
micro-controller that executes the ON/OFF decisions from the HEMS and determines the 
charging status of the connected EV for the next scheduling interval. The scheduling of the 
EV charging also considers the safety and the convenience of drivers by complying with a 
set of physical constraints. Firstly, EV should remain ON or OFF status for adequate amount 
of time before it can change to another status. This constraint prevents frequent interruptions 
to the charging process and protects the charging point from damages. Secondly, there is an 
upper limit of time for which EV can be turned off, guaranteeing a fully-charged EV every 
day. To ensure enough backup capacity for any unplanned travel, the EV will be turned ON 
compulsorily when it has been OFF for too long. 
 




The eHeat Pump provides district heating and water heating to the residents, smart 
micro-controllers were also installed to control the eHeat Pump to be ON or OFF. During 
winter times the consumption power of the eHeat Pump is often higher than the other 
seasons due to increased demand for district heating. If left unmanaged, the eHeat Pump 
would be ON constantly to maintain the indoor temperature and the temperature of the 
water tank at a certain level. However, active management with carefully designed 
constraints can be equally capable of fulfilling the requirement in the heat sector while 
saving considerable amount of energy. 
The smart meters installed at the eHeat Pump report to the HEMS about its ON/OFF status 
and consumption data while receiving the command to turn it ON or OFF for the following 
operation interval. Since the thermal information of the apartments is not yet available, the 
requirements on the thermal dynamics take the form of a series of time constraints. Firstly, 
the minimum time for which eHeat Pump should keep its ON/OFF status before shifting to 
another state is a mandatory requirement for the safety and continuity of the operation. The 
upper limit of time for which eHeat Pump can be turned off continuously utilises the 
thermal dynamics of the building texture to guarantee that the temperature would not drop 
under an undesired level. In addition, the overall OFF time limit guarantees enough heat 
energy and hot water for daily consumption. 
The core DER component in the µVPP is the smart energy storage system (ESS). The ESS 
is an integrated system housed in a 19-inch rack. The components include two 4.8kW 




51.2V, a system controller that integrates the communication circuits and their power supply 
electronics. The communication interfaces are embedded into the inverter and battery 
controller to enable two-way information logging and algorithmic control. The schematic 
diagram of the ESS is shown in Fig. 7 and the actual system installed on site is presented in 
Fig. 8.  
 
Fig. 7 Smart energy storage system schematics 
One ESS is responsible to optimise the local power flow among four apartments with each 
apartment connecting to the four separate AC/DC modules of the bi-directional inverter 




internal power exchange of the four connected apartments. Any surplus power or shortage 
power resulting from the internal exchange will pass on the request to the other side of DC 
link and the request will be transferred into battery charging/discharging commands. The 
system controller equipped in the ESS shoulders the centralised monitoring and control over 
the inverter and battery system, broadcasts the collected information to the EPC and 
receives the charging/discharging command from the EPC. For protection purpose, the ESS 
is also fully equipped with fuses on both AC and DC side as well as a separate DC isolator. 
 




The ESS complies with several physical constraints: firstly, the battery state-of-charge (SOC) 
should not exceed an upper limit of 85% and a lower limit of 15%. The two thresholds are 
set to avoid deep charge or discharge and prolong the life span of batteries; secondly, there 
are also upper and lower limits on the charging and discharging power; a minimum time 
requirement of 15 minutes should be met before the power direction can change for each 
inverter AC/DC module and the battery respectively. The last constraint prevents frequent 
change of power directions for the safety of both inverters and battery modules. Given that 
each operation interval takes 3 minutes, this constraint indicates that the direction of power 
flow should remain the same for at least 5 operation intervals until it can be changed to the 




3.3 µVPP Business Model and Managed Energy Services 
3.3.1 Nomenclature 
Sets and Indices 
t    Index of time in the scheduling horizon 
i    Index of the apartment that is connected to the ESS 
I    Set of the apartments that are connected to the ESS 
NI   Number of apartments connected to the ESS 
k    Index of the apartment in the power redistribution queue 
K    Set of the apartments in the power redistribution queue 
NK   Number of apartments in the power redistribution queue 
EV   Set of parameters and variables related to the electric vehicle 
HP   Set of parameters and variables related to the eHeat Pump 
ESS   Set of parameters and variables related to the energy storage system 
APT   Set of parameters and variables related to the individual apartment 
DNO   Set of parameters and variables related to the distribution network operator 
Parameters 
RTC   $/kWh, real-time electricity price 
η  Discount rate for end-consumers in the µVPP, the released power from the ESS 
is sold to end-consumers at price RTCη ×  




DNOC   $/kW, network surcharge rate determined by the peak consumption rate kW 
cap




  $/kWh, internal electricity trading price for importing the surplus RES 
production from the apartments to the ESS 
ESS
APTC  $/kWh, internal electricity trading price for the transactions between the 
apartment and the ESS 
ESSB   kWh, rated capacity of the ESS 
ESSSOC   Maximum state-of-charge for the ESS 
ESS
SOC   Minimum state-of-charge for the ESS 
ESSP   kW, maximum charging/discharging power for the ESS 
ESSP   kW, minimum charging/discharging power for the ESS 
EVT   hours, total available time that EV can access to the charging point per day 




APT iS  $, the annual electricity bill of a µVPP tenant 
rent
uVPPS  $, the rent that end-consumers pay to the µVPP operator 
uVPPS  $, the profit of µVPP operator from internal electricity trading 
ROIt  years, the payback period of capital investment 
DNOS   $, network surcharge paid by end-consumers to the DNO 
,
grid
APT iP  kW, total power imported from the grid by each apartment; this variable 






APT iP  kW, surplus RES production exported by the apartment to be fed back to the 





  kW, surplus RES production exported by the apartment to be stored in ESS; 





 kW, extra power imported by the apartment from the grid to be stored in ESS; 
this variable corresponds to a single apartment 
,
net
APT iP   kW, the expected power transaction for each apartment calculated by deducting 
the micro-generation from total demand; positive value indicates the apartment 
is a demand block, negative value indicates the apartment is a supply block; 
this variable corresponds to a single apartment 
,
ESS
APT iP  kW, the actual power transaction between each apartment and the ESS; positive 
value means the power flows from the ESS to the apartment, negative value 
means the power flows from the apartment to the ESS; this variable 
corresponds to a single apartment 
pre
ESSP  kW, preliminary charging/discharging decisions for ESS derived by FLC; 
positive value means the ESS is going to be charged and negative value means 
it is going to be discharged 
fin
ESSP  kW, final charging/discharging decisions considering the collective request 
from all connected apartments; positive value means the ESS is going to be 
charged and negative value means it is going to be discharged 
ESS




between the connected apartments and the ESS; this variable corresponds to 
the collective results of all the apartments 
ESSSOC  State-of-charge of the ESS 
EVλ  Fuzzy input variable, the available charging time ratio for the EV 
HPλ  Fuzzy input variable, the available off time ratio for the eHeat Pump 
ESSλ  Fuzzy input variable, the discharging ability ratio for the ESS 
EVt  hours, this variable defines how much time the EV has already been plugged-in 
during the day (EV in the plugged-in status is not necessarily being charged) 
HPt  hours, this variable defines how much time the eHeat Pump has already been 
OFF during the day 
EVγ  Fuzzy output variable, 1 means the decision is to turn ON the EV, 0 means to 
turn OFF the EV 
HPγ  Fuzzy output variable, 1 means the decision is to turn ON the eHeat Pump, 0 
means to turn OFF the eHeat Pump  
ESSγ  Fuzzy output variable, the satisfaction ratio for discharging request of the ESS 
1
,APT iδ  Priority factor 1 when sorting the apartments in a queue, this variable 
corresponds to a single apartment 
2
APTδ  Priority factor 2 when sorting the apartments in a queue, this variable 




3.3.2 µVPP Business Model and Service Types 
To identify the beneficiaries and their revenue streams in the daily operation of the µVPP, 
the business model is presented in Fig. 9. The participants of the µVPP environment include 
DNO, electricity supplier company, µVPP operator and end-consumers. 
 
Fig. 9 Value streams between µVPP participants 
Supplier Company 
Supplier companies such as E. ON is the investor for the µVPP while functioning as 
traditional electricity suppliers. They provide the upfront cost, which mainly consists of the 
capital investment for the ESS at price
cap
ESSC , to construct the hardware and software 
infrastructure of the µVPP. End-consumers pay the supplier for the electricity consumption 
at real-time price RTC and receive compensation for the excessive RES generation which is 
fed back to the grid at FIT FITC . By signing a binding contract with the supplier, 
end-consumers can join the µVPP and the supplier receives an annual rent
rent
uVPPS from the 
tenant. Also, the supplier is the recipient of the µVPP’s profit uVPPS from the internal 
electricity trading. For the supplier company, the return on investment (ROI) for the µVPP 
operation consists of the rent
rent
























        (3.1) 
where the numerator term is the total capital investment of an ESS of size ESSB at price
cap
ESSC ; 
the denominator term is the annual ROI for the supplier and the payback period is the value 
of the fraction as equation (3.1) suggests. 
DNO 
DNO manages the local distribution network and it is not involved in the µVPP operation 
directly. However, end-consumers need to pay DNO a network surcharge DNOS based on 
their highest monthly consumption level. The economic benefit of DNO is not included in 
the design of µVPP algorithm but the network surcharge scheme provides incentives for the 
µVPP to smooth its load profile and reduce peak consumption. 
End-Consumer 
The end-consumers in the µVPP participate in three kinds of electricity trading and they are 
presented as follows: 
 As customers in the current electricity retail market, end-consumers pay for the 
electricity ,
grid
APT iP imported from the grid at retail price RTC . In addition, their electricity 
bill includes the network surcharge DNOS . 
 As renewable energy generators, end-consumers receive compensation at FIT FITC if 
they feed the excessive RES production back to the main grid. 




trading by actively importing power from the ESS or exporting power to the ESS. The 
internal power transactions are priced at
ESS
APTC . 




can be stored 
in the ESS or transferred to be used by another apartment immediately. The end-consumer 




, which is higher than the FIT thus 
providing incentive for end-consumers to sell their surplus RES output to the local µVPP 
instead of feeding it back to the grid. 
If the current retail price is very low, the ESS has the incentive to import electricity for later 




from the grid, which is more than its actual consumption, to sell to the ESS. The additional 
import is priced at the current retail price RTC . 
If the RES generation can’t satisfy the demand, the apartment can purchase from either the 
supplier at price RTC or from the ESS at price
ESS
APTC . To encourage the internal trading 
between the end-consumers and the ESS, the selling price of the released electricity is 
designed to be cheaper than the supplier at a discount rate ofη . 
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     (3.2) 
The annual electricity bill of the µVPP tenants is calculated as: 




where the monetary terms correspond to the three kinds of electricity transaction mentioned 
above. 
µVPP Operator 
The µVPP operator manages the µVPP system on behalf of the supplier company and earns 
the profit from the internal electricity transaction between ESS and each apartment. Its 









= ×∑        (3.4) 
If the power flows from the ESS to the apartment, ,
ESS
APT iP is a positive value and µVPP 
operator receives the payment at price
ESS
APTC ; if the power flows the other way around, ,
ESS
APT iP
is a negative value and µVPP operator pays the apartment at price
ESS
APTC . The settlement of 
the transaction price is shown in equation (3.2). 
Based on the breakdown of the electricity bills paid by the end-consumers, the managed 
energy services aim at reducing the electricity bill and creating new revenue streams from 
different aspects and these approaches can be summarised as the following service types: 
 Service 1 – Maximum self-consumption service 
Given the low level of the FIT, any surplus production from the RES is immediately 
redistributed within the µVPP or stored in the ESS instead of being fed back into the main 
grid. This service aims at utilising the RES locally as much as possible. 
 Service 2 – Dynamic tariff service 




electricity when it is at its cheapest. The ESS will import grid supplied electricity during the 
low tariff period and release the stored electricity during peak price period to be consumed 
by the apartments. CLs are not mobilised in this service. 
 Service 3 – dynamic tariff with active load control 
In addition to all the functions of service 2, service 3 provides an add-on function of actively 
scheduling the CLs based on the dynamics in the retail tariff. Further bill reductions are 
expected compared with service 2. 
 Service 4 – dynamic tariff with load shedding 
In addition to all the functions of service 3, service 4 provides an add-on function of 
smoothing the load profile by shedding the CLs during peak demand period. Further bill 
reductions are expected compared with service 3 due to a cheaper network surcharge. 
The managed energy services described above summarise the popular operation modes in 
the DER applications and provide end-consumers an opportunity to customise their energy 
management schemes. To accommodate these different services without any re-engineering 
of the code, a prerequisite of the µVPP algorithm is to provide a generic architecture to 




3.4 µVPP HEMS Algorithmic Flow 
3.4.1 Overview of the HEMS Algorithm 
The proposed HEMS algorithm for µVPP produces real-time control signals every 3 
minutes. At the beginning of each interval, meter readings of PV generation, critical load 
consumption, CLs status are gathered and fed into the algorithm as inputs. As the result, 
decisions including the charging/discharging command of the ESS, the power flow between 
each apartment and the ESS, the ON/OFF decisions for CLs are produced and transmitted to 
guide these DERs for the upcoming interval. Upon the successful execution of the decisions, 
the accumulative time variables such as the current OFF time of CLs are updated 
accordingly. A standardised workflow is designed for the HEMS algorithm and there are 
three workflow stages as shown in Fig. 10. Detailed inputs, outputs and function blocks are 
presented in Fig. 11. 
 





Fig. 11 Detailed HEMS algorithm workflow 
The three stages are introduced as follows: 
Stage 1 The first stage determines the ON/OFF decisions for CLs based on FLC. This stage 
only applies to service 3 and service 4, service 1 and 2 will proceed straight to the 
second stage. At the end of the first stage, the consumption level for all connected 
apartments for the next interval will be settled. Details of this stage are presented in 
section 3.4.2. 
Stage 1.1 The fuzzified inputs of EV and eHeat Pump are processed based on inference 
rules and decisions EVγ and HPγ are obtained regarding their ON/OFF status for 
the next interval. By adding the rated consumption power of the CLs to the 




the expected power transaction for each apartment ,
net
APT iP is obtained. These 
decisions are final for service 3 but preliminary for service 4 as additional load 
shedding is required.  
Stage 1.2 If the apartment is a demand block and the expected power transaction ,
net
APT iP
obtained in Stage 1.1 exceeds the load limit, the reserved capacity of ESS will 
be utilised first to compensate the exceeding part. If the ESS compensation is 
not enough, load shedding will be activated to turn OFF the CLs whose 
original decision is ON for the next interval. Load shedding will continue until 
the expected power transaction ,
net
APT iP falls under the limit. Stage 1.2 finalises 
the CL decision EVγ , HPγ and the expected power transaction ,
net
APT iP for service 
4. Detailed steps of load shedding are presented in section 3.4.2. 
Stage 2 The second stage firstly derives the charging/discharging power for the ESS based 
on FLC, which is only a preliminary decision. Then the situations of all the 
connected apartments are taken into consideration (whether they act as a demand 
block collectively or as a supply block collectively) and the ESS decisions are 
finalised. Details of this stage are presented in section 3.4.3. 
Stage 2.1 According to the selected service type, the fuzzified inputs of ESS are 




Stage 2.2 The preliminary ESS decision
pre




where the request of apartments to charge or discharge is not consistent with 
that of ESS. Stage 2.2 produces the final ESS charge/discharge power
fin
ESSP
after adjustment. Detailed description of the scenarios and the adjustment 
rules is presented in section 3.4.3. 
Stage 3 In the third stage, the final ESS decision obtained in the second stage is 
decomposed into four power flow decisions between each apartment and the ESS. 
This is based on the actual system topology where the four apartments are 
connected to the ESS via four separate AC power lines. Details of this stage are 
presented in section 3.4.4. 
Stage 3.1 This sub-stage performs queuing of the apartments to determine their 
sequence in receiving the allocated fraction of power to achieve the final ESS 
decision
fin
ESSP . The queuing strategy is presented in section 3.4.4. 
Stage 3.2 This final sub-stage performs the allocation of power based on the apartment 
queue and finalises the exchange power ,
ESS
APT iP between ESS and each 




3.4.2 First Stage in HEMS – Optimise Controllable Loads 
The first stage in HEMS operation optimises CLs including EVs and eHeat Pumps, it 
decides whether they will be turned ON or OFF for the next scheduling interval. The FLC 
takes three steps of fuzzification of inputs, rule-based inference and defuzzification of 
outputs to derive the control signals. 
Under the prerequisite that the physical constraints of the CLs should be satisfied, the 
optimisation of CLs aims at turning them ON when the retail electricity price is relatively 
low. For EVs, there are two fuzzy inputs including the real-time retail price RTC and the 
available charging time ratio EVλ . The latter input defines how much time the EV has left to 






λ = −           (3.5) 
where the variable EVt represents the time that has already passed by since EV was first 
plugged in for the day. Therefore, the ratio EVλ stands for the remaining opportunity for EV 
to be charged in the daily scheduling. The smaller EVλ is, the more urgent it is for EV to be 
charged if it needs to. With the ratio EVλ ranging from 0 to 1, the EV status is fuzzified as 
“Very Urgent (VU)”, “Urgent (U)”, “Medium (M)”, “Flexible (F)” and “Very Flexible 
(VF)”. Another fuzzy input, the real-time retail price, is also fuzzified as “Very Low (VL)”, 




linguistic variable that can be either ON or OFF, corresponding to the “turn ON” or “turn 
OFF” commands. To illustrate the mechanism of the FLC in scheduling the EVs, the 
membership functions of both inputs and output is depicted in Fig. 12 and the fuzzy 
inference rules are explained in the format of pseudo code. 
 
Fig. 12 Membership functions for EV FLC (a) Available charging time ratio;  
(b) retail price; (c) EV charging decision 
The fuzzy inference rules are designed to assess the charging availability and the retail price 
jointly, and produce the decision based on the empirical knowledge. EV tends to be charged 
if it is approaching to the end of today’s scheduling horizon or if the retail price is low. More 
sensitive responses to the input variables are designed and summarised as 25 inference rules 
as shown in Table I.  
TABLE I FUZZY INFERENCE RULES FOR EV SCHEDULING 
               VL L M H VH 
VU ON ON ON ON ON 
U ON ON ON ON OFF 
M ON ON ON OFF OFF 
F ON ON OFF OFF OFF 






The thought process of the FLC inference is presented in the following example. 
IF available charging time ratio EVλ indicates a flexible status (i.e. there is no rush to charge 
the EV immediately), 
AND real-time retail electricity price RTC is low, 
THEN FLC decides to turn on EV charging point. 
Two extreme conditions are worth highlighting: 
IF available charging time ratio EVλ indicates a very urgent status (i.e. the charging point 
will soon be unavailable in today’s optimisation window), 
THEN FLC decides to turn ON the charging point regardless of the price scenarios. 
IF the retail price is very low, 
THEN FLC decides to turn ON the charging point regardless of the availability of the 
charging point. 
The decision-making process of eHeat Pump is carried out in the same fashion. The ON and 
OFF decisions obtained by FLC are the final commands sent to the micro-controllers under 
service 3. However, the load shedding function in service 4 requires these fuzzy decisions to 
be refined to level the peak monthly consumption. In service 4, the add-on function of load 
shedding takes the following steps: 
Step 1) Calculate the expected power transaction amount ,
net
APT iP for each apartment by 
deducting the micro-generation from the demand. Positive value means the 




Step 2) If the apartment is a demand block and the real-time demand value exceeds the 
maximum load limit, activate the reserve capacity of ESS to compensate the excess 
amount (i.e. 5% of the ESS capacity is reserved for compensation purpose, which is 
not allowed to be used in the internal trading); 
Step 3) Activate load shedding if the reserved ESS capacity fails to compensate the excess 
load; 
Step 4) Target the CLs that are scheduled to be running in the upcoming interval, check 
whether their decisions can be overwritten to OFF; 
Step 5) If the overwriting can be authorised, shed the CLs based on the sequence of eHeat 
Pump first and EV second until the peak demand falls under the cap. 
Three prerequisites should be met before the load shedding could be activated: firstly, the 
excess part of the demand is beyond the compensation ability of the ESS; secondly, at least 
one of the CLs are originally scheduled to be turned on for the next interval; thirdly, the 
overwriting of the CL decision will not violate the physical constraints of the CLs. As for 
the sequence of shedding, eHeat Pump comes first because of its lower consumption power. 
Therefore, shedding eHeat Pump alone might fulfil the task of smoothing the peak load 
without involving the EV. To sum up, the load shedding process is designed to reduce peak 
consumption and bring minimal impact on CLs’ operation. 
The mathematical rationale of FLC’s workflow is explained as follows: firstly, conventional 
control algorithms such as PID control are derived from the closed-form mathematical 




and the dynamics of the system could be accurately modelled. However, some parameters of 
the proposed µVPP are unavailable and some system behaviours are hard to model. For 
instance, the driving patterns of the EVs are difficult to obtain. While in the proposed fuzzy 
logic control scheme, there is no need to make unrealistic assumptions for modelling EV 
behaviour. Linguistic quantifications are used in the FLC to define the ambiguous status of 
the EV and to specify a set of rules that captures the expert’s knowledge about how to 
control the EV charging for the benefit of the EV [133]. At the beginning of the day when 
the travel plan is not settled, the EV status is defined as “flexible” and the FLC decides there 
is no need to charge the EV. Secondly, the multiple rules used in the inference resemble the 
parameters of a conventional PID controller. The rules are associated with the gradient of 
the change in the FLC output, and the accuracy of the FLC could be improved by increasing 
the number of rules (i.e. the increase in rules indicates the increase in the FLC’s expertise in 
the subject control problem). The membership functions of the FLC serve as look-up tables 
to convert the crisp input data to fuzzy data and to convert the fuzzy output to crisp values, 




3.4.3 Second Stage in HEMS – Determine ESS Charging/Discharging Power  
The internal electricity trading is facilitated by actively charging and discharging the ESS 
and the profit obtained from the internal trading is a vital source of ROI for µVPP investors. 
This stage determines the power level with which the ESS is charged or discharged. The 
decision process takes two steps: in the first step a preliminary decision is obtained based on 
FLC, where only the ESS’ status is taken into consideration; in the second step the decision 
is finalised by considering the collective request from all the apartments. 
The preliminary decision
pre
ESSP is obtained at the ESS’ point of view, it only considers ESS’ 
own economic interest and safety requirements including the retail electricity price, the 
maximum SOC and maximum power limit. A positive value of
pre
ESSP means the ESS will be 
charged and a negative value means the ESS will be discharged in the next interval. Also, 
the preliminary decisions are closely tied to the service type. Under service 1, ESS is treated 
as a complementary device to store the surplus RES generation and no voluntary 
charging/discharging actions are allowed. However, under service 2, 3 and 4, ESS becomes 
a responsive device to the dynamics in the retail price and performs active 
charging/discharging. 
When the µVPP is configured to run service 1, the preliminary ESS decision is derived for 
the charging process and discharging process separately. Intuitively, the charging power 
equals to the remaining RES power after satisfying the demand to maximise 




similarly to the ones used for the CL control. There are two fuzzified inputs for the FLC 
under service 1: the current state-of-charge ESSSOC and a discharging ability ratio ESSλ














         (3.6) 
The ratio ESSλ defines the ESS’ ability to satisfy the requested amount of power to be 
injected to the apartments. The ability is fuzzified as linguistic variables of “Low (L)”, 
“Medium (M)” and “High (H)” which correspond to the scenarios that “the requested 
discharging power is low and can be handled easily by ESS”, “the requested discharging 
power level is medium and within the ESS’ capability” and “the request discharging power 
level is high and near to the upper limit of the capability”. The other input ESSSOC can be 
fuzzified intuitively based on its numerical readings as “Low (L)”, “Medium (M)” and 
“High (H)”. 
The fuzzy output ESSγ is called the satisfaction ratio for the discharging request and it has 
three values of “Low (L)”, “Medium (M)” and “High (H)” which correspond to the 
scenarios that “the discharging request is poorly satisfied by the ESS”, “the discharging 
request is half-way satisfied by the ESS” and “the discharging request is well satisfied”. The 






ESS ESS ESSP Pγ= − ×         (3.7) 
where the negative value of ESS decision preESSP represents discharging power. 
The fuzzy inference rules for the preliminary decision obtained for service 1 are presented 
in Table II. They are derived based on an empirical anticipation of ESS’ response to 
different discharging request submitted by the apartments: If ESSSOC is low, only the 
apartments with low expected power request will be well satisfied. If ESSSOC is medium, 
then both low power and medium power request will be well satisfied, leaving the request 
with high power level half-way satisfied. If ESSSOC is high then all requests with different 
power levels will be well satisfied. 
TABLE II FUZZY INFERENCE RULES FOR ESS PRELIMINARY DECISION UNDER SERVICE 1 
               L M H 
L H H H 
M M H H 
H L M H 
Under service 2, 3 and 4, both charging and discharging power are derived by FLC. The 
fuzzy inputs include the current ESSSOC and real-time retail electricity price RTC . Both 
inputs are fuzzified as linguistic variables of “Very Low (VL)”, “Low (L)”, “Medium (M)”, 
“High (H)” and “Very High (VH)”. The fuzzy output is categorised based on whether they 
are charging decision or discharging decision and their power levels: “Charge Low (CL)”, 
“Charge Medium (CM)”, “Charge High (CH)”, “Discharge Low (DL)”, “Discharge Medium 
(DM) and “Discharge High (DH)”. The membership functions for the fuzzy inputs and 






combinations of SOC level and the price level and these rules anticipate the logical reaction 
of ESS: the ESS tends to be charged during the period when the price is low and the SOC is 
low as well; otherwise discharging action is the preferable choice. The depth of charging 
and discharging depends on whether the input variable is VL, L, M, H or VH. These rules 
are summarised in Table III. 
TABLE III FUZZY INFERENCE RULES FOR ESS PRELIMINARY DECISION UNDER SERVICE 2, 3 AND 4 
               VL L M H VH 
VL CH CH CM DL DH 
L CH CM CL DM DH 
M CH CL DM DM DH 
H CH CL DM DH DH 
VH CH CL DH DH DH 
 
Fig. 13 Membership functions of inputs and outputs for ESS under service 2, 3 and 4  
(a) SOC; (b) retail price; (c) ESS preliminary decision 
Under service 1, the preliminary ESS decision is also the final decision and can be 
transmitted directly to control the ESS. However, under the other services, the preliminary 















∑ of the four connected apartments. In this way, the final decision finESSP can represent 









means the collective of four apartments behaves as a demand block thus the ESS is required 








∑ means the 
collective of four apartments acts as a supply block thus the ESS is required to be charged 
from the apartments’ point of view. The adjustment rules to deliver the final decision for 
service 2, 3 and 4 are presented as follows: 
Scenario 1 – The apartments act as a supply block collectively, FLC decision instructs 










< >∑         (3.8) 
Two independent decisions are made to charge the ESS, their charging power should be 
combined to deliver the final charging power as shown in equation (9): 
fin net pre
ESS APT ESSP P P= − +∑         (3.9) 
Scenario 2 – The apartments act as a supply block collectively, FLC decision instructs 










< <∑        (3.10) 




discharging of ESS should only be allowed when the apartments have shortage of power 
supply, which is not the case in this scenario. Therefore, the final ESS decision is: 
fin net
ESS APTP P= −∑          (3.11) 
Scenario 3 – The apartments are self-balancing collectively, FLC decision instructs ESS 










= >∑        (3.12) 
When the RES generation of some apartments can balance the demand of the other 
apartments, ESS will agree with the preliminary charging decision to store electricity (i.e. 
increase the volume of the goods when spot price is low, even if there is no immediate 
demand). 
fin pre
ESS ESSP P=          (3.13) 
Scenario 4 - The apartments are self-balancing collectively, FLC decision instructs ESS 










= <∑        (3.14) 
The discharging of ESS should only be allowed when the apartments have shortage of 
power supply, which is not the case in this scenario. Therefore, the preliminary ESS 
decision is overruled: 
0finESSP =          (3.15) 














> >∑        (3.16) 
The FLC decides that the ESS needs to be charged due to low retail price or low SOC of the 
ESS, which prohibits any stored electricity to be used by apartments. On the other hand, the 
collective demand from all the apartments could be supplied by grid at a cheap price in this 
scenario. Therefore, ESS will agree to the preliminary decision and store more electricity. 
fin pre
ESS ESSP P=          (3.17) 
Scenario 6 - The apartments act as a demand block collectively, FLC decision instructs 










> <∑        (3.18) 
The apartments and the FLC in this scenario want the same thing – the ESS to be discharged 
and to satisfy the demand from the collective of all apartments. However, it is not necessary 
to discharge more than the apartments need. Therefore, the final discharging power is the 











= −  
 
∑       (3.19) 
Scenario 7 – The preliminary decision instructs ESS to be idle, regardless of the 
apartments’ situation 
Under this circumstance, the final decision should also be idle for the ESS to prevent any 




direction of the power flow). 




3.4.4 Third Stage in HEMS – Determining the Apartment Exchange Power 
Considering that the final ESS charging/discharging power is a joint decision made by both 
ESS and the end-consumers, the actual power flow between these two parties may deviate 
from the apartments’ expectation. Therefore, the third stage in HEMS is to decompose the 
target ESS power
fin
ESSP into four fractions and assign the specific exchange power ,
ESS
APT iP to 
each connected apartment. This redistribution stage identifies the priority of some 
apartments by performing a queuing process and considers the physical constraints of each 
AC power line that connects the apartment to the ESS. To sum up, the principle of the third 
stage is to guarantee that each apartment is treated equally and fairly while fulfilling the task 
of charging/discharging the ESS at the required power rate. 
The first step is to perform queuing of the apartments to determine their sequence in 
receiving the allocated fraction of power. A numerical example is given as follows to 
illustrate the priority of apartments in the redistribution: apartment A and apartment B have 
surplus power of 0.5kW and 0.75kW respectively from their RES generation; apartment C 
and D are demand blocks with load of 0.45kW and 0.5kW respectively. Therefore, the 
collective of four apartments can be considered as a single supply block with 0.3kW excess 
power ready to be injected to the ESS. Meanwhile the final ESS decision is to put ESS in its 
idle state, making the 0.3kW excess power redundant and hence adjustment is needed. For 
apartment A and B, their power flow into the ESS should be decreased. On the other hand, 




them to increase the consumption just to accommodate the surplus power from A and B. As 
the result, only A and B participate in the redistribution and apartment A comes first because 
it has a smaller room to reduce the power injection (i.e. apartment A can reduce to a 
maximum of 0.5kW while B can reduce to a maximum of 0.75kW). Therefore, the final 
queue for power redistribution is [A, B]. 
This strategy is summarised in the following steps: 
Step 1) Calculate the priority factors
1
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= × + 
 
∑        (3.21) 
Step 2) Sort apartments based on the ascending order of
1










=∑          (3.22) 
Step 3) If the queue has a non-positive factor
2
APTδ , remove the apartments of which
1
, 0APT iδ < and obtain the final redistribution queue with NK number of apartments. 
The queuing strategy is summarised after examining every possible scenario in the power 
allocation. Although the algorithm could be designed to list every possible scenario by using 
“if…else…” statements, the generalised steps above provide a solution to handle large 
number of apartments more efficiently. 
After the position of each apartment is determined, the redistribution process is carried out 




Step 1) Calculate the power difference
ESS
APTP∆ between the total expected transaction and the 









∆ = +∑         (3.23) 
Step 2) Calculate the final exchange power ,
ESS











− −        (3.24) 
Step 3) Update the remaining difference value
ESS
APTP∆ : 
( ), ,ESS ESS net ESSAPT APT APT k APT kP P P P∆ = ∆ − −       (3.25) 
Step 4) Repeat step 2 and 3 until every apartment in the queue has been assigned the final 
exchange power. For those that are not included in the queue, their exchange power 
equals to their expected transaction power. 
, , ,
ESS net
APT i APT iP P i I i K= ∈ ∉       (3.26) 
In the numerical example mentioned in the previous paragraphs, four apartments A, B, C, D 
have the following expected transaction power: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0.5 , 0.75 , 0.45 , 0.5net net net netAPT APT APT APTP A kW P B kW P C kW P D kW= − = − = =  
And the final ESS decision is 0
fin
ESSP = thus the power difference is calculated using 
equation (3.23): 
0.5 0.75 0.45 0.5 0 0.3ESSAPTP kW∆ = − − + + + = −  
Based on the queuing result [A, B], the final exchange power between apartment A and the 













= − − = −
− −  
Then the remaining difference value is updated using equation (3.25): 
( )0.3 0.5 0.35 0.15ESSAPTP kW∆ = − − − + = −  











= − − = −
− −  
For apartment C and D which are not included in the priority queue, their final exchange 
power is derived using equation (3.26): 
( ) ( )0.45 , 0.5ESS ESSAPT APTP C kW P D kW= =  
To sum up, the power flow before redistribution and after redistribution is presented in Table 
IV. 
TABLE IV NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF DETERMINING THE APARTMENT EXCHANGE POWER 
              Apt 
ESS 
A B C D 
Expected exchange power 
(kW) 
-0.5 -0.75 0.45 0.5 
Actual exchange power (kW) -0.35 -0.6 0.45 0.5 
As shown in the table above, the collective of all the apartments reaches self-balancing state 
after the redistribution process, which is required by the final ESS decision that no charging 
nor discharging should be allowed. Apartment A and B must curtail their RES output by 




3.5 Comparative Case Studies 
The µVPP data including the PV generation, consumption and ESS status from January to 
December 2015 is recorded by the smart metering system and used for the case studies. The 
ESS has an installed capacity of 6kWh with an estimated lifetime of 4500 cycles. As for the 
price parameters, the real-time retail price is extracted from the Nord Pool data of 2015 
[134], the FIT and DNO surcharge are provided by local supplier company in Sweden. To 
calculate the payback period, this thesis acknowledges the currently high upfront cost but it 
also acknowledges the fact that the initial capital for ESS will decline 20% to 30% annually 
and reach a more affordable level in 2020 [23]. Therefore, two payback periods are 
presented: one of them is calculated based on the current ESS investment and the other is 
based on a reduced upfront cost. The annual rent that end-consumers pay to the operator is 
set to be 40% of the final bill savings, which guarantees the larger half of the savings still 
goes to the consumers. The important price parameters are summarised in Table V. 





















Value 0.18 Avg. 0.08 0.12 90% 500 165 15 
Each case in this section corresponds to one service type. One set of daily data in quarter 3, 
2015 is used to demonstrate the service feature and another set of annual data of 2015 is 
used to perform economic analysis. The algorithm is coded in C# for the actual system and 




3.5.1 Case A – Maximum Self-Consumption Service 
When the µVPP is configured to run service 1, the system aims at utilising the RES 
generation locally as much as possible. As shown in Fig. 14, the trajectory of the SOC 
overlaps with the PV output throughout the day. The ESS is being charged frequently during 
daytime when sunlight is abundant and discharged to minimum SOC after sunset. 
 
Fig. 14 ESS SOC trajectory under service 1 
Considering that the µVPP operator offers a higher price than the FIT to purchase the 
surplus RES generation, and the stored energy is to be released later and used by the same 
end-consumers, a reduction of electricity bills is expected due to higher payment for the 
surplus RES and decreased grid import. Three key metrics are used in the economic analysis: 
the total bill savings, the payback period of the ESS’ upfront cost and the ESS lifetime. A 
reference case called “No service” is used to make comparisons, where each apartment only 
owns PV generation but not ESS or other types of DER. Difference sizes of ESS are also 
included in the study to see whether it is worthwhile to rescale the ESS in the µVPP. The 




TABLE VI SERVICE 1 PERFORMANCE WITH 1.2KW PV PRODUCTION 
                        
ESS 
Results 
No service 3.6kWh 6kWh 8.4kWh 12kWh 
Electricity bill ($) 3639.85 3593.12 3582.13 3573.6 3563.48 
Bill savings ($) N/A 46.73 57.52 66.25 76.37 
ESS charge cycle N/A 155.68 126.76 110.04 93.86 
µVPP profit ($) N/A 25.9 28.76 29.45 27.66 
Payback period (yrs) N/A 40 57 75 103 
Shortened payback period 
(yrs) * 
N/A 13 19 24 34 
ESS lifetime (yrs) N/A 28 35 40 47 
*Shortened payback period corresponds to a reduction of 67% of ESS cost 
With the current PV capacity of 1.2kW, the annual saving on the electricity bill is very 
insignificant and there will not be much of an improvement if the ESS capacity is increased. 
As for the ESS charge cycle which represents the utilisation rate of the ESS asset, it takes 
more than two days even for the smallest ESS to complete on full charge/discharge cycle. In 
addition, the profit that µVPP operator receives is nearly negligible compared with the 
upfront cost. Economically speaking, the insignificant bill saving does not provide enough 
incentives to end-consumers and the negligible profit also deters investors from establishing 
the µVPP in the first place. Even from the perspective of a reduced capital investment, it 
still takes 19 years for the current ESS capacity to recoup its upfront cost. Although less 
charge cycles lead to a seemingly prolonged battery lifetime, the performance of battery 
modules will suffer from depreciation and eventually the cells fail to operate satisfactorily. 
To sum up, it is challenging for investors to recoup their investment if they intend to use 
ESS just as a complementary device to the RES. With an increasing penetration of RES 




3.5.2 Case B – Dynamic Tariff Service 
When the µVPP is configured to run service 2, the charging and discharging process taps 
into the dynamics of the retail price and the ESS takes a more active role in the µVPP. As 
shown in Fig. 15, the trajectory of the ESS SOC follows the pattern of the retail price where 
the charging action is scheduled during low price period while the discharging action takes 
place during high price period. 
 
Fig. 15 ESS SOC trajectory under service 2 
The price-responsive ESS in service 2 mitigates the pressure at the grid connection point 
during times of peak demand, when the retail price is usually high. At times of low demand, 
the ESS increases the electricity import from the grid by actively store the electricity. 
Overall, service 2 performs peak shaving and valley filling functions for the benefit of the 
DNO. For end-consumers, their electricity bills are reduced because they have a second 
option of purchasing from the internal electricity trading, at a price that is lower than the 
real-time retail price. For µVPP operator, the dynamics of the retail price are exploited to 




retail price RTC is low; several hours later when the system moves into a period with high 
retail price ( )RT RT RTC C Cη′ ′× > , they can still make a profit by releasing the stored 
electricity to the end-consumers and charge them at price RTCη ′× . The economic analysis 
has been performed for service 2 and the results are displayed in Table VII. 
Table VII Service 2 Performance with 1.2kW PV Production 
                        
ESS 
Results 
No service 3.6kWh 6kWh 8.4kWh 12kWh 
Electricity bill ($) 3639.85 3551.67 3529.15 3512.45 3496.42 
Bill savings ($) N/A 88.18 110.7 127.4 143.43 
ESS charge cycle N/A 703.9 550.9 481.4 397.1 
µVPP profit ($) N/A 36.53 67.36 106.5 154.66 
Payback period (yrs) N/A 25 26 26 28 
Shortened payback period 
(yrs) * 
N/A 8 9 9 10 
ESS lifetime (yrs) N/A 6 8 9 11 
*Shortened payback period corresponds to a reduction of 67% of ESS cost 
Compared with service 1, the dynamic tariff service delivers better performance in bill 
savings, ESS utilisation rate and payback period with the same size of PV and ESS. The 
savings on electricity bills are nearly doubled compared with the level in service 1. The 
profit of the µVPP operator is also vastly increased in service 2 and the improvement is 
proportional to the size of the ESS: 41% improvement for a 3.6kWh ESS, 134% 
improvement for the current 6kWh ESS, 262% improvement for an 8.4kWh ESS and 459% 
improvement for a 12kWh ESS. The improvement indicates that higher profits can be 
obtained by upscaling the ESS within a certain range. This is due to an increased share of 
consumer load being supplied by the µVPP operator in the form of internal trading. 
However, if the capacity of the ESS increases beyond the maximum demand level within 




for the ESS is saturated. As for the ESS charge cycle, at least one full charge cycle is 
completed daily under service 2 which is regarded as an ideal utilisation level of the asset. 
For some sizes of the ESS such as 3.6kWh and the current 6kWh, the charging/discharging 
action may be too often and the maximum ESS lifetime is reached prematurely before the 
investment is recouped. For ESS with 8.4kWh capacity and 12kWh capacity, the investment 
is expected to be recouped just before the ESS exhausts its lifetime.  
To sum up, the shortened payback period in service 2 falls under 10 years giving the 
declining upfront cost of the ESS. Supplier company and the end-consumers both benefit 
from an enhanced internal trading mechanism and can be both motivated to facilitate the 
µVPP. Service 2 is regarded as a sustainable business pattern to operate the µVPP and the 
major difference from service 1 is to treat ESS as an active, price-responsive DER instead of 




3.5.3 Case C – Dynamic Tariff with Active Load Control 
When the µVPP is configured to run service 3, the CLs including EVs and eHeat Pumps 
join the ESS to respond to the dynamics in the retail electricity price. The EV SOC 
trajectory is depicted in Fig. 16 to demonstrate the scheduling function of service 3. 
 
Fig. 16 EV charging responds to dynamic electricity price 
As shown in Fig. 16, the EV charging process starts at 18:00 and continues until the EV is 
fully charged if it is unmanaged by the HEMS. However, service 3 turns EV OFF during 
19:00 to 20:00 when the retail electricity price is high and turns EV back ON when the retail 
price drops. Under the prerequisite that the EV should be charged fully every day, the 
charging action should be allocated to low price periods which will lead to further reduction 
on electricity bills. Economic analysis has been performed for service 3 and the results are 
shown in Table VIII. 
EVs and eHeat Pump are energy-intensive appliances and they often account for the largest 




bills can be observed in service 3 – the end-consumers can save up to 8% of their “No 
service” bills. Based on the agreement that end-consumers should pay an annual rent that 
equals to 40% of their bill savings, the rent in service 3 is more than that in service 2. A 
higher rent in this service is acceptable as end-consumers now enjoy an add-on function of 
active load control. In the economic analysis for service 2, conclusion has been drawn that 
the profit of µVPP operator from the internal electricity trading is determined mostly by the 
size of the ESS. Hence, the results displayed in Table VIII show a similar value of µVPP 
profit. In total, the investor receives higher ROI in service 3 and the payback period is 
slashed further. As for the utilisation rate of the ESS, service 3 is also capable to complete 
one charge cycle within one day. 
TABLE VIII SERVICE 3 PERFORMANCE WITH 1.2KW PV PRODUCTION 
                        
ESS 
Results 
No service 3.6kWh 6kWh 8.4kWh 12kWh 
Electricity bill ($) 3639.85 3404.33 3383.08 3367.73 3351.73 
Bill savings ($) N/A 235.52 256.77 272.12 288.12 
ESS charge cycle N/A 686.6 536.2 462.3 383.13 
µVPP profit ($) N/A 35.7 66.47 105.23 152.63 
Payback period (yrs) N/A 13 18 19 22 
Shortened payback period 
(yrs) * 
N/A 5 6 7 8 
ESS lifetime (yrs) N/A 6 8 9 11 
*Shortened payback period corresponds to a reduction of 67% of ESS cost 
To sum up, the inclusion of CLs in the service 3 brings benefits for both parties. More 
savings on the electricity bill are achieved by simply plugging their EVs and eHeat Pumps 
in the HEMS. For µVPP investors, they become more confident in making the decisions 
because the payback period for all sizes of ESS has been reduced by another 2-3 years and 




3.5.4 Case D – Dynamic Tariff with Load Shedding 
When µVPP is configured to run service 4, an add-on function of load shedding is included 
in the control scheme in addition to the price-responsive load scheduling. Given that the 
DNO surcharge is calculated based on the peak consumption power rate, this service aims at 
reducing the electricity bill by shaving the peak demand for each apartment. The EV SOC 
trajectories under service 3 and 4 are presented in the following figure to address the load 
shedding function. 
 
Fig. 17 EV charging with and without shedding function 
As shown in Fig. 17, EV is turned OFF during 19:00 to 20:00 under both service 3 and 
service 4. However, in service 4 the OFF state is kept for another half an hour due to high 
demand level. In other words, EV is originally scheduled to be charged during 20:00 to 
20:30 but it has been shed to keep the consumption level under the cap value. Both service 3 




lower DNO surcharge for end-consumers. The results of the economic analysis are shown in 
Table IX. 
TABLE IX SERVICE 4 PERFORMANCE WITH 1.2KW PV PRODUCTION 
                        
ESS 
Results 
No service 3.6kWh 6kWh 8.4kWh 12kWh 
Electricity bill ($) 3639.85 3277.28 3256.17 3241.46 3225.93 
Bill savings ($) N/A 362.57 383.68 398.4 413.92 
ESS charge cycle N/A 715.06 553.56 472.33 389.17 
µVPP profit ($) N/A 24.23 55.43 92.08 137.15 
Payback period (yrs) N/A 10 14 16 20 
Shortened payback period 
(yrs) * 
N/A 4 5 6 7 
ESS lifetime (yrs) N/A 6 8 9 11 
*Shortened payback period corresponds to a reduction of 67% of ESS cost 
Service 4 is by far the most comprehensive energy service for the µVPP, all the DER assets 
including the RES, ESS and DR programs are considered in the HEMS optimisation scheme. 
Service 4 derives the largest savings on the electricity bill and end-consumers pay 11% less 
than their former bills. A small-size ESS with 3.6kWh capacity can bring $362.57 saving in 
service 4 while a 12kWh ESS in service 3 brings only $288.12 bill reduction. Even with the 
currently high upfront cost, the payback period has already dropped under 10 years. For 
µVPP operator, the economic rationale is the same as that of service 3: a higher reduction on 
consumer bills means more income from the rent; the profit from the internal electricity 
trading remains in a steady level once the capacity of the ESS is determined. In total, service 
4 has the highest ROI for investors and the fastest track to recoup their investment. For 
DNO, the µVPP’s ability to perform peak shaving and valley filling is enhanced compared 





This chapter has presented an exemplar micro virtual power prosumer (µVPP) where the 
downstream DER assets including RES, ESS and DR are actively managed to reduce 
electricity bills, generate revenue streams for investors and provide load smoothing services 
to the DNO. The effectiveness of the WHAN and the HEMS has been validated by a pilot 
µVPP community. A µVPP business model has been proposed to explain elaborately the 
incentives and the economic rationale for the participants. Four energy services have been 
designed based on the types of DER that are utilised in the system and the different control 
strategies applied to them. Considering the scalability of the µVPP and the diversity of the 
consumer groups, the HEMS algorithm has been designed using a generic architecture to 
accommodate all energy services and facilitate easy switching between them. By examining 
the optimisation effect of each energy service in the µVPP, service 4 has been demonstrated 
as the optimal service type to bring maximum bill savings, fastest return on investment and 
active utilisation of the ESS capacity. However, the other services have also offered the 
opportunity for end-consumers to customise their energy mix and choose the suitable 
service considering the consumers’ differences in geographic location, DER types and 
incomes. Moreover, the impact of different sizes of ESS on the economic benefit has been 
analysed and the result provides valuable insight into investment decision-making. It has 
now come to a point in the DER applications where the return on investment does not rely 




CHAPTER 4 CONTRIBUTING TO THE 
ENERGY-RESERVE POOL: A 
CHANCE-CONSTRAINED TWO-STAGE µVPP 
BIDDING STRATEGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The µVPP presented in Chapter 3 has demonstrated a sustainable business pattern to 
generate substantial return on the initial investment for DER assets. The ICT infrastructure 
of the µVPP, which is already capable of real-time monitoring and control in both 
generation and consumption sectors, has given rise to the opportunity of entering the 
distribution level energy-reserve pool market. Once the dispatchable generators (DGs) are 
introduced to the µVPP energy portfolio, µVPP would have enough generation capacity and 
ramping capability to contribute energy and reserve power to the retail markets. This chapter 
is the second step towards the design of market-oriented µVPPs where µVPPs are permitted 
to participate in the distribution pool market by actively submitting quantity bids/offers. 
New revenue streams generated from the market trading can help accelerate the payback 
and ultimately bring net profit for investors. On the other hand, risks associated with the 
volatility of the RES production and the demand level also create barriers for µVPP entry to 
the market and might endanger the security of supply. Therefore, a chance-constrained 




4.2 µVPP Business Model in Local Energy-Reserve Pool 
4.2.1 Nomenclature 
Sets and Indices 
t    Index of time in the scheduling horizon for each stage 
i    Index of the dispatchable generators in the µVPP 
s    Index of the scenarios in the real-time stage 
Ω  Set of original portfolio scenarios, there are three components in each scenario 
including wind generation, load level and real-time electricity price 
J  Set of the deleted portfolio scenarios, there are three components in each 
scenario including wind generation, load level and real-time electricity price 
S  Set of the selected portfolio scenarios, there are three components in each 
scenario including wind generation, load level and real-time electricity price 
NT   Number of hours in each of the two scheduling stages 
NG   Number of dispatchable generators in the µVPP 
N Ω  Number of the original portfolio scenarios generated by the Monte Carlo 
method 
NS   Number of the selected scenarios to represent the real-time portfolio 
1I  DER index which represents the ratio of on-site DER capacity over the 
maximum load level 





DA   Set of parameters and variables related to day-ahead scheduling stage 
RT   Set of parameters and variables related to real-time scheduling stage 
Parameters 
,E DA
tC   £/kWh, day-ahead energy retail price during time t  
R
DAC   £/kWh, day-ahead reserve energy retail price 
Gen
iC   £/kWh, variable production cost of dispatchable generator i  
SU
iC   £, start-up cost of dispatchable generator i  
SD
iC   £, shut-down cost of dispatchable generator i  
lossC   £/kWh, penalty price for involuntary disconnection of the load within the 
µVPP 
η  price coefficient determined by the maximum transaction limit at the grid 
connection point, a higher transaction limit corresponds to more expensive 
tariff 
ω    discount rate of electricity price to motivate end-consumers to join the µVPP 
,
up
s tSIG  real-time binary call up signals for upward reserve offers in scenario s during 
time t ; “1” represents the offer is called up to produce, “0” represents the offer 
is not called up to produce 
,
dw
s tSIG  real-time binary call up signals for downward reserve offers in scenario s
during time t ; “1” represents the offer is called up to produce, “0” represents 




maxEXCH  kW, the transaction limit at the µVPP grid connection point 
,W DA
tP   kW, day-ahead forecasted power of wind generation of the µVPP 
,L DA
tP   kW, day-ahead forecasted power of load level of the µVPP 
Gen
iP   kW, maximum output power of dispatchable generator i  
Gen
iP   kW, minimum output power of dispatchable generator i  
Gen
onT   hour, minimum time the dispatchable generator should be up per day 
Gen
offT   hour, minimum time the dispatchable generator should be down per day 
iRU   kW/h, maximum power limit for dispatchable generator i to ramp up 
iRD   kW/h, maximum power limit for dispatchable generator i to ramp down 
upρ   upper limit of the available upward spinning reserve power 
dwρ   upper limit of the available downward spinning reserve power 
LOLPε  loss of load probability, represents the chance of involuntary disconnection of 
the consumer loads 
ξ    maximum load loss percentage that is tolerable in the µVPP 
Variables 
sπ    the probability of each scenario in the original portfolio scenario set 
*
sπ    the probability of each scenario in the selected portfolio scenario set 
D  the distance between any two scenario points of the original portfolio set after 
mapping the scenario values into a three-dimensional coordinate space 















s tP  kW, real-time load level in scenario s during time t  
CEσ  £/kWh, standard deviation of real-time retail energy price from day-ahead 
prediction 
Wσ  kW, standard deviation of real-time wind generation from day-ahead prediction 
Lσ  kW, standard deviation of real-time load level from day-ahead prediction 
,
E
DA tP  kW, day-ahead energy bid/offer quantity submitted by the µVPP; positive 
value corresponds to energy bid, negative value corresponds to energy offer 
,
R
up tP  kW, day-ahead upward reserve offer quantity submitted by the µVPP; this 
variable has positive values which correspond to offers 
,
R
dw tP  kW, day-ahead downward reserve offer quantity submitted by the µVPP; this 








−∆  kW, real-time downward variation to the energy bids/offers 
,
Gen
i tP  kW, day-ahead output power of dispatchable generator i during time t  
,i to  day-ahead binary variable which represents the operation status of dispatchable 
generator i during time t  
,i tu  day-ahead binary variable which represents the start-up decision of 
dispatchable generator i during time t  
,i tv  day-ahead binary variable which represents the shut-down decision of 






s i tP∆  kW, real-time variation of the output power of dispatchable generator i in 
scenario s during time t  
,W S
tP  kW, day-ahead variable which represents the scheduled usage of the forecasted 
wind generation power 
,W A





i tr  kW, available upward reserve capacity sourced from dispatchable generator i




i tr  kW, available downward reserve capacity sourced from dispatchable generator
i during time t  
,
Loss
s tP  kW, real-time consumption power of load loss in scenario s during time t  
DSO
uVPPS  £, total income of the µVPP from the two-stage distribution system market 
E
DAS  £, income/expense of the µVPP from day-ahead energy market; positive value 
corresponds to expense, negative value corresponds to income 
R
DAS  £, income of the µVPP from day-ahead reserve market 
E
RTS  £, income/expense variation of the µVPP from real-time energy market 
R
RTS  £, income variation of the µVPP from real-time reserve market 
Gen
DAS  £, day-ahead generation cost of all the dispatchable generators 
Gen
RTS  £, real-time generation cost variation of all the dispatchable generators 
Load
DAS  £, day-ahead income of the µVPP from supplying energy to end-consumers 
Loss




4.2.2 µVPP Business Model in the Local Energy-Reserve Pool 
By pooling the energy and reserve capacities resourced from both local DERs and 
traditional suppliers, a market is established in the distribution system as shown in Fig. 18. 
The participants in the market including µVPPs and energy suppliers are managed by a 
Distribution System Operator (DSO). The dual role of µVPP as both producer and consumer 
enables a submission of either energy offer or energy bid to the market, depending on the 
capacity of DER and the demand level inside the µVPP. The energy suppliers submit only 
energy offers to sell the capacity purchased from wholesale market. The proposed 
distribution system pool introduces more competition to the retail energy market and 
provides µVPPs with the liberty to switch between producer and consumer in the daily 
operation. 
 
Fig. 18 Energy-reserve pool market in the distribution system 
In the day-ahead (DA) market, the DA retail energy price
,E DA
tC (£/kWh) is broadcasted by 
the DSO to the market participants. Based on the price signals, µVPPs submit two sets of 
hourly quantity bid/offer: the energy bid or offer ,
E




































the upward or downward reserve offer , ,/
R R
up t dw tP P (kW) to provide regulating service. In the 




s tC (£/kWh). Thus, changes 







−∆ (kW). Should the need arise for the provision of reserve capacity, call up 
signals , ,/
up dw
s t s tSIG SIG will be issued by the DSO and the µVPPs that are called up will 
produce the exact amount of regulating power as they offered in the DA market. To sum up, 
DA market matches the electricity demand bids and supply offers from pool participants and 
RT market settles the imbalanced power to achieve real-time equation of supply and demand. 
This thesis focuses on the behaviour of a price-taking µVPP when pursuing its individual 
profit in the local pool market. As a prerequisite, the decisions made by DSO including DA 
and RT retail price as well as the call up signals are assumed to be known. 
To illustrate the context and beneficiaries of the energy-reserve pool in the distribution 
system, the µVPP business model should be developed addressing the roles and value 
transactions between players including DSO, µVPP and end-users as presented in Fig. 19. 
 
Fig. 19 Value transactions between participants in the distribution system market 
µVPP - DSO 
DSO manages the pool market and channels the value stream between participants from 























Methodology issued by Ofgem, a capacity charge determined by the highest kW power flow 
at the grid connection point will be included in the energy tariff. Thus, the DA energy 
bid/offer ,
E
DA tP (kW) is priced at
,E DA
tCη × (£/kWh), where the ratioη implies that a higher 
transaction limit corresponds to more expensive tariff. Also in the DA market, DSO pays 
each µVPP for the submission of upward or downward reserve offer , ,/
R R
up t dw tP P (kW) at 
price
R
DAC (£/kWh). Later in the RT market, µVPP’s payment/income from DA energy 
bid/offer could be affected by two sources: the upward or downward changes to the DA 




s tC (£/kWh) and the DA 
energy tariff. Another RT income for µVPP comes from the provision of reserve capacity if 
its DA reserve offer is called up to produce. The income of µVPP from participating in the 
distribution system market is calculated as: 
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∑ , ,EDA tP s t× ∀ ∀∑
(4.1) 
where the first term of equation represents the revenue of µVPP
R
DAS (£) for the provision of 
reserve offers in the DA market. This income is obtained whether the offers are called up or 
not. The second term stands for the payment
R
RTS (£) in the RT market when the reserve 
capacity is called up to produce. The third term is the expense
E
DAS (£) of purchasing energy 






RTS (£), which is the result of changes of the energy capacity 
being traded in the RT market and the difference between DA and RT energy price. In 




RTS under each scenario s are assigned with a 
specific probability
*
sπ derived from scenario reduction process presented in section 4.3. 
µVPP Generation Cost 
The DER located in the proposed µVPP includes small or medium scale wind turbines and 
diesel generators. The operation cost of wind turbines is assumed to be zero, leaving the 
inherent cost to be the operation cost of dispatchable generators (DG): 




Gen Gen Gen SU SD
DA i i t i i t i i t
t i
S C P C u C v i t
= =
= × + × + × ∀ ∀∑∑    (4.2) 
where the price parameters include fuel cost
Gen





iC (£) associated with start-up decision ,i tu and shut-down cost
SD
iC (£) 
associated with shut-down decision ,i tv . While in the RT market, the diesel generators must 
ramp up or ramp down their output power , ,
Gen
s i tP∆ (kW) to accommodate the changes in 
demand level and fulfil the task to produce reserve capacity. The variation of operation cost 







RT s i s i t
s t i
S C P s i tπ
= = =
= × ∆ ∀ ∀ ∀∑∑∑     (4.3) 
µVPP – End-Consumer 











Load E DA L DA
DA t t
t
S C P tω η
=
= × × × ∀∑      (4.4) 
where
,E DA
tCω η× × is the DA energy price with discount for the end-users in the µVPP and
,L DA
tP (kW) is the forecasted load level. In the RT market scenarios, both the retail energy 
price and the actual demand vary from DA forecasted value, the variation of retail income is 
calculated as: 
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s tP (kW) is the RT load level in each scenario. Additionally, a small level of load loss
,
Loss
s tP (kW) is tolerable in the µVPP supply commitment but the end-consumers should be 







RT s loss s t
s t
S C P s tπ
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4.3 Modelling of the Uncertainties in the µVPP 
The uncertain components in the µVPP include wind power output, load level, RT energy 
price and RT call up signals for reserve offers. A truncated normal distribution is used to 
mimic the DA forecast error of the first three components. The truncated normal distribution 
is one of the straightforward interpretations of the forecast errors in predicting the renewable 
generation, demand and electricity price because the characteristic parameters of mean and 
standard deviation could be readily derived by analysing the historical data [135]. In theory, 
the values of a normally distributed parameter can range from −∞ to +∞ and could lead to 
significant computational errors if the sample number is not enough. Therefore, the 
normally distributed data is “truncated” to preserve the realistic probability range [135]. In 
practice, the truncated normal distribution is already used by California Independent System 
Operator (ISO) to establish the forecast model for renewable resources and load [136]. 
( ), , 2, ~ , ,W RT W DAs t t WP TN P s tσ ∀ ∀       (4.7) 
( ), , 2, ~ , ,L RT L DAs t t LP TN P s tσ ∀ ∀       (4.8) 
( ), , 2, ~ , ,E RT E DAs t t CEC TN C s tσ ∀ ∀       (4.9) 






tC are used as the mean value in 
equation (4.7) - (4.9) and the forecast error is represented by the standard deviation of each 
component. A truncated normal distribution is like a normal distribution but differs in its 
bounded or truncated extremities, which corresponds to the fact that forecasting error would 




signals for reserve offers, they are generated as random binary signals with a low probability 
of signal “1” (“1” represents the offer is being called up). This is because the reserve 
capacity is only required to be produced during emergency period when there is an 
unexpected disruption to the supply. The Monte Carlo method is applied to generate 
scenarios for the uncertain components in µVPP based on repeated sampling following the 
truncated normally probability distribution. As a computational approach, the complexity 
for solving stochastic programs gets worse when increasing the number of scenarios. In this 
case, scenario reduction technique is introduced in the following as a tradeoff between data 
accuracy and computational efficiency. 
Scenario reduction techniques including forward selection algorithm and backward 
reduction algorithm have been widely utilised in [137-139] to deal with individual 
stochastic data. Through eliminating scenarios with very low probability and aggregating 
close scenarios based on the distance of probability distributions, a subset of the original 
scenario set is derived to be the best approximation. This section aims at capturing all the 
stochastic components concurrently thus the scenario reduction should be executed for three 
stochastic variables simultaneously. A novel three-dimension forward selection algorithm is 
therefore proposed to produce an optimal subset of scenarios with an updated probability 
distribution. Each scenario contains a wind generation power, load consumption power and 
RT electricity price.  




components ( ), , ,, , ,, ,W RT L RT E RTs t s t s tP P C ; perform mapping of the components onto a 













s tC as Z coordinate. 
Step 2) Calculate the distance between any two scenario points: 






t t t t t t
t
D s s X s X s Y s Y s Z s Z s
s s
=















′ ′= × ∀ ∈ Ω∑      (4.11) 
 Choose 1 arg min s ss KD∈Ω∈  
 Update the deleted scenario set { }1\J S← Ω  
Step i) Calculate the distance between any two scenario points left in J : 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 11, min , , , ,i i i iiD s s D s s D s s s s J− − −−′ ′ ′= ∀ ∈   (4.12) 
 Calculate the Kantorovich distance of the scenario point: 
( )1 1 1\ ,i
i i i
s ss J s
KD D s s s Jπ− − −′′∈ ′= ∀ ∈∑     (4.13) 
 Choose arg min
i
i s ss KD∈Ω∈  
 Update the deleted scenario set { }1 \i i iJ J S−←  
Step i+1) Repeat Step I until the required number of scenarios have been deleted then 
update the following set: 
* 1 \i *J J S J+= = Ω  






s s ss J s
π π π ′′∈= +∑  where 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* | , arg min ,s SJ s s J s j s j s D s s′′∈′ ′ ′ ′′ ′= ∈ = ∈   (4.14) 
The initial scenario set generated in step 1 has a large scenario number N Ω and an equal 
probability of 1 / N Ω for each scenario. By mapping each scenario as a point in the 
three-dimensional coordinate space, the distance between any two scenarios could be 
calculated using equation (4.10) in Step 2 and later in Step 3 a probability metric called 
Kantorovich distance is obtained using equation (4.11). Intuitively, if each scenario 
distributed in the three-dimensional space is viewed as a unit amount of “earth” pile, then 
the scenario point 1s with minimum Kantorovich distance represents the minimum “cost” of 
transferring all earth piles to a single point in the given space. Therefore 1s is selected as the 
first scenario to represent the stochastic profile. This iterative process in Step i continues to 
select representative scenarios is by updating the distance in equation (4.12) and 
Kantorovich distance in equation (4.13), leaving fewer and fewer scenarios in the deleted set
J . Finally, the process terminates when required number of scenarios have been selected. 
Equation (4.14) assigns the new probability
*
sπ to each selected scenario by adding its 
former probability and all probabilities of the deleted scenarios that are closest to it with 
respect to distance. The following figure Fig. 20 displays how the three-dimensional 
forward selection algorithm delivers a best possible approximation of the initial stochastic 
data. In the 3D domain where the scenarios ( ), , ,, , ,, ,W RT L RT E RTs t s t s tP P C are mapped onto, the 
selected scenarios after reduction are distributed uniformly while the deleted scenario points 




the scenario reduction algorithm because the scenarios distributed uniformly in the centre of 
the domain have minimum distances from the rest of the points and therefore the selected 
scenarios can better represent the original data sample. 
 
Fig. 20 Three-dimensional forward selection algorithm performance 
From the probability distribution point of view, the cumulative probability curves of the 
selected scenarios for ( ), , ,, , ,, ,W RT L RT E RTs t s t s tP P C are derived from their RT value and new 
probability
*
sπ . The new cumulative probability curves nearly overlap with the original 
curve formed by 1000 scenarios, which verifies the close resemblance between the selected 
set S and initial set Ω in terms of data distribution. In addition, both cumulative probability 
curves are only continuous against a limited range of X-axis, which proves that the obtained 
uncertain data complies with the truncated normal distribution and unrealistic data values 




4.4 Chance-Constrained Two-Stage Stochastic µVPP Bidding 
Strategy Formulation 
In this section, a chance-constrained two-stage stochastic formulation is utilised to devise 
the bidding strategy for a µVPP. In the first stage, the objective is to maximise µVPP’s 
expected net profit by adding up its income from the DA energy-reserve market and 
deducting the operation cost of generators. The decision variables determined in the first 
stage include: 1) the energy bid/offer submitted to the DA market; 2) the reserve bid 
submitted to the DA market; 3) the operation schedule and output power for each generator 
and 4) the scheduled usage of wind power based on the forecasted output. 
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where the DA revenue comes from submitting reserve offers
R
DAS and energy retail
Load
DAS . 
The DA cost includes expected payment for energy bid
E
DAS (if the energy offer instead of bid 
is submitted in the DA market,
E




Subject to the following constraints: 
max , max
E






i i t i t iP P o P i t≤ ≤ ∀ ∀             (4.17) 
( ), 1 , , 0,1 1 ,Geni t i t i k ono o o k t T i t−− + − ≤ ≤ − − ≤ ∀ ∀         (4.18) 
( ), 1 , , 1,1 1 ,Geni t i t i k offo o o k t T i t− − + ≤ ≤ − − ≤ ∀ ∀          (4.19) 
, 1 , , 0 ,i t i t i to o u i t−− + − ≤ ∀ ∀              (4.20) 
, 1 , , 0 ,i t i t i to o v i t− − − ≤ ∀ ∀              (4.21) 
( ) ( ), , 1 , 1 , , 1 ,2 1 ,Gen Gen Geni t i t i t i t i i t i t iP P o o P o o RU i t− − −− ≤ − − + + − ∀ ∀      (4.22) 
( ) ( ), 1 , , 1 , , 1 ,2 1 ,Gen Gen Geni t i t i t i t i i t i t iP P o o P o o RD i t− − −− ≤ − − + − + ∀ ∀      (4.23) 






E Gen W S L DA
DA t i t t t
i
P P P P i t
=








i t dw ir P i tρ≤ ≤ ∀ ∀             (4.27) 
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Gen Gen up Gen
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( ) ( ),, , 1 , , 1 , , 1 ,2 1 ,Gen Gen Gen up Geni t i t i t i t i t i i t i t iP P r o o P o o RU i t− − −− + ≤ − − + + − ∀ ∀    (4.30) 
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The objective function (4.15) aims at maximising the expected DA profit of µVPP while 
considering the limits of its generators and guaranteeing a small probability of load loss. 
Equation (4.16) defines the upper and lower limits of the DA energy bid/offer. Equation 
(4.17) ensures the power output of each generator is within its capacity. Equation (4.18) and 
(4.19) are the minimum on time and minimum off time constraints for generators 
respectively. Equation (4.20) and (4.21) define the start-up and shut-down variables. 
Equation (4.22) and (4.23) apply the ramping rate limits on the speed of each generator to 
increase or decrease its power output. Equation (4.24) represents the fact that the scheduled 
wind power will not exceed the forecasted value. Equation (4.25) is the power balance 
constraint between supply and demand inside the µVPP. Should the DA reserve offer be 
called up to produce, equation (4.26) and (4.27) set the upper limit of upward and 
downward spinning reserve that are available from each generator. However, the production 
of upward or downward spinning reserve capacity should also abide by the output power 
limit and ramping limit as indicated by (4.28) - (4.29) and (4.30) - (4.31) respectively. 
Equation (4.32) indicates that the upward reserve capacity offered by µVPP should not 
exceed its demand level since satisfying the load is the priority of DER production. 
Equation (4.33) explains that the upward reserve capacity offer is originated from ramping 




downward reserve offer. Equation (4.36) is the chance constraint for LOLP if upward 
reserve offer is not called up to produce. Equation (4.37) is the chance constraint for LOLP 
if upward reserve offer is called up to produce. In this case the power flows from the µVPP 
to the distribution pool and the upward reserve capacity will be deducted from the upward 
spinning reserves. The remainder of the power supply should guarantee a low probability of 
load loss. 
The chance constraints (4.36) and (4.37) are converted into their equivalent deterministic 
formulation as follows: 
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  (4.39) 
where the mean of the RT net load (i.e. net load is obtained by deducing the wind power 
from load) is calculated as: 
( ), , , ,, ,L RT W RT L DA W DAs t s t t tE P P P P t− = − ∀      (4.40) 
And the standard deviation of the stochastic net load is calculated as: 
( ) ( )( )2, , * , , , ,, , , , , ,
1
NS
L RT W RT L RT W RT L RT W RT
s t s t s s t s t s t s t
s
P P P P E P P tσ π
=
− = − − − ∀∑    (4.41) 
In the second stage, the objective is to maximise the gains (or minimise the losses) of µVPP 
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Subject to the following constraints: 
, ,
, , , , , ,
Gen dw Gen Gen up
i t s i t i tr P r s i t− ≤ ∆ ≤ ∀ ∀ ∀            (4.43) 
, max , max0 ,0 ,
E E
s t s tP EXCH P EXCH s t
+ −≤ ∆ ≤ ≤ ∆ ≤ ∀ ∀         (4.44) 
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+ −− + = ∆ − ∆ ∀ ∀         (4.49) 
The second stage objective function (4.42) aims at maximising the increment (or equally 
minimising the decrement) of expected µVPP profit in different scenarios with specified 
probability. The first term represents the RT income
R
RTS from delivering the offered reserve 
capacity. The second term refers to the income variation
Load
RTS caused by uncertain RT load. 
The third and fourth terms of function (4.42) stand for cost variation
E
RTS which settles the 
RT payment for any upward or downward changes to energy bid and for the price difference 
between the DA market and the RT market. The fifth term is the cost variation
Gen
RTS  for the 
increment or decrement in output power for all generators. The last term ,
Loss






RTS to end-consumers for possible load loss in certain scenarios. The 
first stage decision variables ,
E
DA tP , ,
R
up tP , ,
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i tr are still involved in the 




or downward change ,
E
s tP
−∆ to the DA energy quantity bid/offer; 2) the change to the thi
scheduled generator output power , ,
Gen




s tP according to 
the RT wind power production and 4) the load loss power ,
Loss
s tP . 
As for constraints, equation (4.43) ensures that the adjustment to the generator output lies 
within the limits of upward and downward spinning reserve. Equation (4.44) and (4.45) 
address that the transaction limit should not be exceeded when changing the energy 
bid/offer capacity in the RT market. Equation (4.46) represents the constraint for actual wind 
power usage in different scenarios. The chance constraints (4.36) - (4.37) guarantee a low 
probability of load loss event, however, the capacity of load loss should be confined to a 
small portion ζ of load as equation (4.47) indicates. Equation (4.48) is the power balance 
constraint between supply and demand for the µVPP in the RT market. Finally, the power 
flow relationship at the distribution network connection point is described in an equality 
constraint (4.49).  
To sum up, the two-stage stochastic bidding strategy is formulated as a mixed-integer linear 
programming (MILP) problem with the first stage objective (4.15) subjected to the first 
stage constraints (4.16) - (4.37) and the second stage objective (4.42) subjected to the 
second stage constraints (4.43) - (4.49). The two-stage objective functions are combined and 




4.5 Comparative Case Studies 
In the comparative performance study, the interrelation between the µVPP design and its 
projected profit are addressed. Two parametric indexes are introduced: the DER index that 
represents the ratio of on-site DER capacity over the value of maximum load level and the 
RES index that is defined as the ratio of RES capacity over the total DER capacity. The first 
case is set up with fixed uncertainty level for volatile parameters, where µVPPs with 
different DER indexes and RES indexes are studied. The second case studies the impact of 
wind power uncertainty, load uncertainty and LOLP level individually. The third case 
compares the proposed chance-constrained formulation with the classical Monte Carlo RT 
recourse approach. The fourth case analyses the impact of the congestion on the µVPP 
bidding behaviours. Considering the decarbonisation strategy promoted by the UK 
government, the last case investigates the impact on µVPPs’ profit brought by the 
introduction of carbon tax. 
The UK DA forecasted retail electricity price is extracted from Nord Pool price data 2016 
[134], while the carbon tax rates are calculated according to the UK government’s policy on 
carbon pricing [140]. The µVPP candidate, a residential community located in West 
Midlands County, has around 200 households with an average of 533kW daily consumption 
power. End-consumers of the community are subject to a 10% discount on retail price and 
200% compensation for load loss. To provide guidance to deploy DERs in this community, 




20kW to 660kW are studied. All case studies are coded with YALMIP and CPLEX 12.1.4 is 
utilised as the solver. The program runs on an Intel Core-i5 2.5-GHz computer and the run 
time for the algorithm is around 80 seconds.  
4.5.1 Case A – Impact of DER Index and RES Index 
In this case, four DER indexes of 1/4, 1/2, 3/4 and 1 are studied. Nine RES indexes from 0 
to 1 with a gradient of 1/8 are also introduced. Firstly, the bidding behaviour in DA 
energy-reserve market for different combinations of DER index (I1) and RES index (I2) is 







Fig. 21 µVPP bidding behaviour: (a) energy market bidding;  
(b) upward reserve offering; (c) downward reserve offering 
The diagram on the left-hand side of Fig. 21(a) shows a similar pattern of bidding behaviour 
for µVPPs with the same RES index and different DER index: the peak and valley bidding 
curves overlap with peak and valley load. When the DER capacity equals to the value of 
maximum load, µVPP can make energy offers to the pool during low demand period of 3-4 
a.m. and 6-7 a.m. The diagram on the right-hand side of Fig. 21(a) demonstrates how the 
RES index impacts the bidding behaviour under a fixed DER capacity: with a low RES 
penetration level of 0 and 1/4 Index value, µVPP is more inclined to an autonomy state from 
the grid and will only make energy bid during energy intensive period of the day. The 
capacity of the bid is also lower with low RES indexes since dispatchable generators, which 
account for the larger half of the DER, can provide more upward spinning reserve to be used 
inside µVPP. For higher RES index of 1/2 and 1, the bidding/offering pattern becomes more 
volatile. Although µVPP is capable of producing energy offers during low consumption 
period, it also needs to purchase large capacity of energy during energy intensive hours. 




increases µVPP’s vulnerability to fault events. 
In the left diagram of Fig. 21(b), the upward reserve offers submitted by µVPPs with 
different DER indexes share the same pattern. Intuitively, a larger DER capacity means a 
higher offer capacity from dispatchable generators. When the DER is made up entirely of 
wind generation, µVPP becomes incapable of providing upward reserve offer. 
The provision of downward reserve offer as indicated in Fig. 21(c) shares similarities with 
upward reserve offering except for the energy intensive period of 10 a.m. to 18 p.m., when 
µVPP rarely submits downward reserve offers. This is because the submission of downward 
reserve offers during the high demand period is only driven by lower energy price. If the 
cost of dispatchable generation is lower than the RT energy price, µVPP will not provide 
downward reserve service for economic concerns. 
Secondly in Case A, the daily profit of µVPP of different DER index and RES index is 
presented in Fig. 22. 
 
Fig. 22 µVPP profit for different DER and RES indexes 




assumption that wind turbine has zero operation cost. When the DER index is fixed and the 
RES index increases gradually, the net load will gradually decrease and therefore the 
expected profit will increase with a gradually reduced grid import. When the RES index is 
fixed, the increase of the profit with a rising DER index has two reasons: firstly, the 
reduction of net load still increases with the same gradient as the RES capacity increases. 
Secondly the rise in DG capacity brings more revenue from offering in the energy and 
reserve markets. However, high penetration of RES requires major initial investment 
followed by regular expenses on maintenance and repair. A µVPP with a seemingly high 
daily profit could also risk being put on a slow lane to recoup its capital investment. The 
profit for RES-dominated µVPP calculated based on the optimistic assumption may seem 
tempting for investors. However, the limitation of Case A is that the maximum capacity of 
RES does not exceed the peak demand. If the installed capacity of the RES is higher than 
the demand and µVPP expects to earn more by transforming itself into RES plant, the 
expectation will be challenged by non-profitable curtailment of the RES output due to 
supplier market saturation. Therefore, it is expected that the increase of profit will slow 
down and eventually stop if the RES capacity continues to rise. Thus, the financial viability 
of entering the distribution market relies heavily on the allocation of DER capacities. A 
poorly organised µVPP such as the one with the DER index 1 and RES index 0 has a 




4.5.2 Case B – Impact of Uncertainties and LOLP 
 
 
Fig. 23 Extra revenue obtained by (a) eliminating 20% wind forecast error;  
(b) eliminating 5% load forecast error 
In this case, the impact of narrowing down the parameter uncertainties of wind power and 
load level is demonstrated in Fig. 23. It is pointed out that extra revenue can be generated by 
acquiring more accurate forecast information during the DA bidding stage. This figure 
depicts the increment of the revenue instead of the revenue itself, therefore the positive 
values of the bars still indicate a continuous increase in the profit as the DER index and the 
RES index rise. However, the extra revenue (or the increment of the revenue) demonstrates 
a fluctuating characteristic: the increment from more accurate wind forecast drops a bit and 




severe for the extra revenue from more accurate load forecast. The fluctuation profile can be 
explained by examining the chance constraints (4.38) and (4.39) in section 4.4. When one of 
the forecast error is fixed and the other is changing gradually, the mean value of the net load
( ), ,, ,L RT W RTs t s tE P P− changes at the same speed. But the change of the standard deviation
( ), ,, ,L RT W RTs t s tP Pσ − does not follow a fixed pattern which causes the fluctuation. Ultimately 
the fluctuation passes to the left-hand side of the chance constraints and leads to fluctuating 
patterns of bidding behaviours. Since the load level is higher than the wind power for most 
indexes, the change in revenue increment brought by altering load forecast accuracy is 
expected to be more dramatic. Fig. 23(a) shows how much extra revenue can be obtained by 
narrowing down the wind forecast error from 20% to 0. The revenue rises with an increasing 
capacity of DER and the increasing share of RES, but the additional income barely achieves 
5% increase in percentage terms for all possible configurations. This phenomenon also 
results from the relatively small capacity of the wind generation. Therefore, a small level of 
wind power forecast error is tolerable for µVPPs under the current configurations but an 
accurate forecast system will be beneficial to those with large wind turbine assets. Fig. 23(b) 
displays the extra revenue generated by slashing the load forecast error from 5% to 0. 
Unlike wind power uncertainty, an accurate load forecast information proves to be crucial 
for µVPPs with all configurations because of the relatively large capacity of the load 
compared with the RES. The maximum profit increments in percentage terms are 71.28%, 
36.88% and 86.66% for µVPP with DER index 1/2, 3/4 and 1 respectively. For µVPP with 




back to a break-even point. To sum up, accurate load forecast system is mandatory for 
profit-seeking µVPPs, especially for those with small wind turbine assets because a more 
volatile load would cost more energy bidding variations and more spinning reserves to be 
consumed inside µVPP. 
The second result presented in this case is the impact of LOLP level on the profit and 
upward reserve offering behaviour. The European Parliament has issued a regulation on 
risk-preparedness in the electricity sector, in which the security of power supply requires 
that 95% to 99% of the time no one should be involuntarily disconnected. Consequently, the 
value of LOLP could be set as 0.01, 0.02 and 0.05. The result of an example µVPP with 
DER index 1/4 is given in Table X. Theoretically speaking, a strict LOLP level requires 
more upward spinning reserve to be ready for domestic consumption inside the µVPP 
instead of being submitted to the market. By relaxing the LOLP level from 0.01 to 0.02, 
there is an increase in the upward reserve capacity being submitted to the market for almost 
all configurations and by relaxing the LOLP from 0.01 to 0.05 the increase in the upward 
reserve offer can be doubled. For µVPP with higher share of dispatchable generators 
(represented by lower RES index I2), the reserve offer increment becomes more significant 
with LOLP relaxation and so does the extra revenue. An inconsistency is spotted in the 
results presented in Table X: the increase in the profit of a full-dispatchable µVPP is not as 
significant as the µVPP with 1/8 of RES share. This phenomenon results from the optimistic 
assumption that the operation cost of RES in this study is zero. The profit increment of the 




TABLE X IMPACT OF LOLP ON PROFIT AND UPWARD RESERVE OFFERING FOR DER INDEX 1/4 







































0 290.37  415.04  602.03   42.93% ↑  107.33% ↑  36.86% ↑  
1/8 404.69  532.68  723.01   31.63% ↑  78.66% ↑  186.11% ↑  
2/8 581.77  638.54  788.39   9.76% ↑  35.52% ↑  38.60% ↑  
3/8 627.97  697.67  782.41   11.10% ↑  24.59% ↑  18.38% ↑  
4/8 607.25  649.63  674.00   6.98% ↑  10.99% ↑  9.63% ↑  
5/8 509.23  517.89  520.85   1.70% ↑  2.28% ↑  6.17% ↑  
6/8 358.75  362.92  372.21   1.16% ↑  3.75% ↑  4.58% ↑  
7/8 192.50  192.50  192.50   0 0 3.66% ↑  
1 0 0 0  0 0 3.33% ↑  
Four specific configurations are worth highlighting: for µVPPs with extremely high share of 
dispatchable generators in their energy mix (represented by low RES index 0 and 1/8), the 
LOLP setting has a tremendous impact on the upward reserve offer behaviour and a LOLP 
relaxation from 0.05 to 0.01 could potentially recover a losing µVPP operation to the 
break-even point. To achieve the trade-off between supply security (guaranteed by low 
LOLP) and economic viability (financially sound under higher LOLP), these µVPPs with 
low RES index should consider the deployment of controllable loads to actively shed the 
lost load. On the other hand, some µVPPs have extremely low capacity of dispatchable 
generators (represented by high RES index 7/8 and 1) and the upward spinning reserve is 
not enough to be submitted as reserve offers. Thus, it is not necessary for these µVPPs to 
participate in the reserve market. Also, the insignificant rise in extra revenue makes them 




4.5.3 Case C – Comparison of Risk-Hedging Methods 
To address the competitiveness of the proposed chance-constrained formulation, a reference 
case is derived by solving a deterministic DA problem and applying the Monte Carlo 
recourse method in RT stage to obtain the best approximation of µVPP profit. The DA 
objective (4.15) subjected to constraints (4.16) - (4.35) is solved independently as a 
deterministic problem, with chance constraints (4.36) - (4.37) replaced by the following 
limits (4.50) - (4.51): 
max , , max
E R
DA t up tEXCH P P EXCH t− ≤ − ≤ ∀       (4.50) 
max , , max
E R
DA t dw tEXCH P P EXCH t− ≤ + ≤ ∀       (4.51) 
where the provision of upward and downward reserve strictly obeys the transaction limit at 
the grid connection point, regardless of any RT stochastic parameters. Then the already 
derived bid/offer capacities and the dispatchable generation schedule are utilised in RT 
recourse with objective (4.42) subjected to constraints (4.43) - (4.49). Both risk-hedging 
methods are applied in an example µVPP with DER index 1 and RES index 1/2. The result 
is displayed in Table XI.  
Based entirely from DA forecasted knowledge, the capacity of energy bid in the reference 
case (Monte Carlo recourse method) is closer to the forecasted consumption level and there 
is larger headroom to purchase more energy from the pool to provide downward reserve. 
Also, the deterministic formulation requires the forecasted load to be satisfied without any 




reserve services. Although the RT recourse has made every effort to accommodate the 
uncertainties and achieved 97.3% of the proposed profit, it still yields a staggering 69% 
probability of load loss event and a daily penalty that is more than 100 times of the proposed 
method. The deterministic & Monte Carlo recourse method utilises Monte Carlo sampling 
to realise the uncertainties in the RT operations given the DA schedules. The purpose of the 
method is to approximate the projected profit from the two-stage market and evaluate 
physical requirement such as the loss of load probability. Therefore, the DA schedules from 
the separate deterministic formulation could be assessed and modified accordingly. 
Chance-constrained formulation, on the other hand, incorporates the risk management in the 
DA scheduling and solves the two-stage bidding problem concurrently. This consideration 
gives chance-constrained method more confidence in purchases and sales of larger 
quantities and yields a higher expected profit. 
TABLE XI COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO RISK-HEDGING METHODS IN THE BIDDING STRATEGY 




Monte Carlo Recourse 
Total Power bid/offer  
in energy market (kW) 
1547.11 960.09 
Total Up reserve offer (kW) 2161.95 1889.46 
Total Down reserve offer (kW) 1517.59 1582.29 
Loss of Load Probability 5% 69% 
Total energy payment in 
DA and RT market (£) 
125.44 109.80 
Total reserve income in 
DA and RT market (£) 
202.00 178.56 
Avg. Load Loss Penalty (£) 0.05 5.13 
µVPP Profit (£) 926.15 900.94 
Computation time (s) 80.1 104.0 
To sum up, the reference case represents a conservative business pattern for µVPP to 
participate in the energy-reserve distribution market. Although the RT recourse method does 




major hazard unless controllable loads are introduced. On the other hand, the proposed 





4.5.4 Case D – Rival’s Impact on Bidding Behaviours 
The bidding behaviours of the µVPP is influenced by rivals located in its nearby buses. For 
price-taking µVPPs, such impact takes place in the event of distribution line congestion 
when the feeders are heavily loaded. A three bus DC network model is utilised in this case 
and presented in Fig. 24: two rival µVPPs are represented by two adjacent nodes (node 1 
and node 2) while node 3 is the energy-reserve pool managed by the DSO. 
 
Fig. 24 Three bus DC network model for µVPPs 
With the following additional constraints of the DC power flow model: 
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And the following additional constrains of the line limits: 
max max
12 12 12P P P− ≤ ≤         (4.55) 
max max
13 13 13P P P− ≤ ≤         (4.56) 
max max
23 23 23P P P− ≤ ≤         (4.57) 
And the constraints for state variables: 
10 0θ≤ ≤          (4.58) 
2θ−∞ ≤ ≤ ∞         (4.59) 
3θ−∞ ≤ ≤ ∞          (4.60) 
 
 
Fig. 25 Impact on behaviours: (a) energy market bidding; (b) dispatchable generation;  




If network congestion is not considered, the bidding quantity of individual µVPP in the 
energy market is limited only by the overall transaction limit. However, the distribution line 
between node 1 and node 3 is congested during peak load period from 09:00 to 21:00 since 
the power flow requested by the µVPP exceeds the thermal limit of the distribution line. As 
shown in Fig. 25(a), the energy bidding trajectory becomes flat during the same congestion 
period. To satisfy the demand within µVPP that has encountered congestion, the 
dispatchable generators must ramp up and produce more power as Fig. 25(b) indicates. 
Consequently, the dispatchable generators would have reduced room to ramp up and 
increased room to ramp down if they enter the reserve market. Fig. 25(c) and Fig. 25(d) 
show the decreased ability to provide upward reserve offer and the increased ability to 




4.5.5 Case E – Impact of Implementing Carbon Tax 
To promote the decarbonisation of electricity supply and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
the UK government has introduced a carbon tax levied on the electricity produced by 
generators using fossil fuels. From previous case studies, it has been demonstrated that 
dispatchable generators play a vital role in mitigating the RES volatility, load forecast error 
and providing regulating services. However, high penetration of fuel-fired dispatchable 
generators will compromise the 2020 emission targets and carbon tax is introduced to 
prevent harmful and unfavourable application of the dispatchable generators. The carbon tax 
ranges from 1.3p/kWh to 3.9p/kWh and it will be added to the variable unit cost for the 
dispatchable generators in the proposed µVPP. This case investigates how µVPPs, with their 
different shares of dispatchable generators, are affected by the implementation of carbon tax 
in terms of economic profit. 
 
Fig. 26 Impact of carbon tax on µVPPs with different RES indexes 
In Fig. 26, the bars in dark shade represent µVPPs’ profit without the consideration of 




generators. The medium bars and bars in light shade depict µVPPs’ profits with a low 
carbon tax rate of 1.3p/kWh and a high rate of 3.9p/kWh respectively. The introduction of 
carbon tax decreases µVPPs’ profit due to an increased operation cost of dispatchable 
generators and the reduction grows more significant with a higher tax rate. For those µVPPs 
with extremely high share of dispatchable generators (characterised by low RES index of 
1/8), the profit even drops to zero in the presence of a high carbon tax rate of 3.9p/kWh. 
Secondly, with the RES index increases from 1/8 to 7/8, the electricity supply of the µVPP 
becomes more decarbonised and the reduction on profit brought by carbon tax becomes less 
obvious. With the implementation of carbon tax, the µVPP would purchase more from the 
energy market and sell less to the market because of a reduced margin in energy transactions. 
Similarly, it would become less active in the provision of reserve capacities. Although the 
carbon tax deters many investors, especially the small-scale ones, from installing 
dispatchable generators in their µVPPs, it is still crucial to have adequate number of 
dispatchable generation assets in the distribution network if DSO wants to meet the reserve 
requirement locally and avoid catastrophic loss of load. This case study reveals the 
disadvantage of the price-taker model of the µVPP: the investment decision-making and the 
projected revenue of the µVPP are heavily influenced by the current policies and pricing 
mechanisms because µVPP as a prosumer does not have a say in the price-making process. 
By submitting price bids/offers along with the quantity bids/offers, those µVPPs with large 






This chapter has presented the bidding strategy formulation for price-taking micro Virtual 
Power Prosumers (µVPPs) to gain competitive advantage in the upcoming deployment of 
the distribution system market. Beside active bidding and offering in the energy pool, the 
µVPP also has its asset value stretched to provide ancillary services. In a foreseeable future, 
the energy-reserve equilibrium will be achieved locally by the interworking of multiple 
µVPPs. The increasing revenue for µVPPs will encourage the distribution system pool to 
become a highly competitive market. End-users will have a greater choice of energy 
suppliers which may yield retail electricity price reductions. µVPPs, recognised as 
full-dependent, semi-autonomous and full-autonomous in terms of DER coverage and 
full-dispatchable, semi-renewable and full-renewable in terms of RES share, have been 
shown to have significant differences in bidding behaviours and projected daily profits. The 
numerical tests have shown that accurate wind power and load forecasting bring additional 
revenue to the µVPP. The extra income can also be obtained by relaxing the required LOLP 
level due to increased DG availability to make higher offer in the reserve market. As a 
computationally efficient and technically secure method, the proposed chance-constrained 
two-stage µVPP optimisation has provided valuable guidance to investors in the 
determination of DER and RES capacities and the mitigation of risks brought by 
uncertainties. The deployment of such µVPPs in the distribution network could be a 




CHAPTER 5 MARKET EQUILIBRIUM IN    
ACTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WITH µVPPS:           
A COEVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 
5.1 Introduction 
The price-taking µVPP presented in Chapter 4 has demonstrated its ability to actively utilise 
the DERs and earn considerable profit as a new entry to the distribution system market. The 
bidding strategy derived from Chapter 4 is suitable for a type of market where the µVPP has 
perfect knowledge of the rivals’ information and market demand. Therefore, the µVPP is not 
exposed to market risks but only to the risks associated with the uncertainties within the 
µVPP itself. Consequently, the bidding strategy derived from the chance-constrained 
two-stage stochastic formulation is a rational decision under the market assumption. 
However, it is hard to find examples of industries which fit the criteria of “perfect 
knowledge”. In a more practical market setting, market players submit sealed bids to the 
system operator simultaneously so that no bidder knows the price and the quantity of the 
others. In such a non-cooperative market environment, players submit various quantities of 
the goods and price them differently to compete with rivals and maintain profit margin. This 
chapter investigates the equilibrium model of the distribution system market, where multiple 
µVPPs participate in the energy-reserve auction by submitting price-quantity bids/offers. A 




5.2 Three Market Frameworks in the Distribution System 
5.2.1 Nomenclature 
Sets and Indices 
t    Index of time in the scheduling horizon 
i    Index of the µVPPs in the market, index of the species in the ecosystem 
i−    Set of the rival µVPPs of the µVPP i  
s    Index of the individual in the population of the species 
k  Index of the iteration 
I  Set of the µVPPs in the market, set of the species in the ecosystem 
T  Set of the scheduling periods 
NI   Number of the µVPPs, number of the species 
NT   Number of hours in the scheduling horizon 
NS  The population size of the species, number of the individuals in the population 
NK   Number of the iterations in the coevolution 
,
i
k sInd  the individual in the s position of the population of species i in the kth iteration 
( )*,ik sInd  pure strategy Nash Equilibrium individual of species i found at the s position 
of the population and in the kth iteration 
i
kPop  the population of species i in the kth iteration 
UL
if  upper-level objective function: the profit of µVPP i  
LL






tλ   £/kWh, energy price of traditional retailer during time t  
RR
tλ   £/kWh, reserve price of traditional retailer during time t  
FIT
tλ   £/kWh, feed-in tariff for µVPPs’ surplus RES generation 
Gen
iC   £/kWh, variable production cost of the dispatchable generator in µVPP i  
SU
iC   £, start-up cost of the dispatchable generator in µVPP i  
SD
iC   £, shut-down cost of the dispatchable generator in µVPP i  
maxEXCH  kW, the transaction limit at the µVPP grid connection point 
,
W
i tP   kW, power of wind generation of the µVPP i during time t  
,
L
i tP    kW, power of load level of the µVPP i during time t  
Gen
iP   kW, maximum output power of the dispatchable generator in µVPP i  
Gen
iP   kW, minimum output power of the dispatchable generator in µVPP i  
Gen
onT   hour, minimum time the dispatchable generator should be up per day 
Gen
offT   hour, minimum time the dispatchable generator should be down per day 
iRU   kW/h, ramping up limit for the dispatchable generator in µVPP i  
iRD   kW/h, ramping down limit for the dispatchable generator in µVPP i  
upω   upper limit of the available upward spinning reserve power 
dwω   upper limit of the available downward spinning reserve power 
E
t
λ  £/kWh, upper limit of the energy bid price during time t  
E
tλ  £/kWh, lower limit of the energy bid price during time t  
R
t





tλ  £/kWh, lower limit of the reserve offer price during time t  
RUδ  total amount of upward spinning reserve required as a percentage of the total 
load 




tP  kW, the energy offer quantity of the traditional supplier to satisfy demand 
blocks in the distribution system 
RRU
tP  kW, the upward reserve offer quantity of the traditional supplier 
RRD
tP  kW, the downward reserve offer quantity of the traditional supplier 
,
E
i tP  kW, the energy bid quantity submitted by µVPP i during time t ; positive value 
corresponds to bid quantity, negative value corresponds to offer quantity 
,
RU
i tP  kW, the upward reserve offer quantity submitted by µVPP i during time t  
,
RU
i tP  kW, the downward reserve offer quantity submitted by µVPP i during time t  
,
E
i tλ  £/kWh, the energy bid price submitted by µVPP i during time t  
,
R
i tλ  £/kWh, the reserve offer price submitted by µVPP i during time t  
E
tC  £/kWh, market clearing price for energy bids/offers 
RU
tC  £/kWh, market clearing price for upward reserve offers 
RD
tC  £/kWh, market clearing price for downward reserve offers 
,
ULOC
i tC  £/kWh, the lost-opportunity-cost of µVPP i during time t for submitting 
upward reserve offer 
,
DLOC




downward reserve offer 
RE
tq  kW, the accepted quantity of the energy offer submitted by the traditional 
supplier during time t  
RRU
tq  kW, the accepted quantity of the upward reserve offer submitted by the 
traditional supplier during time t  
RRD
tq  kW, the accepted quantity of the downward reserve offer submitted by the 
traditional supplier during time t  
,
E
i tq  kW, the accepted quantity of the energy bid/offer submitted by µVPP i during 
time t  
,
RU
i tq  kW, the accepted quantity of the upward reserve offer submitted by µVPP i
during time t  
,
RD
i tq  kW, the accepted quantity of the downward reserve offer submitted by µVPP i
during time t  
,i to  binary variable which represents the operation status of dispatchable generator 
in µVPP i during time t  
,i tu  binary variable which represents the start-up decision of dispatchable generator 
in µVPP i during time t  
,i tv  binary variable which represents the shut-down decision of dispatchable 
generator in µVPP i during time t  
,
Gen
i tP  kW, the scheduled generation power of dispatchable generator in µVPP i







i tr  kW, available upward reserve capacity sourced from the dispatchable generator 




i tr  kW, available downward reserve capacity sourced from the dispatchable 
generator in µVPP i during time t  
,
Loss




5.2.2 The Current, A Passive and An Active Distribution System Market 
 
Fig. 27 Three types of markets in the distribution system 
Fig. 27 illustrates the proposed active distribution system market (ADSM) structure. To 
highlight its novelties, the frameworks of the current distribution system market (DSM) and 
a passive distribution system market (PDSM) are also included. The participants in three 
types of distribution markets include µVPPs and traditional retailers and the markets are 
managed by a DSO. The differences between market types lie in the role of µVPPs, type of 
the bids/offers and market status as Table XII shows. 
TABLE XII THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THREE TYPES OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM MARKETS 
   Properties 
Types 
Role of µVPPs Type of Bids Type of Competition 







































































































The section “I. Current DSM” in Fig. 27 illustrates the power flow and the information flow 
between market participants and the DSO in the current electricity retail market. For an 
individual µVPP, the DERs generate electricity only to satisfy its own demand during the 
periods when the operation cost is lower than retail energy price. Otherwise the µVPP 
submits the quantity ,
E
i tP (kW) it intends to buy from retailers at the retail energy price
RE
tλ
(£/kWh). The DSO then sums up the demand from µVPPs and request the total amount of
RE
tP (kW) from the retailers. There are times when renewable energy sources (RES) generate 
more than the demand needs, µVPP will export the excess power back to grid at feed-in 
tariff
FIT
tλ (£/kWh). As for reserve capacities required in the distribution system, the upward 
reserve demand
RRU
tP (kW) and downward reserve demand
RRD
tP (kW) are completely 
supplied by retailers at retail reserve price
RR
tλ (£/kWh). To sum up, the current distribution 
system market is dominated by retailers. The capacities of DERs are restricted to be 
consumed inside µVPPs, thus the function of µVPPs is degraded into MGs and the role of 
µVPPs is limited as pure consumers despite their insignificant renewable export. 
PDSM 
The section “II. PDSM” in Fig. 27 depicts the transaction of power and information between 
market participants and the DSO in a PDSM. In a PDSM, the transactions of power in 




tλ respectively. Based 






i tP (kW) to purchase or sell energy and the upward/downward reserve offer /
RRU RRD
t tP P
(kW) to provide regulating service. Then DSO clears the energy and reserve markets for 
each hour by matching the quantity in supply offers to the quantity in demand bids. The dual 
role of both producer and consumer defines µVPPs as prosumers. As price-takers, µVPPs 
and traditional retailers provide a homogeneous product at the same price which leads the 
market towards perfect competition. However, the volatility and small-scale capacities of 
DERs’ generation make µVPPs an imperfect substitution for traditional retailers therefore 
the PDSM can be described as “close-to-perfect”. 
ADSM 
The proposed ADSM is shown in section “III. ADSM” in Fig. 27 µVPPs participate in the 
ADSM as price-making prosumers by submitting two sets of hourly price-quantity 
bids/offers: the energy bid or offer ,
E
i tP (kW) at price ,
E
i tλ (£/kWh) to purchase or sell energy; 
the upward/downward reserve offer , ,/
RU RD
i t i tP P (kW) at price ,
R
i tλ (£/kWh). Traditional retailers, 
on the other hand, offer ADSM with quantities that are large enough to cover all the energy 
demand and reserve demand inside the distribution system at their retail prices. Then DSO 
clears the energy and reserve markets for each hour and produce the clearing price and 
clearing quantity for both markets aiming at maximising social welfare. DSO informs 
µVPPs of their clearing quantity ,
E
i tq (kW) and clearing price
E
tC (£/kWh) after clearing the 
energy market; the clearing quantity , ,/
RU RD
i t i tq q (kW) and clearing price /
RU RD
t tC C (£/kWh) 




/ /E RU RDt t tC C C (£/kWh) also apply to traditional retailers for their clearing quantity
/ /RE RRU RRDt t tq q q (kW) in the energy market, upward reserve market and downward reserve 
market respectively. 
The market frameworks of the current DSM and PDSM are used in this thesis as reference 
cases to demonstrate the advantages of ADSM. The maximisation of µVPPs’ profit (or 
equally the minimisation of their cost) in the current DSM and PDSM can be easily 
formulated as mixed-integer linear problem (MILP) and solved by commercial solvers. The 
results are utilised to investigate the operation strategies of µVPPs under different market 




5.3 Bilevel EPEC Formulation of Active Distribution System 
Market 
This section concentrates on formulating the proposed ADSM equilibrium model as a 
bilevel EPEC. The upper-level (UL) problem aims at maximising the economic profit of 
each µVPP and the lower-level (LL) problem aims at maximising the social welfare of the 
market clearing process. The objective functions and constraints of the bilevel EPEC are 
presented as follows. 
5.3.1 Upper-Level Problem - µVPP Profit Maximisation 
The objection function of the UL problems is formed as: 
{
( )}
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    (5.1) 
where the first two terms , ,
RU RU RD RD
t i t t i tC P C P× + × represent the revenue received from upward 
and downward reserve markets. The third term ,
E E
t i tC P× is the cost for energy bid. If µVPP 
offers energy to the market, the term ,
E E
t i tC P− × is another source of revenue. The fourth term
,
E L
t i tC P× is the income from supplying µVPPs’ end-consumers. The income and payment of 
the transactions between µVPPs and ADSM are calculated by multiplying the 
offering/bidding quantities by the clearing prices. The last term
, , ,
Gen Gen SU SD
i i t i i t i i tC P C u C v× + × + × is the generation cost of dispatchable generators (DG) 




Subject to the following constraints: 
( ), 1 , , 0,1 1 ,Geni t i t i k ono o o k t T i t−− + − ≤ ≤ − − ≤ ∀ ∀                (5.2) 
( ), 1 , , 1,1 1 ,Geni t i t i k offo o o k t T i t− − + ≤ ≤ − − ≤ ∀ ∀                 (5.3) 
, 1 , , 0 ,i t i t i to o u i t−− + − ≤ ∀ ∀                    (5.4) 
, 1 , , 0 ,i t i t i to o v i t− − − ≤ ∀ ∀                    (5.5) 
, , , , 1 0 ,i t i t i t i tu v o o i t−− − + = ∀ ∀                   (5.6) 
, , ,
Gen Gen Gen
i i t i t iP P o P i t≤ ≤ ∀ ∀                   (5.7) 
( ) ( ), , 1 , 1 , , 1 ,2 1 ,Gen Gen Geni t i t i t i t i i t i t iP P o o P o o RU i t− − −− ≤ − − + + − ∀ ∀         (5.8) 
( ) ( ), 1 , , 1 , , 1 ,2 1 ,Gen Gen Geni t i t i t i t i i t i t iP P o o P o o RD i t− − −− ≤ − − + − + ∀ ∀          (5.9) 
max , max ,
E
i tEXCH P EXCH i t− ≤ ≤ ∀ ∀               (5.10) 
, , , , ,
E Gen W L
i t i t i t i t








i t dw ir P i tω≤ ≤ ∀ ∀               (5.13) 
,
, , , ,
Gen Gen up Gen
i t i t i i tP r P o i t+ ≤ ∀ ∀               (5.14) 
,
, , , ,
Gen Gen dw Gen
i t i t i i tP r P o i t− ≥ ∀ ∀               (5.15) 
( ) ( ),, , 1 , , 1 , , 1 ,2 1 ,Gen Gen Gen up Geni t i t i t i t i t i i t i t iP P r o o P o o RU i t− − −− + ≤ − − + + − ∀ ∀         (5.16) 








i t i t
P r i t≤ ≤ ∀ ∀                   (5.19) 
Equation (5.2) and (5.3) are the minimum on time and minimum off time constraints for 




Equation (5.7) ensures the power output of each generator is within its capacity. Equation 
(5.8) and (5.9) apply the ramping rate limits on the speed of each generator to increase or 
decrease its power output. Equation (5.10) defines the upper and lower limits of the energy 
bid/offer quantity. Equation (5.11) is the power balance constraint between supply and 
demand for each µVPP. Equation (5.12) and (5.13) set the upper limit of upward and 
downward spinning reserve that are available from each generator. In addition, the 
production of upward or downward spinning reserve capacity should also abide by the 
output power limit and ramping limit as indicated by (5.14) - (5.15) and (5.16) - (5.17) 
respectively. Equation (5.18) explains that the upward reserve capacity offer is originated 
from ramping up the generator output. Similarly, constraints (5.19) explains that the 




5.3.2 Lower-Level Problem – DSO Social Welfare Maximisation 
The objective function of the LL problem is formulated as: 
( ) ( )
( )}
, , , , , , , ,
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− × − × +
∑
  (5.20) 
where the term , ,
E E
i t i tqλ × stands for the consumer benefit if the thi µVPP acts as consumer in 
the energy market during period t (the value of clearing quantity ,
E
i tq is positive for consumer 
µVPP). If the µVPP acts as producer, the term , ,
E E
i t i tqλ− × represents the production cost (the 
value of clearing quantity ,
E
i tq is negative for producer µVPP). The term ( ), , ,R ULOC RUi t i t i tC qλ + × is 
the production cost of the thi µVPP in the upward reserve market, in which the marginal cost 
consists of the reserve offer price ,
R
i tλ and lost opportunity cost ,
ULOC
i tC . Similarly, the term
( ), , ,R DLOC RDi t i t i tC qλ + × is the production cost of the thi µVPP in the downward reserve market. 
The production costs of traditional retailer in both energy and reserve market are also 
included and they are calculated as
RE RE
t tqλ and ( )RR RRU RRDt t tq qλ × + respectively. The social 
welfare of the market clearing process is then derived by deducting the overall production 
cost from the total consumer benefit. 
The LL objective function (5.20) subjects to the following constraints: 
, ,
E E E
t i t t i tλ λ λ≤ ≤ ∀ ∀                              (5.21) 
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          (5.30) 
As for constraints, equation (5.21) - (5.22) define the upper and lower limits of the bid/offer 
prices in the energy market and reserve market respectively. Equation (5.23) describes the 
relationship between clearing quantity and bid/offer quantity for the thi µVPP in the energy 
market: if the µVPP acts as energy producer during period t, it is possible that its offer 
quantity will be not accepted, partially accepted or fully accepted. If the µVPP acts as 
energy consumer during period t, then its bid quantity will be fully satisfied under any 
condition. The same rules apply for the reserve offer quantities submitted by the thi µVPP 
during period t as equation (5.24) - (5.25) indicate. If the energy and reserve capacities 
produced by µVPPs can’t meet the demand, the rest will be provided by traditional retailers 
as equation (5.26) - (5.29) describe. The concept of lost opportunity cost is included in 
equality constraint (5.30). It is defined as the difference in net compensation for µVPPs 




would have received for providing energy only [141]. For those µVPPs who decide to 
reserve some of their capacities for upward regulation service during the period when 
energy market clearing price
E
tC (£/kWh) is higher than the energy offer price ,
E
i tλ (£), they 
would have received an added revenue at price ,
ULOC
i tC (£/kWh) if the reserved capacities were 
sold as energy offers. Similarly, if the energy market clearing price
E
tC (£/kWh) is lower than 
the energy offer price ,
E
i tλ (£) and the µVPPs’ output is still raised uneconomically to provide 
downward regulation, they should receive compensation at price ,
DLOC
i tC (£/kWh) for the extra 
energy output that will not bring any profit given the low market clearing price. 
The bilevel EPEC formulation above demonstrates a highly-coupled nature of the 
decision-making process for both market participants and the DSO: In UL problem, µVPPs 
derive their optimal bidding/offering strategies and schedule their DERs’ generation based 
on the maximisation of individual profit, in which the quantities of energy/reserve 
transactions are priced at the clearing prices determined in LL problem. In LL problem, the 
DSO derives the clearing prices and quantities based on the maximisation of social welfare, 
in which the clearing quantities of energy/reserve transactions are priced at the original 
bid/offer prices from UL problem. The highly-coupled nature requires the UL problem and 
LL problem to be solved simultaneously. However, due to the pessimistic assumption that 
µVPPs do not have any knowledge of the acceptance for their bids/offers, it is hard to utilise 
KKT conditions and transform the bilevel EPEC problem into a single-level problem [142]. 




5.4 Finding Market Equilibrium using A Coevolutionary 
Approach 
To solve the bilevel EPEC formulated in Section 5.3, this section proposes a bilevel 
coevolutionary algorithm with real-coded Genetic Algorithm (GA) Operators including 
selection, crossover and mutation. Under the coevolutionary framework, a µVPP is 
represented by a “species” i in the ecosystem and the total number of species NI corresponds 
to the total number of µVPPs participating in ADSM. The “individual” of the species i is 
defined as the operation strategy set{ }, ,, , , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , , ,E R E RU RD Gen Gen up Gen dwi t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tP P P P o u v r rλ λ  of 
the thi µVPP for a scheduling period of 24 hours. For species i in the kth iteration, there are
NS number of individuals ,
i
k sInd which constitute a “population”
i
kPop . The UL and LL 
objective functions are utilised as two separate fitness functions to assess the quality of the 
operation strategy set represented by individuals ,
i
k sInd . While the UL fitness function 
determines the fittest individual that brings the maximum profit for species i among the 
entire population, the LL fitness function provides a shared domain for all species to interact 
with one another. After NK number of iterations, the coevolutionary algorithm aims at 
finding the pure strategy NE set ( )*, ,ik sInd i∀ for all species. The pure strategy NE satisfy the 
following conditions: 
( )( ) ( )*, ,UL i UL ii k s i k sf Ind f Ind i≥ ∀              (5.31) 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )* * *, , , ,| |LL i i LL i ik s k s k s k sf Ind Ind f Ind Ind i− −≥ ∀          (5.32) 




pure strategy NE set ( )*, ,ik sInd i∀ . It is the fittest individual among the entire population that 
brings the maximum profit. Condition (5.32) states the LL optimality of the pure strategy 
NE: if the rest of the species i− find their UL optimal strategy set ( )*, ,ik sInd i− ∀ − , the pure 
strategy NE ( )*, ,ik sInd i∀ is the best response for species i . No single µVPP can obtain a 
higher margin by deviating unilaterally from its pure strategy NE profile without decreasing 
the social welfare of the ADSM. 
5.4.1 Building Blocks of the Coevolutionary Algorithm 
Initialisation 
At the beginning of the iterative process, all elements in the individual strategy string 0,
i
sInd
are initialised with their real value to form the initial population 0
i
Pop . The randomly 
generated value should comply with its upper and lower limits defined in constraints (5.2) - 
(5.19) and (5.21) - (5.22). Firstly, the binary variables , , ,, ,i t i t i to u v are initialised subject to 
constraints (5.2) - (5.6). Based on the derived operation variable ,i to and constraints (5.7) - 
(5.9), the DG output ,
Gen
i tP is initialised. Then the value of energy bid/offer quantity ,
E
i tP can be 
derived based on constraints (5.10) - (5.11). After ,
Gen
i tP is settled, constraints (5.12) - (5.17) 
and (5.18) - (5.19) initialise the value of available reserve capacities
, ,
, ,/
Gen up Gen dw
i t i tr r and 
reserve offer quantities , ,/
RU RD
i t i tP P respectively. Finally, the bid/offer prices for energy ,
E
i tλ and 
for reserve ,
R





The aim of selection in the coevolution paradigm is to form a mating pool of individuals for 
reproduction. Fitter individuals have a higher chance to pass on their profile to the 
succeeding iteration and the offspring will in turn have even higher fitness. The proposed 
coevolutionary algorithm uses an elitism-based tournament selection method in which some 
of the fittest individuals could transfer their unaltered profile to their offspring [126]. In 
addition to the computationally efficient tournament selection method, elitism concept is 
applied in this thesis to improve the performance of the algorithm by preventing loss of 
good solutions. To select fitter individuals for species i , firstly the rest of the species i− must 
choose their best individual set ( )*, ,ik sInd i− ∀ − based on UL optimality. Then the individual
,
i
k sInd from current population
i
kPop can be evaluated with LL optimality as criterion. The 
elite individuals of species i are those with high LL fitness value, in other words, they 
represent the best response of the thi µVPP given the strategies of the others. The selection 
process will then run several “tournaments” among the non-elite individuals, after which the 
non-elites with low LL fitness value are removed from the mating pool. 
Crossover 
For the selected individuals in the mating pool, crossover operation randomly chooses a 
position and the parts of two parent individuals at the position are exchanged to form two 
offspring. In the proposed coevolutionary algorithm, every individual has 24 points in its 
strategy string which corresponds to the scheduling horizon of 24 hours. A multi-point 
crossover scheme is applied in this thesis which means every hour is a potential point for 




strategy string{ }, ,, , , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , , ,E R E RU RD Gen Gen up Gen dwi t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tP P P P o u v r rλ λ of both parents will be 
exchanged. However, the crossover operation may be disruptive to the parents’ genetic 
profile because the new strategy string at hour t may conflict with the original strings at 
hour t-1 and t+1. Therefore, the crossover operation should be supervised by constraints 
(5.2) - (5.19). 
Mutation 
After crossover operation updates the individuals in the mating pool, there is a small 
probability for the algorithm to perform mutation operation on updated individuals. This GA 
operator will randomly choose a position of the individual and change the value of the string 
to another value within its feasible region. The probability of mutation is small but the 
operation itself is indispensable because it helps the search evade local optimums and 
prevents premature convergence [143]. When mutation happens at hour t, an element will be 
chosen randomly from the strategy string
{ }, ,, , , , , , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , , ,E R E RU RD Gen Gen up Gen dwi t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tP P P P o u v r rλ λ and changed to another feasible value. 
Similarly, the mutation process should also be supervised by constraints (5.2) - (5.19). 
Energy and Reserve Market Clearing 
The process of energy and reserve market clearing determines the market clearing price, at 
which the transactions of energy/reserve capacities are priced; and the market clearing 
quantities, which are assigned to producers to dispatch their generation resources. The offers 




increasing supply curve and the bids from consumer µVPPs are aggregated as a 
monotonically decreasing demand curve. At each hour, the energy market is cleared first by 
finding the intersection of supply and demand curves. The price at the intersection is defined 
as energy market clearing price
E
tC . Then the lost opportunity cost , ,/
ULOC DLOC
i t i tC C are 
obtained based on equation (5.30). By matching the supply quantity to the demand quantity 
as constraints (5.23) and (5.27) suggest, the market clearing quantities , /
E RE
i t tq q are derived 
for µVPPs and retailers respectively. The DSO then clears the reserve market following the 
same procedure and derives the following results: reserve market clearing prices /RU RDt tC C , 
market clearing quantities , ,/
RU RD
i t i tq q for µVPPs and /
RRU RRD
t tq q for retailers. The only 
difference between energy market clearing and reserve market clearing is that the reserve 
demand is a fixed level in every scheduling period, which is represented by a straight line 
perpendicular to the price axis. The market clearing process represents the LL problem and 
the maximum social welfare is achieved at the intersection of supply and demand curves. 




5.4.2 Procedure of the Coevolutionary Algorithm 
 
Fig. 28 Coevolutionary algorithm workflow 
The workflow of coevolutionary algorithm in this thesis is shown in Fig. 28. Detailed 
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Step 1) Initialise the first population for each species i . There are NI number of populations 
and each population
i
kPop contains NS number of individuals; 
Step 2) Perform energy/reserve market clearing, obtain UL and LL fitness value of the 
individuals in the first population; 
Step 3) Based on the UL and LL fitness value of the individuals in the previous iteration, 
perform selection, crossover and mutation to form new population
i
kPop ; 
Step 4) Perform energy/reserve market clearing, obtain UL and LL fitness value of the 
individuals in the current population; 




Ind with the highest UL fitness and 




Ind with the highest LL fitness; 
Step 6) Repeat Step 3) to Step 5) until ( ) ( ), ,
UL LL
i i
k s k s
Ind Ind= is achieved for every species 
simultaneously, output pure strategy NE ( )*, ,ik sInd i∀ . The strict equality of the 
convergence criteria is relaxed by a very small tolerance of 0.02. It means that for 
the two strategy sets which achieve UL and LL optimality respectively, they can be 
regarded as the same strategy and the convergence is achieved when the difference 
between them does not exceed 2%. The criterion is derived based on the pure 




5.5 Comparative Case Studies 
In the comparative performance study, the effectiveness of the proposed coevolutionary 
approach in finding the equilibrium is investigated and demonstrated. Also, the operation 
behaviours of a single µVPP under different market structures are analysed, addressing the 
advantages of the proposed ADSM over the current DSM and PDSM. The UK retail energy 
price and reserve price are extracted from Nord Pool price data 2016 [134]. A modified 
IEEE 33 bus distribution system is used and presented in Fig. 29. the supply and demand 
nodes of the example system are aggregated into four µVPPs to form the oligopolistic 
ADSM.  
 
Fig. 29 Modified IEEE 33 bus distribution system model with aggregated µVPPs 
µVPP1 (node 23 to 25) has an average hourly demand of 930kW and DER capacity of 




node 33) has a similar hourly demand of 860kW and DER capacity of 860kW, but its RES 
capacity accounts for only 30% of the DER. µVPP3 (node 1 to node 18) has the highest 
hourly demand of 1445kW, the highest RES capacity of 1500kW and the highest DG 
capacity of 1500kW. µVPP4 (node 19 to node 22) has a small demand level of 360kW and 
no DER assets. The four µVPPs presented in the case studies represent the typical types of 
DER resource allocation: µVPP1 and µVPP2 can be viewed as prosumers, one is equipped 
with more RES than DG and the other has more DG than RES. µVPP3 is a major producer 
in the market and a main competitor for the traditional suppliers. µVPP4 is a pure consumer 
but it can participate in the market by pricing its demand strategically. By assigning 
different profiles to the participating µVPPs, this thesis studies the impact on µVPPs’ 
bidding strategies brought by DER and RES penetration level. 
For the parameters of the coevolutionary approach, the population size, crossover rate and 
mutation rate are set as 60, 0.8 and 0.1 respectively. Although the correlation between the 
population size and the solution speed remains debatable, references [127-131] showed that 
convergence of the coevolutionary algorithm could be achieved relatively fast if the 
population size is set to be 5 to 10 times the number of decision variables. The high 
crossover rate is chosen to give more genetic diversity within the population, promoting the 
search for new feasible solutions. The low mutation rate prevents the coevolutionary process 
from degrading to random search and improve the computation efficiency [143]. The 
operation problems in the current DSM and PDSM are formulated as MILP and solved 




is coded in MATLAB and solved using embedded solvers. The equilibrium of ADSM is 
found after executing 253 coevolutionary iterations for 14 hours, however, the proposed 
method delivers pure strategy NE under strict convergence criteria described in section 5.4. 
5.5.1 Case A – Consumer µVPP in the Current DSM 
Under the market structure of the current DSM, any µVPP is a pure consumer regardless of 
their DER portfolio. The DG assets are forbidden to actively offer energy nor reserve 
capacity to the distribution system market. The surplus RES outputs can be fed into the main 
grid at FIT. In the current DSM, an optimal energy dispatch is performed for µVPP3 which 
aims at minimising the energy cost and the operation strategy is depicted in Fig. 30. 
 
Fig. 30 Operation strategy of µVPP3 in current DSM 
As shown in Fig. 30, µVPP3 submits nearly no energy bid to the market. This µVPP is 
operated autonomously from the grid due to its large DER capacity and it is degraded to a 
MG. During the period of 9 a.m. to 23 p.m., the demand inside µVPP3 is satisfied by the 
combined output of RES and DG since the generation cost is lower than the retail energy 




rated value of 1500kW, showing a poor utilisation of the DER capacity. This is because 
DER generation is restricted to be consumed inside µVPP under the current DSM instead of 
exported for extra revenue. 
5.5.2 Case B – Price-taking Prosumer µVPP in PDSM 
 
Fig. 31 Offering strategy of µVPP in PDSM: (a) energy market; (b) reserve market 
Under the market structure of PDSM, µVPP is permitted to submit quantity bids/offers to 
the market for revenue. However, they do not participate in settling the clearing prices of 
both energy and reserve markets. The bidding/offering strategy of µVPP3 in PDSM is 
shown in Fig. 31. 
As a price-taker, one market player (µVPP or retailer) has no strategic advantage over the 
others because they provide a homogenous product. For DSO, it makes no difference to 
accept the offer from a µVPP or from a traditional retailer. Consequently, the offering 
strategy of a producer µVPP can be characterised as “aggressive” (AGG) or “conservative” 
(CONS). In Fig. 31(a), µVPP3 can submit aggressive energy offers to the market by keeping 




profit. Alternatively, µVPP3 operates conservatively and submits no energy offers. The DG 
is utilised only for the demand inside µVPP3 thus the operation cost can be reduced to 
minimum. Fig. 31(b) demonstrates similar behaviours in the reserve market: aggressive 
µVPP would use the ramping capability of its DG to make upward and downward reserve 
offers to the market while conservative µVPP would offer nothing. In a non-cooperative 
PDSM environment, price-taking prosumer µVPPs have a hard time determining their 
optimal offering strategies because they lack the market power to influence the market 
outcome. Consequently, their revenue from the market would vary significantly from the 
anticipation. 
5.5.3 Case C – Price-making µVPP in ADSM 
Under the framework of ADSM, µVPPs are permitted to submit price-quantity bids/offers to 
the markets. The proposed coevolutionary approach achieves pure strategy NE for all 
participants in the market. No single µVPP can obtain a higher margin by deviating 
unilaterally from its pure strategy NE profile without decreasing the social welfare of the 






Fig. 32 Energy bidding/offering strategies in ADSM: (a) bid quantity a.m.; (b) bid price a.m.;  
(c) bid quantity p.m.; (d) bid price p.m. 
µVPPs’ behaviours in terms of bid price are analysed together with their bid quantities. 
µVPP1 and µVPP2 have similar DER capacity and they both act as energy consumers for 
the first half of the day as Fig. 32(a) indicates. However, µVPP2 has a larger percentage of 
DG capacity in its DER which results in lesser dependence on the imported energy. 
Therefore Fig. 32(b) shows that µVPP2 tends to bid a lower price for its energy import 
compared with µVPP1 knowing it can always produce its own energy even the bid is 
rejected. µVPP3 acts as a pure producer in the ADSM to compete with traditional retailers. 
To gain strategic advantage, Fig. 32(b) shows high bid price at 9 a.m. when µVPP3 exports 
low volume and low bid price during 0 a.m. to 8 a.m. when it exports high volume. µVPP4 
is a pure consumer in the ADSM and has similar load level with µVPP2 as Fig. 32(a) shows. 
However, the lack of self-generation assets forces µVPP4 to bid a higher price than µVPP2 
as Fig. 32(b) depicts. Fig. 32(c) and Fig. 32(d) describe the energy bidding/offering 
behaviours for the second half of the day. A peak point of energy bid price trajectories is 




clearing process. At 18 p.m., the aggregated demand of µVPP1, µVPP2 and µVPP4 exceeds 
the supply quantity offered by µVPP3. In this case, traditional retailers must supply some or 
all the demand at its peak retail price £0.37/kWh. For consumer µVPPs, they tend to submit 
higher bid price to guarantee the acceptance of their demand bids; for producer µVPP3, it 
needs to submit a lower bid price £0.2/kWh to occupy some of the supplier market share. 
For DSO who aims at maximising social welfare, the bidding/offering strategies at 18 p.m. 
produce the highest consumer benefit and the lowest production cost. To sum up, the 
bidding/offering strategies obtained by the coevolutionary approach have achieved UL and 
LL optimality simultaneously. 
Fig. 33(a) and Fig. 33Fig. 33(b) display µVPPs’ offering strategies of upward reserve 
capacity while Fig. 33(c) and Fig. 33(d) show µVPPs’ offering strategies of downward 
reserve capacity. For upward reserve market, only µVPP2 and µVPP3 have the DG large 
enough to provide upward ramping resources. Their bid prices in Fig. 33(b) follows the 
economic rationale to compete with traditional retailers: bid high price when the reserve 
production is low and bid low price when the reserve production is high. The same rule 
applies to determining the downward reserve offer price shown in Fig. 33(d) as µVPP1-3 






Fig. 33 Reserve offering strategies in ADSM: (a) upward offer quantity; (b) upward offer price;  
(d) downward offer quantity; (d) downward offer price 
To address the advantage of deploying an ADSM in the distribution system, the impact of 
different market structures on µVPP operation is demonstrated in Table XIII. Six criterions 
are used to characterise µVPP3 in the current DSM, PDSM and the proposed ADSM 
respectively: DG utilisation rate is calculated as the ratio of the average DG output power 
over its rated power; Energy market income is the revenue received from µVPP’s energy 
offers which are settled at market clearing price; Reserve market income is the revenue 
received from µVPP’s reserve offers which are settled at market clearing price; 




energy consumption; DG cost calculates the operation cost of µVPP’s self-generation assets; 
finally total profit is the net revenue of µVPP from market activities. 
TABLE XIII IMPACT OF MARKET STRUCTURES ON µVPP3'S OPERATION AND PROFIT 
              Framework 
Result 
 Current DSM PDSM ADSM 
DG utilisation (%)  5% 5% - 65% 31% 
Energy market income (£)  114.36 114.36 – 2800.86 1360.75 
Reserve market income (£)  0 0 – 12508 282.33 
End-consumer income (£)  4012.9 4012.9 3960.7 
DG cost (£)  390.53 390.53 – 1955 1339.4 
Total profit (£)  3736.73 3736.73 – 17366.76 4264.38 
Under the current DSM structure, consumer µVPP only receives an insignificant payment 
for exporting its excessive RES generation back to grid at feed-in tariff. The DER assets 
within µVPP are utilised poorly and their capacities are not exploited to generate extra 
revenue. The energy market income of the µVPP comes entirely from feeding the surplus 
RES back to the grid and it is the lowest (£114.36) of all three market types. The reserve 
market income is zero because the ramping capability of the DG is not exploited to provide 
regulation services. The optimal energy dispatch strategy for the µVPP under the current 
DSM does yield a minimum DG cost, however, it is still not favourable for such a large DG 
capacity installed in the µVPP3. The PDSM structure shows a promising range of DG 
utilisation rate up to 65% and a profit that could be four times higher than that of the current 
DSM. However, these improvements are based on an optimistic anticipation that all the 
aggressive offers will be accepted by the DSO. As price-takers, µVPP under PDSM has no 




market may deviate considerably from the anticipation (from £114.36 to £2800.86). The 
uncertainty grows even severe in the reserve market in which the projected profit of an 
aggressive strategy yields £12508 and the profit of a conservative strategy is zero. Therefore, 
the market structure of PDSM is impractical for µVPP to make a reliable decision if the 
rivals’ information is shielded from each participant. On the other hand, the framework of 
ADSM gives µVPP market power to obtain reliable bidding/offering strategies that lead to 
secured net profit. Compared with the current DSM, µVPP3’s offering strategy at the NE 
point shows a good DG utilisation rate of 31% and a considerable 14% increase (from 
£114.36 to £4264.38) in the total profit. Above all, the projected return on investment will 





This chapter has established a novel application of an active distribution system market 
(ADSM) which allows µVPPs to submit price-quantity bids/offers of both energy and 
reserve resources. Market power has been granted to the DER assets by involving their 
owners in the price-making process of the retail electricity market. A bilevel EPEC 
formulation has been presented to model the operation of both energy and reserve market at 
the distribution level, addressing the maximisation of all µVPPs’ profit and the 
maximisation of social welfare at the same time. A coevolutionary approach has been 
successfully applied for the first time to derive the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a 
non-cooperative game under the market framework of ADSM. The application of 
coevolutionary approach in this context has two unique advantages: firstly, the approach 
contains straightforward translation of various bid types, market settlement rules and 
participant configurations. The construction of the algorithm is intuitive and does not 
require additional assumptions which could be unrealistic in practice (e.g. KKT method 
often assumes the supplier offers exactly the amount of required demand). Secondly, the 
coevolutionary approach relies on repeated search and evaluation to improve the solution 
quality. Considering that the solution does not have to be a global optimum but rather a 
strategy NE to guide the operation, the proposed coevolutionary approach is as effective as 
the conventional method while maintaining the simplicity of the model (i.e. it does not 




Comparative case studies have been carried out to investigate µVPPs’ operation strategies 
under different market frameworks of the current DSM, PDSM and ADSM. The 
configuration of µVPPs in terms of their DER capacity and RES capacity has been proved 
to be a major factor that influences the strategic bidding/offering behaviours. The proposed 
ADSM structure guarantees that each µVPP can receive the promised profit by exercising 
its market power. This advantage is non-discriminatory to µVPPs with different DER 
configurations and it is valuable real market practice when the rivals’ information is 
shielded from each other. Simulation results have pointed out that the behaviours of µVPPs 
in energy and reserve market under three different frameworks, even for those with the same 
DER/RES capacities, can be significantly different from one another. Compared with the 
current DSM, the deployment of ADSM can better exploit the DER assets and generate 
higher returns on investment. Compared with PDSM, the framework of ADSM provides a 
secured anticipation of the profit and can better guide µVPP owners to make 
bidding/offering decisions. 
The proposed ADSM is a promising market framework that can accommodate the emerging 
µVPPs in the current distribution system. By introducing them as new entries to the local 
energy and reserve markets, the retail segments of electricity will be further liberalised and 
ultimately end-consumers will benefit from a diversified electricity supply. The proposed 
EPEC formulation and its coevolutionary solution provide valuable guidance for µVPP 




CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND            
FUTURE RESEARCH WORK 
6.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated a plan that matches both short-term and long-term goals of a 
better integration of DERs into the energy supply: to achieve higher utilisation of the 
installed capacity; to generate higher revenue by participating in the retail electricity 
markets and to mitigate the risks associated with the supply adequacy and profit deviation 
caused by ill-advised bidding strategy. The concept of micro virtual power prosumer (µVPP) 
has been proposed to include MGs and VPPs that are connected to the restructured 
distribution system. µVPP is defined as an extension to the MG concept and the DERs 
located within the µVPP have a capacity that can either cover part of the load or generate 
excess electricity to be consumed by other µVPPs. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 has demonstrated 
multiple stages for the µVPP to evolve from a home-oriented energy management system to 
a market-oriented prosumer, where the incentives for the µVPP has also shifted from 
receiving compensation to creating profits. The µVPP design presented in this thesis has 
three contributions: It has addressed the link between a sustainable business and the role of 
the µVPP as MG, price-taking prosumer or price-making prosumer; it has identified a set of 
requirements to deliver technically sound and economically beneficial solutions; and it has 




the future development. In addition, the performances of the µVPP have been analysed on 
both simulation platforms and industrial test sites, which makes the economic analysis more 
persuasive and gives credibility for the prediction of market trends. 
The evolution towards market-oriented µVPPs consists of three progressive steps: Chapter 3 
has designed and implemented a home-oriented µVPP where the downstream DER assets 
including RES, ESS and DR are actively managed to achieve optimised local power flow 
and provide limited regulation services to the upstream distribution networks. Chapter 4 has 
upgraded the µVPP to a price-taker and incorporated it into the distribution system market, 
where the µVPP can actively bid and offer in the energy-reserve pool to pursue profit after 
considering its uncertainties. Chapter 5 has summarised the pros and cons of the business 
patterns proposed in the previous chapters and upgraded the µVPP again to a price-maker in 
the distribution system market, where the µVPP can secure a profitable margin by 
participating in the price settlement. There are three phases in each of the steps: a 
preliminary phase to define the scope and boundaries in the context of technological 
constraints and economic policies; a development phase to construct the hardware and 
software layers of the solution, especially the algorithmic workflow of the optimisation 
schemes; finally, a follow-up activity phase to analyse the performance of the proposed 
solution and identify any obstacles towards implementation. 
The first step is the development of a configurable µVPP with managed energy services. In 
the preliminary phase, the µVPP design has recognised the diversity of the DER assets 




surcharge scheme has been noticed and exploited to develop the load shedding function. The 
scope of this step is to design the HEMS with generic algorithm architecture to facilitate 
different types of energy services and find out how much the bill savings are for the 
end-consumers and how fast the investors can recoup their investment. In the development 
stage, a ESS and a wireless-based home area network have been designed, manufactured 
and installed. The HEMS algorithm of the µVPP has adopted FLC-based strategy and 
delivered real-time control signals. In the follow-up phase, the unique function of each 
energy service has been demonstrated and the economic analysis has been carried out to 
distinguish those services in terms of electricity bill savings, asset utilisation rate and 
payback period. This part of the work has demonstrated that both end-consumers and 
investors could benefit more from the active response of µVPP to the electricity price 
dynamics. The proposed µVPP has a feasible business pattern than can recoup the upfront 
cost before ESS reaches its life span. 
The second step is the development of a price-taking µVPP in a passive distribution system 
market (PDSM), where the µVPP contributes its energy and reserve flexibilities to the local 
pool and makes profit. In the preliminary stage, the µVPP design has recognised the 
uncertainties in the RES generation, load forecasting and price forecasting and the 
associated risks that could lead to undesirable load loss. Therefore, a two-stage settlement 
market has been adopted to combine the realisation of uncertain RT situations and the 
deterministic DA scheduling problem. Uncertain µVPP portfolio has been delivered by a 




repeated sampling has been conducted to generate a large number of scenarios based on a 
realistic (i.e. adopted in practice by California ISO) truncated normal distribution of the 
uncertain parameters. Then the scenario reduction algorithm has selected a small number of 
the original scenarios to hasten the computation speed while maintaining the probabilistic 
distribution of the selected sample. To mitigate the real-world risk of involuntary loss of 
load in the RT operation, chance-constrained method has been utilised to incorporate the 
precautions into the DA scheduling where adequate ramping capacity of the dispatchable 
generation is reserved to supply the load should the risk arise in RT. In the follow-up phase, 
various case studies have been carried out to analyse the impact of the uncertainties, the 
impact of network congestion, the impact of carbon tax policy and to address the advantages 
of the proposed chance-constrained method. This part of the work has provided strategic 
propositions for price-taking µVPP to seek increased revenue while enhancing the ability to 
meet peak demand. Conclusion has also been drawn that the increment of profit by 
narrowing down the forecast errors is not guaranteed to be gradual therefore rash expansion 
of the RES may not deliver the expected rise in revenue. In addition, the findings have 
pointed out a passive distribution system market is still manipulated by the current 
compensation policies and market power should be given to the µVPPs to encourage the 
diversification of the DERs. 
Following the argument in the second step, the third step is the development of 
price-making µVPPs in an active distribution market (ADSM), where the µVPPs submit 




electricity suppliers. In the preliminary phase, the ADSM has been distinguished from the 
current DSM and PDSM based on its non-cooperative nature and the “price-maker” role of 
µVPPs. The scope of this step is to solve the market equilibrium of the proposed ADSM 
which consists of the bidding strategies of all market participants and the market clearing 
results. In the development phase, bilevel equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints 
(EPEC) have been utilised to form the ADSM model with upper-level problems that 
maximise each µVPP’s profit and a lower-level problem that maximises the social welfare 
of the market clearing. A novel application of the coevolutionary approach has been 
successfully implemented to find the market equilibrium. In the follow-up phase, the 
behaviours of the µVPP in different market structures have been compared, addressing the 
advantages of the ADSM setup. This part of the work is the unique contribution towards the 
body of new knowledge and it has demonstrated the benefits of the proposed ADSM: 
µVPPs with their different configurations of DERs can receive the projected profit as 
promised by pricing their bids strategically. The strengths of the coevolutionary approach 
has also been demonstrated: it preserves the realistic interpretation of the non-cooperative 
market where the rivals’ information is kept from each other; it could be applied to market 
with various bid types and complex clearing rules; the approach is based on intuitive, 
repeated search and evaluation to improve the solution quality and it can effectively produce 




6.2 Future Research Work 
Based on the progress presented in this thesis, the future research efforts could be dedicated 
to the following aspects. 
Firstly, in the development of a configurable µVPP with managed energy services, there are 
three improvements could be made in the future:  
• Firstly, more detailed modelling could be applied to the controllable loads with 
consideration for the thermo-dynamics of the building and the driving patterns of the 
EV owners. Currently the physical constraints of both EVs and eHeat Pumps take 
the form of minimum up and down times, but more specified physical boundaries 
such as the required temperatures should be applied. Once the metering system has 
added devices such as smart thermostats, this improvement could be easily 
implemented.  
• Secondly, the EVs in the µVPP could be utilised as both controllable appliances and 
energy storages through a bi-directional charging/discharging scheme. Currently the 
EVs are utilised as pure load blocks but the bi-directional scheme could improve the 
total ESS capacity significantly within the µVPP and yield more savings.  
• Thirdly, in the development of price-taking µVPPs in the passive distribution system 
market, the case studies could include the results from robust optimisation or CVaR 




Additionally, in the development of ADSM and the price-making µVPPs, the quality 
of the market equilibrium solution could be further improved by considering the 
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